Bittner v. American-Marietta Company

Decision Date14 May 1958
Docket NumberCiv. No. 1534-D.
Citation162 F. Supp. 486
PartiesFrank O. BITTNER, Jr., Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN-MARIETTA COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Illinois

John A. Appleman, Urbana, Ill., E. Grant Mathis, Rantoul, Ill., for plaintiff.

Robert Z. Hickman, of Bookwalter, Carter, Gunn & Hickman, Danville, Ill., Dallstream, Schiff, Hardin, Waite & Dorschel, Chicago, Ill., for defendant.

PLATT, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff, a citizen of St. Louis, Missouri, seeks to recover for his services as a "finder". The defendant company is a citizen of Illinois, and its principal office is in Chicago, Illinois.

It is alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to be paid for his services by virtue of an alleged oral contract with the defendant to procure for the defendant a willing seller of a cement company; that the plaintiff performed the contract and the defendant purchased the Dragon Cement Company as a result of the plaintiff's services.

The defendant presents a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. Rules Civ.Proc. rule 56(b), 28 U.S.C.A., based upon the pleadings, the plaintiff's deposition, and the ordinance of the city of Chicago requiring a "general broker" to have a license.

The defendant contends that a relationship of broker and client existed between the plaintiff and the defendant, and since the plaintiff was not licensed in the city of Chicago to act as a broker he cannot recover.

It is not disputed that the plaintiff was engaged in the brokerage business with Edward D. Jones Co. of St. Louis, Missouri; that the alleged contract of employment was not made in Chicago; that Dragon Cement Company is not located in Illinois; and that the plaintiff performed his services in locating a cement company outside of the city of Chicago.

From the deposition it appears that the plaintiff made an effort to locate companies available for sale and called the defendant from his St. Louis office to determine whether the defendant might be interested. The plaintiff made a trip to Chicago and informed the defendant that the Dragon Cement Company had expressed a willingness to sell if a satisfactory price could be reached.

The Chicago Ordinance, which was in full force and effect when the plaintiff performed his services, provided as follows:

"General Brokers
"113-1. The words `general broker' are hereby defined to mean any person other than an employe of the principal from whom the business is done that negotiates, buys, sells, trades, leases, or handles for another, on a commission basis, or on the basis of compensation in proportion to the amount of the transaction, any stocks, bonds, mortgages, loans, investment, securities, certificates of indebtedness, foreign exchange letters of credit, steamship transportation tickets, grain, provisions, produce, livestock, goods, wares, merchandise or any other commodity, article or property (except real property), whether similar or dissimilar to those herein mentioned, or acts through the medium of another licensed broker in the capacity and for any of the purposes aforesaid.
"113-2. It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in the business of, or to act in the capacity of, a general broker without first having obtained a license so to do."

Thus, the Chicago Ordinance confines its definition to any person who negotiates, buys, sells, trades, or leases for another any property. The plaintiff alleges he procured the available property. One who merely procures does not act as agent in the consummation of the sale, or have anything to do with the fixing of the price, or the terms of the sale. The principals negotiate the terms between themselves. All the "finder" is required to do is to bring the seller to the attention of the purchaser. Neither counsel for the parties nor has the court found any case in the Illinois Appellate or Supreme Courts directly in point.

Cities are granted the power to license brokers by the Legislature. Ill. Rev.Stat. ch. 24, §§ 23-91.

"Statutes granting
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14 cases
  • Davidson v. Robie
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • January 16, 1963
    ...See also Lindeman v. Textron, Inc., 229 F.2d 273, 274-275 (2d Cir.), S.C. 143 F.Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y.); Bittner v. American-Marietta Co., 162 F.Supp. 486, 488-489 (E.D.Ill.); Wells v. Dent, 4 A.D.2d 307, 308-309, 164 N.Y.S.2d 646; Corson v. Keane, 4 N.J. 221, 225-227, 72 A.2d 314.7 See also C......
  • Lyons v. Stevenson
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • January 4, 1977
    ...v. Textron, Inc. (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1956) 143 F.Supp. 955; Kuffler v. List (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1956) 144 F.Supp. 776; Bittner v. American-Marietta Co. (D.C.E.D.Ill.1958) 162 F.Supp. 486). A more precise designation for a finder would appear to be an 'intermediary' or a "The services performed by finders......
  • Kilbane v. Dyas
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • November 6, 1975
    ...find and bring the parties together but leaves the negotiation of the ultimate transaction to the principals. (Bittner v. American-Marietta Co. (E.D.Ill.1958), 162 F.Supp. 486; Tyrone v. Kelley (1973), 9 Cal.3d 1, 106 Cal.Rptr. 761, 507 P.2d 65; Zappas v. King Williams Press, Inc. (1970), 1......
  • Evans v. Riverside Intern. Raceway
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • October 25, 1965
    ...2 Cir., 39 F.2d 555; Lindeman v. Textron, Inc., D.C., 143 F.Supp. 955; Kuffler v. List, D.C., 144 F.Supp. 776; Bittner v. American-Marietta Company, D.C., 162 F.Supp. 486). A more precise designation for a finder would appear to be an 'intermediary' or a 'The services performed by finders m......
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