Bishop v. Reno

• Decision Date: 24 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 98-4109,98-4109
• Citation: 210 F.3d 1295
• Parties: (11th Cir. 2000) William BISHOP, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Janet RENO, U.S. Attorney General, Director of the United States Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Bureau of Prisons, Warden, Dade County Jail, Federal Detention Center, Miami, U.S. Parole, Respondents-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1295

210 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2000)

William BISHOP, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Janet RENO, U.S. Attorney General Director of the United States Bureau of Prisons U.S. Bureau of Prisons, Warden, Dade County Jail Federal Detention Center, Miami, U.S. Parole, Respondents-Appellants.

No. 98-4109.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

April 24, 2000.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. (No. 96-02457-CV-FAM), Federico A. Moreno, Judge.

Before EDMONDSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and OWENS^*, Senior District Judge.

BIRCH, Circuit Judge:

This appeal requires us to determine whether a district court has subject matter jurisdiction to entertain habeas corpus relief for a foreign sentence of a United States citizen, who is serving the foreign sentence in the United States pursuant to treaty transfer. The district judge granted habeas relief and reduced the foreign sentence. We reverse and remand for dismissal.

I. BACKGROUND

In July, 1995, petitioner-appellee and United States citizen, William Bishop, was convicted by a Bahamian court of conspiracy to possess with intent to supply 1,956 pounds of marijuana. He was sentenced to a five-year term of imprisonment and an $80,000 fine. If Bishop failed to pay the fine by the end of this five-year term of imprisonment, then the Bahamian court sentenced him to serve an additional five years in prison "bringing the to[t]al imprisonment to 10 years." R1-1-Exh. A- 1.¹

In a March 22, 1996, letter to the Attorney General of the Bahamas, the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") requested that Bishop be transferred to the United States to serve the remainder of his sentence pursuant to the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Mar. 21, 1983, 35 U.S.T. 2867, T.I.A.S. No. 10824 (entered into force in the United States on July 1, 1985) ("Treaty"), to which the United States and the Bahamas are signatories. The DOJ letter specifically states that "[t]he United States will apply the 'continued enforcement' provision of the [Treaty] to the United States nationals transferred from the Bahamas to serve their sentences in the United States." R1-11-Exh. D, Attachment C. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. 4108, a United States magistrate judge conducted a hearing in the Bahamas that included Bishop and other similarly sentenced offenders to verify their consent to the transfer.

At this April 10, 1996, hearing, Bishop and the other convicted transferees were represented by an assistant federal public defender from the Southern District of New York. That counsel subsequently testified at an evidentiary hearing that he advised the transferees "that a sentence can only be modified or set aside by a proceeding brought in the Bahamas and not in the United States."² R2-9. During the hearing, the magistrate judge explained the consequences of the convicts' consent to transfer. He informed the sworn transferees collectively: "[Y]ou understand that your conviction or sentence can only be modified or set aside through appropriate proceedings brought by you, or on your behalf, in the Commonwealth of the Bahamas." R1-11-Exh. E-13. Bishop raised his hand acknowledging his understanding. Pursuant to individual questioning as to understanding of the result of the transfer, Bishop stated that he understood the consequences. See id. at 18. In the presence of the magistrate judge, Bishop additionally signed a verified consent form, showing his agreement to being transferred to the United States to serve the remainder of his Bahamian sentence.³

Because Bishop did not pay his imposed fine, the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") calculated his sentence to include the additional five-year incarceration ordered by the Bahamian court if the fine was not paid.⁴ This five-year term subsequently was translated by the United States Parole Commission ("Parole Commission") into supervised release.⁵ An assistant federal public defender in the Southern District of Florida wrote the BOP on Bishop's behalf that his imprisonment for his inability to pay his fine violated the United States Constitution under Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S.Ct. 668, 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1971). While the BOP acknowledged that a defendant's imprisonment because of his inability to pay a fine would be unconstitutional in the United States, it explained that "the sentence is enforceable in the United States as required by the treaty. The defendant was fully aware of, and accepted, the conditions under which the transfer was made." R1-1-Exh. D at 5 (BOP Bahamian Foreign Treaty Sentences memorandum). The BOP response further advised "that the defendant's method of relief should be taken up with the Bahamian courts or by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the federal court." Id. at 6.

The assistant federal public defender then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in federal court for the Southern District of Florida and asserted that a prison term imposed for indigence "may not be enforced and a federal court has authority to release an inmate from service of such an illegal sentence." R1-1-3. In a consolidated response for respondents Attorney General Janet Reno, the BOP Director, and the Federal Detention Center Warden, the government asserted that the district court was without jurisdiction under the Treaty to modify Bishop's Bahamian sentence. Because of his verified and documented consent to the conditions of his transfer to the United States to serve the remainder of his Bahamian sentence, the government alternatively argued that Bishop had waived his right to challenge his Bahamian sentence in a United States court.

Following two reports and recommendations by a magistrate judge that Bishop's habeas corpus petition be granted as well as an evidentiary hearing, the district judge conducted a status conference in Bishop's case and the other transferee cases presenting the same issue. With respect to Bishop, the following exchange occurred between the assistant federal public defender and the district judge:

[COUNSEL]: When Mr. Bishop filed his initial petition, he had a ten year sentence. The Parole Commission has reduced that to five years, which was the imprisonment relief he sought by way of this petition, but they tacked on a five year period of supervised release to follow.

As to Mr. Bishop, our request is for the Court to strike the five year period of supervised release which would make his sentence longer in effect.

THE COURT: What authority do I have to do that? I either vacate-you get the whole thing or nothing.

....

[COUNSEL]: You could. That is an alternative you have. You can either strike-you can vacate the treaty transfer determination of the Parole Commission completely. They can hold a new hearing or you can just strike that portion of it which offends the constitution which at this point is the supervised release portion of five years.

R3-4, 5 (emphasis added). The government maintained its position that the district judge was without jurisdiction to strike any part of Bishop's sentence based on his Bahamian sentence.

Thereafter, the district judge granted Bishop's habeas petition by striking the Bahamian five-year sentence for failure to pay his fine: "The terms of imprisonment that were imposed shall be ADAPTED, in accordance with the U.S.- Bahamas Treaty, Art. 10 2, Art. 9 3, to include only that portion of the sentence which was actually imposed, and not the remaining portion which is optional upon the payment of a fine." R1-36-2. Although Bishop has completed the incarceration portion of his sentence, he remains on supervised release pending this appeal. On appeal from the grant of habeas relief to Bishop, the government pursues its argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction to reduce Bishop's Bahamian sentence.⁶

II. DISCUSSION

Subject matter jurisdiction of the district court is a legal question that we review de novo. See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 846 (11th Cir.1996). "Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction" and "possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994); see Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 307, 115 S.Ct. 1493, 1498, 131 L.Ed.2d 403 (1995) (stating that the jurisdiction of "federal courts ... is grounded in, and limited by, statute"). "It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction." Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377, 114 S.Ct. at 1675 (citation omitted). "As courts of limited jurisdiction, the federal district courts possess no warrant to create jurisdictional law of their own." Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 711, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 2109, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982).

Questions of statutory and treaty interpretation present legal questions that are subject to plenary review. See United States v. MacAllister, 160 F.3d 1304, 1306 (11th Cir.1998) (per curiam), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 120 S.Ct. 318, 145 L.Ed.2d 114 (1999); United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir.1995). "[I]t is a well established axiom of statutory interpretation that in construing a statute, courts must first look to the plain meaning of the statute itself." Solis-Ramirez v. United States Dep't of Justice, 758 F.2d 1426, 1430 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam). "When the text of the statute is clear, our interpretive inquiry ends." Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 538, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 1035, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring). " 'In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.' " Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713, 95 S.Ct. 1893, 1898, 44 L.Ed.2d 525 (1...