Bjornson v. Dave Smith Motors/Frontier Leasing, CV 04-0285-N-MHW.
| Decision Date | 31 July 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 04-0285-N-MHW.,CV 04-0285-N-MHW. |
| Citation | 578 F.Supp.2d 1269 |
| Parties | Sheryl L. BJORNSON, Plaintiff, v. DAVE SMITH MOTORS/FRONTIER LEASING AND SALES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Idaho |
April M. Linscott, Ramsden and Lyons LLP, Coeur D'Alene, ID, for Plaintiff.
Phillip J. Collaer, Robert A. Anderson, Anderson Julian & Hull, Boise, ID, for Defendant.
Currently pending before the Court is Defendant Dave Smith Motors/Frontier Sales and Leasing's Renewed Motion for Directed Verdict or, in the alternative, Motion for New Trial and/or Remittitur (Docket No. 91), filed March 27, 2008; and Plaintiff Sheryl Bjornson's Motion for Fees and Costs (Docket No. 94), filed March 31, 2008.
Plaintiff Sheryl Bjornson ("Plaintiff") filed this lawsuit on June 8, 2004, against Defendant Dave Smith Motors/Frontier Sales and Leasing ("Defendant"), bringing claims of a sexually hostile work environment, gender discrimination, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Complaint, Docket No. 1. On September 12, 2007, this Court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff's claim of gender discrimination and retaliation. Memorandum Decision and Order, Docket No. 59. The remaining claim for a sexually hostile work environment was tried to a jury February 26-29, 2008 in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, awarding nominal damages in the amount of $1.00 and assessing punitive damages in the amount of $100,000.00. Special Verdict, Docket No. 88-2. Defendant has brought a post-trial motion for a direct verdict, new trial and/or remittitur. Plaintiff has filed a motion for fees and costs.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) permits a party to file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law following trial. A jury's verdict must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence. Wallace v. City of San Diego, 479 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir.2007). Substantial evidence is "evidence adequate to support the jury's conclusion, even if it is also possible to draw a contrary conclusion from the same evidence." Id. (quoting Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir.2001)). The court should "simply ask whether the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion." Id. The court must review the entire evidentiary record, but "must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe." Id. Judgment as a matter of law is "proper if the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, permits only a conclusion contrary to the jury's verdict." McLean v. Runyon, 222 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir.2000). When ruling on the motion, the court may: (1) allow judgment on the verdict; (2) order a new trial; or (3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) provides that a new trial may be granted "on all or part of the issues . . . in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States."
Defendant contends that there is not substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict finding that Plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment. Defendant submits that Plaintiff's evidence merely consists of a few isolated incidents including: (1) Mr. Orsi used profanity (by referring to Plaintiff and her family as "that fing Sheryl" and "Sheryl's f-ing kids"); (2) he hugged and rubbed the shoulders of other female employees, which was not directed at Plaintiff, not sexual in nature, nor unwelcome; (3) Mr. Orsi's comment that he was going to have sex with Carrie Adamovich and that it would be the new rumor of the week; (4) the photograph of Mr. Orsi and other co-workers in which he stuck his finger through the zipper of his pants to depict a penis; and (5) Mr. Orsi nicknamed Plaintiff "half-rack," a reference to her breast size. Defendant maintains that this evidence does not meet the standard for a sexually hostile work environment because much of it was not directed at Plaintiff, was not unwelcome and did not have an impact on Plaintiff's terms and conditions of employment.
Plaintiff submits that there is sufficient evidence from which the jury could have concluded that she was subjected to a hostile work environment. This includes testimony that: Mr. Orsi asked Plaintiff out on dates and once she turned him down, he demeaned her and her family by calling them "f-ing Sheryl" and "Sheryl's f-ing kids;" Mr. Orsi referred to Plaintiff as "half-rack;" Plaintiff watched Mr. Orsi touch female employees; Plaintiff had to listen to Mr. Orsi's sexual exploits; Plaintiff was told by her supervisors to go along with Mr. Orsi's conduct if she wanted to keep her job; Plaintiff received a written warning for her attire after she had complained to her supervisors about Mr. Orsi; Mr. Orsi used foul language and told explicit jokes at work; Plaintiff viewed a photograph of Mr. Orsi simulating a penis with his finger, among other incidents. Plaintiff also kept a journal in which she wrote down examples of Mr. Orsi's conduct. This journal described incidents including: Mr. Orsi disparaging Plaintiffs credit at a paint store; the photograph described above; that Plaintiff was subjected to rumors about Mr. Orsi's sexual exploits, etc.
Under Title VII, it is "an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII's prohibition not only applies to situations with tangible or economic discrimination but also to situations where sexual harassment is so severe or pervasive that it alters the conditions of the plaintiffs employment and creates a hostile work environment. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998).
To show that Plaintiff was subject to a hostile work environment, she must prove that: (1) she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature; (2) the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive work environment. Porter v. California Dep't of Corrections, 419 F.3d 885, 892 (9th Cir. 2005). A hostile work environment must be found to be "both subjectively and objectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998). In determining whether the work environment reaches the level where it is considered to be hostile or abusive, courts are directed to look at all the circumstances including "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17, 23, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993). Simple teasing, comments, and isolated incidents, unless extremely serious, will not amount to a hostile work environment. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998). Title VII is not designed to be a "general civility code." Id. The conduct must be extreme in order to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment. Montero v. AGCO Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir.1999).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex." Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998). The Ninth Circuit further elaborated on this holding by stating that plaintiffs do not have to prove that defendants had a specific intent to discriminate against women, but that "conduct may be `unlawful sexual harassment even when harassers do not realize that their conduct creates a hostile working environment.'" EEOC v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 844-45 (9th Cir.2005) (quoting Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir.1991)).
When construing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the nonmoving party, the Court finds that there is substantial evidence to uphold the jury's verdict. The following evidence was introduced at trial: Mr. Orsi repeatedly hugged and touched female employees, including Plaintiffs daughter, in what others construed as a sexual manner; Mr. Orsi nicknamed Plaintiff "half-rack;" Mr. Orsi asked Plaintiff out on dates; Mr. Orsi bragged about his sexual exploits and told sexual jokes with others; while at work, Plaintiff saw a photograph of Mr. Orsi simulating a penis with his finger through his zipper that was taken at a work-related event; Plaintiff was referred to as "f-ing Sheryl" and her kids as "Sheryl's f-ing kids" by Mr. Orsi; Plaintiff received a written warning for her attire after she had complained to her supervisors about Mr. Orsi's conduct; she was basically told by her supervisors, Mary Crawford and Kelly Van Winkle, to go along with Mr. Orsi's behavior; Mr. Orsi disparaged Plaintiffs credit at a local paint store; Mr. Orsi told Plaintiff how to...
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