Bishop v. Kelly, 13051

• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Writing for the Court: Before PETERS; PETERS
• Citation: 206 Conn. 608,539 A.2d 108
• Parties: Jon BISHOP et al. v. James J. KELLY.
• Docket Number: No. 13051,13051
• Decision Date: 22 March 1988

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539 A.2d 108 206 Conn. 608 Jon BISHOP et al.
v.
James J. KELLY. No. 13051. Supreme Court of Connecticut. Argued Jan. 6, 1988.
Decided March 22, 1988.

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[206 Conn. 609] J. Kevin Golger, with whom was Joyce Riccio, Bridgeport, for appellant (defendant).

Paul A. Sobel, with whom, on the brief, was Robert K. Lesser, Bridgeport, for appellee (plaintiff Elyse L. Dalton).

Before [206 Conn. 608] PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, CALLAHAN and HULL, JJ.

[206 Conn. 609] PETERS, Chief Justice.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether General Statutes § 14-295, ¹ which allows a trial [206 Conn. 610] court to double or treble the damages awarded by a jury in tort actions involving violations of the rules of the road, infringes the right to trial by jury under the Connecticut constitution. After trial, a jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, Elyse L. Dalton, in the amount of $60,000. ² In accordance with the plaintiff's motion for double or treble damages, the trial court rendered a judgment doubling these damages, from which the defendant, James J. Kelly, appeals. We find error and remand to the trial court with direction to render a judgment in the amount of $60,000.

This action arose out of an automobile accident that occurred on January 21, 1979, in Newtown. The jury could reasonably have found that at the time of the accident the defendant, traveling on route 25, in the opposite direction from that of the plaintiff, drove his car so as to cross the median of the highway and to strike the car of the plaintiff. In addition, the plaintiff presented evidence that, at the time of the accident, the defendant had been driving above the speed limit and was intoxicated. The accident resulted in severe injuries to the plaintiff.

Before the commencement of trial, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint seeking double or treble damages pursuant to § 14-295. Accordingly, after the close of the evidence, she filed a timely motion asking the court to submit interrogatories to the jury "for specific findings of fact upon which the Court may decide [whether to award] increased damages." In response to the special interrogatories, the jury found that the defendant had violated General Statutes § 14-230, captioned "Driving in Right Hand Lane," and that the violation[206 Conn. 611] was the sole proximate cause of the accident. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $60,000, and was subsequently discharged. After a hearing, the trial court, over objection by the defendant, granted the plaintiff's motion, doubling the verdict to $120,000, and rendered judgment in that amount.

On appeal the defendant's claims of error are directed only to the trial court's doubling of the verdict pursuant to § 14-295. He argues that the trial court erred in determining that: (1) § 14-295 is not unconstitutionally vague under the state and federal constitutions; (2) § 14-295 does not violate the defendant's right to a trial by jury under the state constitution; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to support an award of double damages. Because we agree with the defendant that § 14-295 violates his right to trial by jury, we conclude that the award of double damages must be set aside without regard to the

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sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's decision. I

We consider first the defendant's argument that the statute is void for vagueness, since our interpretation of § 14-295 is relevant to the resolution of the defendant's claim that the issues he raises implicate his right to trial by jury. See Seals v. Hickey, 186 Conn. 337, 341-49, 441 A.2d 604 (1982). Due process of law under our state and federal constitutions requires that "a statute afford a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is permitted or prohibited." McKinney v. Coventry, 176 Conn. 613, 618, 410 A.2d 453 (1979). To meet the mandate of due process, a statute must, in addition, " 'state its standard with adequate clarity and mark sufficiently distinct boundaries for the law to be fairly administered.' " Seals v. Hickey, supra, 186 Conn. at 344, 441 A.2d 604; State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 164, 425 A.2d 939 (1979). "Lack of precision[206 Conn. 612] however, is not, in or of itself, offensive to the requirement of due process." Seals v. Hickey, supra.

Section 14-295 provides that "[e]ach person who, by neglecting to conform to any provision of sections 14-230 to 14-242, inclusive, or section 14-245, or 14-247, causes any injury to the person or property of another, shall be liable to the party injured in double or treble damages if, in the discretion of the court in which any action is pending, double or treble damages are just, with the costs of such action." While the operation of § 14-295 is triggered only by a violation of §§ 14-230 to 14-242, inclusive, § 14-245 or § 14-247, such a violation does not automatically require the imposition of multiple damages; rather, the determination of whether double or treble damages are "just" is left to the discretion of the trial court.

The defendant claims that § 14-295 is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to provide fair warning of the standards of conduct that will determine whether double damages are "just." ³ He argues that the statute, by virtue of permitting the imposition of punitive damages, is penal in nature; see Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co., 127 Conn. 533, 537, 18 A.2d 357 (1941); and urges us to evaluate § 14-295 by the stricter standards that apply to penal statutes. See Seals v. Hickey, supra, 186 Conn. at 343, 441 A.2d 604. According to the defendant, under these standards of review, the statute is impermissibly vague in two ways: it provides no criteria for when multiple damages are "just" and it confers upon the court unfettered discretion to decide whether to impose any multiple damages at all.

[206 Conn. 613] Although it is undeniable that the statute, on its face, contains no standards for the imposition of multiple damages, the plaintiff contends that it meets constitutional muster because its interpretation in a number of Connecticut cases has added sufficient judicial gloss to provide the specificity that due process requires. See State v. Proto, 203 Conn. 682, 698, 526 A.2d 1297 (1987); Seals v. Hickey, supra, 186 Conn. at 344-49, 441 A.2d 604; State v. Pickering, 180 Conn. 54, 64, 428 A.2d 322 (1980). We agree.

In unbroken precedents dating back to 1913, judicial discretion to impose multiple damages under § 14-295 or its precursors has been held to be limited to cases where the record demonstrates more than ordinary negligence. Although its statutory designation has changed over time, § 14-295 has remained essentially unchanged since 1909. See Public Acts 1909, c. 268. ⁴ In an early interpretation, Justice

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Beach, dissenting from this court's refusal to apply a Massachusetts wrongful death statute as against public policy, observed with regard to a precursor and similar statutes imposing multiple damages that "[i]n all these cases the excess over actual damages is assessed because of the defendant's criminal, malicious or reckless conduct." Cristilly v. Warner, 87 Conn. 461, 469, 88 A. 711 (1913) (Beach, J., dissenting). Subsequently in Eustace v. Adley Express Co., 1 Conn.Sup. 58, 59 (1935), the Superior Court denied the plaintiff's motion seeking double or treble damages under a precursor of § 14-295, concluding that the defendant's violation of the rules of the road was [206 Conn. 614] not deliberate or reckless but "was the result simply of inadvertence...." The court observed: "The imposition of the penalty of double or treble damages should be reserved for cases which involve offenses more serious than simple negligence. Such a penalty should be imposed only where the violation of the rules of the road has been deliberate or at least under conditions which indicate that the defendant was conducting himself with reckless disregard of the rights of others." Id. In Goldfarb v. Bragg, 39 Conn.Sup. 228, 229, 475 A.2d 346 (1983), the Superior Court reaffirmed this interpretation, implying that the statute applied only to instances of "gross and culpable negligence." Finally, the Appellate Court, in considering whether the trial court's award of double damages had been proper, recently approved the construction given the statute in Eustace v. Adley Express Co., supra. Jack v. Scanlon, 4 Conn.App. 451, 455, 495 A.2d 1084, cert. dismissed, 197 Conn. 808, 499 A.2d...