Bixby v. KBR, Inc.
| Decision Date | 26 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | 3:09-CV-632-PK |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
| Parties | ROCKY BIXBY, LAWRENCE ROBERTA, SCOTT ASHBY, CHARLES ELLIS, MATTHEW HADLEY, JESUS BRUNO, COLT CAMPREDON, STEPHEN FOSTER, BYRON GREER, KELLY HAFER, DENNIS JEWELL, STEPHEN MUELLER, VITO PACHECO, JOHN RYDQUIST, KEVIN STANGER, RONALD BJERKLUND, ADANROLANDO GARCIA, BRIAN HEDIN, CHARLES SEAMON, BERTHA HELMAN-SHUIT, MATT KUHNEL, DENNIS ROSGEN, AARON ST. CLAIR, KEVIN WILSON, JASON BLAIN, JAMES BORJA, DEVON FIELDS, LESLIE ING, RICHARD LAWRENCE, JAY LOUISIANA, JAMES McGOWAN, DONALD YEARGIN, and JASON ARNOLD, Plaintiffs, v. KBR, INC., KELLOGG, BROWN & ROOT SERVICE, INC., KBR TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC., OVERSEAS ADMINISTRATION SERVICES, LTD., and SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendants. |
Plaintiffs Rocky Bixby, Lawrence Roberta, Scott Ashby, Charles Ellis, and Matthew Hadley filed this action against defendants KBR, Inc., Kellogg, Brown & Root Service, Inc.,KBR Technical Services, Inc., Overseas Administration Services, Ltd., and Service Employees International, Inc. (collectively, the "KBR defendants"), on June 8, 2009. On September 8, 2009, plaintiffs amended their complaint, adding Carlos Avalos, Jesus Bruno, Colt Campredon, Stephen Foster, Byron Greer, Kelly Hafer, Dennis Jewell, Stephen Mueller, Vito Pacheco, John Rydquist, and Kevin Stanger as additional plaintiffs. Plaintiffs amended their pleading a second time on February 2, 2010, adding Ronald Bjerklund, Adanrolando Garcia, Brian Hedin, Lewis Martin, and Charles Seamon as additional plaintiffs. On June 25, 2010, plaintiffs amended their complaint a third time, adding Randy Keiper, Matt Kuhnel, Dennis Rosgen, Aaron St. Clair, and Kevin Wilson as further additional plaintiffs. On October 27, 2010, plaintiffs amended their complaint a fourth time, adding Jason Blain, James Borja, Devin Fields, Leslie Ing, Richard Lawrence, Jay Louisiana, James McGowan, and Donald Yeargin as further additional plaintiffs, and adding Halliburton Company and Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. (collectively, the "Halliburton defendants"), as additional defendants. Plaintiffs amended their complaint a fifth time on January 10, 2011, adding as additional plaintiffs Jason Arnold, Thomas Barella, Daniel Grover, Christopher Wangelin, and Michael O'Rielly. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Barella as a plaintiff in this action on the following day, January 11, 2011, and voluntarily dismissed Grover as a plaintiff in this action on February 25, 2011. On June 16, 2011, these chambers recommended that the court dismiss the plaintiffs' claims to the extent alleged against the Halliburton defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, and on July 20, 2011, Judge Hernandez adopted that recommendation as his own opinion. The parties stipulated to the dismissal of Avalos, Martin, and Wangelin as plaintiffs in this action, on December 16, 2011, and to the dismissal of O'Rielly as a plaintiff on April 4, 2012.
By and through their fifth amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged defendants' liability for negligence and for fraud arising out of plaintiffs' exposure to sodium dichromate and subsequent hexavalent chromium poisoning while stationed as Oregon National Guardsmen in Iraq and assigned to duty at the Qarmat Ali water plant in May-September 2003. From October 9, 2012, through November 2, 2012, trial was held in this action on the claims alleged in plaintiffs' fifth amended complaint on behalf of plaintiffs Arnold, Bixby, Bjerklund, Campredon, Ellis, Greer, Hadley, Hedin, Pacheco, Roberta, Seamon, and St. Clair (collectively, the "trial plaintiffs") against defendants KBR, Inc., and Kellogg, Brown & Root Service, Inc. ("KB&RS" and, collectively with KBR, Inc., the "trial defendants"). The jury found the trial defendants not liable in connection with the trial plaintiffs' fraud claims, but awarded both non-economic and punitive damages against them in connection with the trial plaintiffs' negligence claims. The claims brought against the defendants on behalf of all other plaintiffs remain at issue in this action.
Effective December 21, 2012, plaintiffs amended their complaint a sixth time, substituting Bertha Helman-Shuit, personal representative of the estate of Randy Keiper, as a plaintiff in lieu of deceased plaintiff Keiper. The amendment otherwise effected no significant modification to plaintiffs' claims or to their allegations in support thereof.1
Now before the court are defendants' Federal Civil Procedure Rule 50(b) motion (#630) for judgment as a matter of law, plaintiffs' Federal Civil Procedure Rule 54(b) motion (#651) for entry of final judgment on the jury verdict resolving the trial plaintiffs' claims, and defendants'Federal Civil Procedure Rule 59 motion (#653) for new trial or remittitur in connection with the jury verdict on the trial plaintiffs' claims. I have considered the motions, oral argument on behalf of the parties, and all of the pleadings and papers on file. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' Rule 50(b) motion (#630) is denied, plaintiffs' Rule 54(b) motion (#651) is granted, and defendants' Rule 59 motion (#653) is denied as to defendants' request for a new trial and granted in part and denied in part as discussed below as to defendants' request for remittitur of the jury's award of damages.
Federal Civil Procedure Rule 50 governs entry of judgment as a matter of law in connection with a jury trial. Rule 50(a) permits a party to move for judgment as a matter of law as to any issue or combination of issues raised by the party's claims at any time before the claims are submitted to the jury. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). Rule 50(b) provides as follows:
If the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made under Rule 50(a), the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion. No later than 28 days after the entry of judgment—or if the motion addresses a jury issue not decided by a verdict, no later than 28 days after the jury was discharged—the movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and may include an alternative or joint request for a new trial under Rule 59. In ruling on the renewed motion, the court may:
"It is error to deny a [Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law] when it is clear that the evidence and its inferences cannot reasonably support a judgment in favor of the opposing party." Erickson v. Pierce County, 960 F.2d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 1992), citing Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1014 (9th Cir. 1985). By contrast, entry of Rule 50(b) judgment notwithstanding a contrary jury verdict is "inappropriate if there is substantial evidence to support a verdict for the non-moving party." Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1256 (9th Cir. 1985). That is, a Rule 50(b) motion should be granted if a reasonable jury could not have returned the verdict actually returned on the claims at issue, and should otherwise be denied.
The district court's discretionary decisions whether to order a new trial or to order a reduction in an award of damages following return of a jury verdict, whether on a party's motion or sua sponte, is governed by Federal Civil Procedure Rule 59. Rule 59 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) In General.
(1) Grounds for New Trial. The court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues—and to any party—as follows:
* * *
(b) Time to File a Motion for a New Trial. A motion for a new trial must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment.
Federal Civil Procedure Rule 59(a)-(d).
In deciding a Rule 59 motion for new trial following a jury verdict, the district court has the right and duty "to weigh the evidence," and where the jury's verdict was "contrary to the clear weight of the evidence," even if nevertheless "supported by substantial evidence," to "set aside the verdict . . . to prevent, in the sound discretion of the trial judge, a miscarriage of justice." Murphy v. Long Beach, 914 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1990), quoting Moist Cold Refrigerator Co. v. Lou Johnson Co., 249 F.2d 246, 256 (9th Cir. 1957). "It is equally clear that erroneous jury instructions, as well as the failure to give adequate instructions, are also bases for a new trial." Id., citing Rinker v. County of Napa, 831 F.2d 829, 832 (9th Cir. 1987), Cleveland v. Southern Pac. Co., 436 F.2d 77, 80-81 (9th Cir. 1970).
Whether or not to grant a new trial under Rule 59 is a question "confided almost entirely to the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court." Id. at 186, citing Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980). However:
The trial judge is ultimately responsible for the conduct...
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