Bishop v. United States, 18581.
Decision Date | 15 March 1961 |
Docket Number | No. 18581.,18581. |
Citation | 288 F.2d 525 |
Parties | Bill J. BISHOP, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
John F. Sheehy, Richey, Sheehy, Teeling & Cureton, Waco, Tex., for appellant.
Raymond N. Zagone, Roger P. Marquis, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Perry W. Morton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Russell B. Wine, U. S. Atty., San Antonio, Tex., Carl E. Mason, Asst. U. S. Atty., Waco, Tex., for appellee.
Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, BROWN, Circuit Judge, and CLAYTON, District Judge.
As this case comes to us once again, Bishop v. United States, 5 Cir., 1959, 266 F.2d 657, the question now relates to interest. Specifically the issue is whether interest is payable by the Government under the Declaration of Taking Act, 40 U.S.C.A. § 258a,1 for that period of time in which withdrawal of a deficiency deposit in the Registry is prohibited by the Court pursuant to the Government's motion. The District Court, without opinion, answered in the negative. We disagree and reverse.
The facts may be severely capsulated.2 At the time of the filing of the Declaration of Taking, May 27, 1954, a deposit of estimated compensation was made by the Government and withdrawn by the Owner in full. Thereafter hearings were held on valuation before a commissioner resulting in the determination of deficiency awards. The District Court confirmed the commissioner's awards and on July 11, 1955, entered judgments, as to each of the tracts, for the specified deficiency together "with interest thereon at the rate of six (6%) per cent per annum from May 27, 1954, until said sum, together with interest, has been deposited in the Registry of the Court." The funds were deposited on September 8, 1955, but were not then withdrawn. The Government gave notice of appeal and some time later withdrew it. The Owner filed a motion for interest during the pendency of the Government's notice of appeal. While this motion was pending, the Government filed on April 27, 1956, a motion on which the Court on April 30, 1956 entered an order, directing that the funds be retained in the Registry pending determination of the Government's claim that it, not Bishop, was the true owner by virtue of the facts discussed in our prior opinion, 266 F.2d 657. Two years later, March 21, 1958, the District Court sustained the Government's contention and entered a final judgment setting aside the earlier one of July 11, 1955. That judgment was reversed by our opinion of May 1959. This expressly directed the reinstatement of the judgment of July 11, 1955, see 266 F.2d at 666. This was done by the District Court on September 17, 1959. The Registry check tendered to the Owner was for the exact amount of the deposit of September 8, 1955. The Court thereafter denied the Owner's motion for additional interest for the period from April 30, 1956 to September 17, 1959, during which time withdrawal was prohibited by the express order.
The sole period of time now involved is from Step 8 to Step 11 during which the Owner could not obtain any of the funds. No question any longer exists from Step 3 to Step 8 or from Step 11 to the present. As to these the Owner acquiesces in the Government's contention that since the Registry funds were available, the failure to withdraw is deemed the responsibility of the Owner, and no interest is due for such periods. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. United States, 5 Cir., 1943, 132 F.2d 959, 962-963; United States v. 0.45 Acres of Land, 2 Cir., 1945, 151 F.2d 114, 115.
While, in this problem, we deal with a statute, the statute is one which has constitutional overtones, and it is to be read in this light. The Declaration of Taking Act United States v. Dow, 1958, 357 U.S. 17, at page 23, 78 S.Ct. 1039, at page 1045, 2 L.Ed. 2d 1109; In re United States, 5 Cir., 1958, 257 F.2d 844, 847. By the time of its enactment in 1931, the doctrine was unquestioned that interest was a part of just compensation not, as in a damage suit, a mere payment for delay. This is so because the compensation must be "the full and perfect equivalent of the property taken." Seaboard Airline Railway Co. v. United States, 1923, 261 U.S. 299, 304, 306, 43 S.Ct. 354, 356, 67 L.Ed. 664. Citing this case specifically, the Court reiterated this in the broadest of terms. United States v. Miller, 1943, 317 U.S. 369, 373 and note 9, 63 S.Ct. 276, 279, 87 L.Ed. 336.
This Act is a mechanism by which to facilitate the exercise of the sovereign's power of eminent domain and give full practical protection to both Government and owner alike. It could not have been intended to whittle down the property owner's rights for "interest from the date of taking is usually a part of just compensation to be paid and cannot be denied by statute." Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. United States, 5 Cir., 1943, 132 F.2d 959, 962. * *"United States v. Miller, supra, 317 U.S. at page 381, 63 S.Ct. at page 283. The objective of the latter is to give "the owner the immediate use of cash approximating the value of his land." 317 U.S. 381, 63 S.Ct. 284.
Congress did not, by word "deposit" in § 258a, note 1, supra, mean that the Constitutional mandate of just compensation would be satisfied by the mere act of delivering cash to some depository. It contemplates a transfer of funds for the effectual withdrawal and use by the former owner of the property taken. Unless that were so, it could not constitute a "payment * * of estimated compensation * * *" or "a payment `on account of' compensation," 317 U.S. at page 381, 63 S.Ct. at page 284.
This essential purpose of the deposit is not achieved where, by action of the Government as the petitioning litigant, the right to the immediate use of the sum in the Registry is denied to the owner. This view does not thwart or impede action which the Government thinks essential to protect its interests. If in its judgment valuation is too high or even if it still attacks the owner's title adjudicated by the judgment of condemnation,3 it may appeal. To effectually protect its rights, it is entirely proper for it to seek protective orders forbidding the disbursement of Registry funds. But when it does that, the money is no longer available to the owner. He is now deprived both of the enjoyment of his property and the cash in payment (or provisional payment) for it. During that time interest is required to constitute just compensation. And the funds, though physically "deposited" are deemed withdrawn or reduced by the Government accordingly.
This principle has found practical application in several cases by the Second Circuit. In United States v. 15.03 Acres of Land, 2 Cir., 1958, 253 F.2d 698, the Court held the Government liable for additional interest for a 14-day period during which time distribution of funds on deposit was forbidden pursuant to an order obtained on the Government's motion. This case has unusual significance since that Court itself refutes the contention here pressed by the Government that two prior decisions of the Second Circuit, United States v. 53¼ Acres of Land, 2 Cir., 1949, 176 F.2d 255, and United States v. City of New York, 2 Cir., 1951, 186 F.2d 418, compel a different result. Indeed, in the earlier case (176 F.2d 255) the Court had put it this way. ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
U.S. v. 1.04 Acres of Land, More or Less
...1039, 2 L.Ed.2d 1109 (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 240, 65 S.Ct. 631, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945)); see Bishop v. United States, 288 F.2d 525, 527-28 (5th Cir.1961); Poison Logging Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir.1945). Catlin, one of the most cited cases on the s......
-
United States v. 6.584 Acres of Land
...303 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting United States v. Dow , 357 U.S. 17, 23, 78 S.Ct. 1039, 2 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1958) ).94 Bishop v. United States , 288 F.2d 525, 528 (5th Cir. 1961).95 United States v. 101.88 Acres of Land, more or less, in St. Mary Par. , 616 F.2d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 1980).96 See 162.......
-
Boyce v. United States
...The fund deposited with the court is considered vested in defendant from the time it is deposited free of restriction. Bishop v. United States, 288 F.2d 525 (5 Cir. 1961); United States v. 53¼ Acres of Land in the Borough of Brooklyn, 176 F.2d 255, 258 (2 Cir. 1949); United States v. Certai......
- Russell v. United States