Black Lives Matter-Stockton Chapter v. San Joaquin Cnty. Sheriff's Office

• Decision Date: 02 July 2019
• Docket Number: No. 2:18-cv-00591-KJM-AC,2:18-cv-00591-KJM-AC
• Citation: 398 F.Supp.3d 660
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: BLACK LIVES MATTER-STOCKTON CHAPTER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, et al., Defendants.

398 F.Supp.3d 660

BLACK LIVES MATTER-STOCKTON CHAPTER, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:18-cv-00591-KJM-AC

United States District Court, E.D. California.

Signed July 2, 2019

Yolanda Huang, Law Office of Yolanda Huang, Oakland, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Gregory Brian Thomas, Temitayo Peters, Burke Williams & Sorensen, LLP, Oakland, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER

Kimberly J. Mueller, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Black Lives Matter Stockton Chapter ("BLM") and several of its members bring this civil rights action and putative class action against San Joaquin County, the San Joaquin County Sheriff's Office, and several individual officers. Defendants have moved to dismiss the first amended complaint. Mot., ECF No. 17. Plaintiffs opposed, ECF No. 26, defendants replied, ECF No. 27, and the court held a hearing on December 7, 2018, ECF No. 29. As explained below, the court GRANTS defendants' motion in part and DENIES it in part.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 7, 2017, plaintiffs Lareesha Brown, Kenneth Marbley and three others were arrested at a BLM protest in Stockton and eventually charged with state criminal misdemeanor charges of assaulting officers and resisting arrest. First Am. Compl. (FAC), ECF No. 16, ¶ 33. On October 30, 2017, a discovery motion related to the five BLM members' cases was heard before Judge Bernard J. Garber at the San Joaquin County Superior Court. Id. ¶¶ 35, 39. BLM organized "court support" for the October 30 hearing, meaning that it organized BLM members to attend the hearing, dressed in ways that identified them as BLM members. Id. ¶¶ 38–39. When BLM members, including the plaintiffs in this case, attempted to enter the courthouse to attend the hearing, San Joaquin County sheriff's deputies controlled the entrance to the courthouse. See id. ¶ 42. Allegedly, the officers questioned and denied entrance to individuals who are black and brown, and to BLM members specifically, while allowing white individuals unfettered entrance. Id. ¶ 43. On January 29, 2018, after a hearing on another related motion, a group of sheriff's deputies allegedly followed, insulted, harassed and intimidated BLM members inside the courthouse, implying BLM members were not welcome and would be subjected to violence and arrest if they did not leave. Id. ¶¶ 44–46.

BLM and its founding member Dionne Smith-Downs sued the County, the sheriff, and several individual sheriff's deputies for violating their civil rights under federal and state law. Compl., ECF No. 1. Defendants moved to dismiss each of the claims in the original complaint, ECF No. 4, plaintiffs opposed, ECF No, 6, and defendants replied, ECF No. 7. After a hearing on May 18, 2018, the court granted defendants' motion and dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. Order, ECF No. 15. Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint on August 13, 2018, identifying Denise Friday, Lareesha Brown and Kenneth Marbley¹ as plaintiffs, in addition to BLM and Smith-Downs. See generally FAC.

In the FAC, plaintiffs allege violations of federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.² Specifically, they assert claims under the First Amendment, providing the right to free speech and association (Claim 1); the Sixth Amendment, establishing the right to a public trial (Claim 2); and the Fourteenth Amendment, providing rights of due process (Claim 3). See FAC ¶¶ 70–82. Plaintiffs also assert two state civil rights claims under the Act, California Civil Code § 51.7 (Claim 4), and the Bane Act, California Civil Code § 52.1 (Claim 5).³ Id. ¶¶ 83–86. Finally, they bring a negligence claim (Claim 6). Id. ¶¶ 87–89. Plaintiffs ask the court to certify as a class the members and supporters of BLM, make findings of fact reflecting defendants' violations of plaintiffs' rights, grant preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, award compensatory damages, and award punitive damages against the individual defendants. Id. at 31–32. All claims are pled against all defendants, without differentiation.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A party may move to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court may grant the motion only if the complaint lacks a "cognizable legal theory" or if its factual allegations do not support a cognizable legal theory. Hartmann v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab. , 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). A complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), though it need not include "detailed factual allegations," Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 545, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). But "sufficient factual matter" must make the claim at least plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citation omitted). Conclusory or formulaic recitations of elements do not alone suffice. Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). In a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, the court must accept well-pled factual allegations as true and construe the complaint in plaintiff's favor. Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 93–94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. , 550 U.S. at 555–56, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

If a plaintiff requests leave to amend a claim subject to dismissal, the federal rules mandate that leave "be freely given when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Before granting leave, a court considers any potential bad faith, delay, or futility regarding the proposed amendment, and the potential prejudice to the opposing party. Foman v. Davis , 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962).

III. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY

A. Official-capacity Claims for Damages

"Under the Eleventh Amendment, agencies of the state are immune from private damage actions or suits for injunctive relief brought in federal court." Mitchell v. Los Angeles Cty. Coll. Dist. , 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman , 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (Eleventh Amendment proscribes suit against state agencies "regardless of the nature of the relief sought")). Because the instant suit is against county actors, not state actors, Eleventh Amendment immunity ordinarily would not apply. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York , 436 U.S. 658, 690–691 & n.54, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). However, when local government units are considered part of the state, they can be entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as well. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe , 519 U.S. 425, 429, 117 S.Ct. 900, 137 L.Ed.2d 55 (1997).

To support their argument that court security officers should be considered state actors for purposes of this case, defendants cite Rojas v. Sonoma Cty. , No. C-11-1358 EMC, 2011 WL 5024551, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2011), in which the court concluded that "sheriffs ... function as representatives of the state and not the county when providing courtroom security services." In so concluding, the court relied on the fact that, under California Government Code § 77200, the state had sole responsibility for the funding of court operations and, under then-§ 72115, court-related services formerly provided by marshals were provided by sheriffs. Id. (citing Cal. Gov't Code § 77200 (West, effective 2009–present) (providing "the state shall assume sole responsibility for the funding of court operations, as defined in Section 77003"); Cal. Gov't Code § 77003(a)(3) (West, effective 2008–2012) (defining court operations to include "[t]hose marshals and sheriffs as the court deems necessary for court operations"); Cal. Gov't Code § 72115(a) (West, effective 2003–2017) (repealed by Stats. 2002, c. 784 (S.B.1316) § 370, effective Jan. 1, 2018) (referring to "abolition of the marshal's office and the transfer of court-related services provided by the marshal within the county to the sheriff's department")).

Plaintiffs argue Rojas is no longer good law, because the Superior Court Security Act of 2012 shifted the funding of court security from the state to the counties, thereby either repealing or significantly amending the statutes relied upon by the court in Rojas. Opp'n at 4 (citing Cal. Gov't Code § 69920 et seq. ); see also A.B. 118, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. Legis. Serv. (Ca. 2011) (amending, inter alia , Cal. Gov't Code § 30025, creating the "Trial Court Security Account" within the Local Revenue Fund 2011, and requiring county treasurer to create a "Trial Court Security Account" to "be used exclusively to fund trial court security provided by county sheriffs").⁴

Only one sister court has addressed this issue since the 2012 amendments to the statutes relied upon in Rojas. See Hiramanek v. Clark , No. C-13-0228 EMC, 2013 WL 4734025, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2013) ("Order Re Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint"); Hiramanek v. Clark , No. 13-00228, 2014 WL 2855512, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2014) ("Order Granting in Part Motion to Amend"). In both Hiramanek decisions, the court held that court security officers are state actors and cited only to Rojas , without any mention of the statutory changes. Hiramanek , 2013 WL 4734025, at *4 ; Hiramanek , 2014 WL 2855512, at *6. Because of the statutory changes, this court declines to rely on Rojas , but rather conducts its own analysis, and concludes as explained below, that, in San Joaquin County, sheriffs and sheriff's deputies are state actors when providing court security to the Superior Court.

1. Supreme Court's McMillian Decision

In McMillian , the United States Supreme Court directed courts to analyze state law to determine "the actual function of a governmental official, in a particular area." McMillian v. Monroe Cty., Ala. , 520 U.S. 781, 786, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997). In conducting this functional analysis, the court in that case rejected plaintiff's argument that the sheriffs were county actors...