Black v. Cent. Puget Sound Reg'l Transit Auth.

• Decision Date: 13 February 2020
• Docket Number: No. 97195-1,97195-1
• Citation: 195 Wash.2d 198,457 P.3d 453
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Taylor BLACK, Anne Black, Jerry King, Rene King, Roger Struthers, Mary Louise Struthers, and Frank Maietto, individually and on behalf of a class of all persons similarly situated, Appellants, v. CENTRAL PUGET SOUND REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY and State of Washington, Respondents.

195 Wash.2d 198

457 P.3d 453

Taylor BLACK, Anne Black, Jerry King, Rene King, Roger Struthers, Mary Louise Struthers, and Frank Maietto, individually and on behalf of a class of all persons similarly situated, Appellants,

v.CENTRAL PUGET SOUND REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY and State of Washington, Respondents.

No. 97195-1

Supreme Court of Washington.

Argued September 10, 2019

Filed February 13, 2020

Matthew C. Albrecht, David Knox Dewolf, Albrecht Law PLLC, 421 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 614, Spokane, WA 99201-0402, Joel Bernard Ard, Ard Law Group PLLC, P.O. Box 11633, Bainbridge Island, WA 98110-5633, for Appellants.

Desmond Leoron Brown, Mattelyn Laurel Tharpe, Natalie Anne Moore, Sound Transit Union Station, 401 S. Jackson Street, Seattle, WA 98104-2826, Dionne Padilla-Huddleston, Office of the Attorney General, 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000, Seattle, WA 98104-3188, Paul J. Lawrence, Matthew J. Segal, Jessica Arme Skelton, Pacifica Law Group LLP, 1191 2nd Avenue, Suite 2000, Seattle, WA 98101-3404, for Respondents.

OWENS, J.

¶ 1 In 2015, the legislature enacted RCW 81.104.160(1) (MVET statute), which authorizes Sound Transit to use two separate depreciation schedules to calculate motor vehicle excise taxes (MVET). The MVET statute authorizes Sound Transit to use the former 1996 depreciation schedule for MVETs whose revenue is pledged to pay off Sound Transit’s bond contracts. The MVET statute further authorizes Sound Transit to use the current 2006 depreciation schedule for all other MVETs. Though each schedule is referenced, the MVET statute does not restate in full either of these schedules. Taylor Black and other taxpayers allege the MVET statute violates article II, section 37 of the Washington Constitution, which states "[n]o act shall ever be revised or amended by mere reference to its title, but the act revised or the section amended shall be set forth at full length."

¶ 2 We hold the MVET statute is constitutional for the following reasons: (1) the statute is a complete act because it is readily ascertainable from its text alone when which depreciation schedule will apply, (2) the statute properly adopts both schedules by reference, and (3) the statute does not render a straightforward determination of the scope of rights or duties established by other existing statutes erroneous because it does not require a reader to conduct research to find unreferenced laws that are impacted by the MVET statute.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. Background

¶ 3 In 1992, the legislature authorized "counties in the state’s most populous region to create a local agency for planning and implementing a high capacity transportation system." ENGROSSED SUBSTITUTE H.B. 2610, at 2, 52d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1992). The legislature also allowed any authorized regional transit authority to submit ballot propositions detailing its transportation system plans and proposed financing to voters living in eligible counties. Id. at 5, 30. Whenever voters approve of a proposition, the transit authority may then levy and collect local funding from an MVET. Id. at 47-48. An MVET is "a tax on the privilege of relicensing a motor vehicle for use on public roadways." Sheehan v. Cent. Puget Sound Reg’l Transit Auth., 155 Wash.2d 790, 802, 123 P.3d 88 (2005). MVETs are calculated based on the value of the vehicle, as set out by statute in a depreciation schedule. Former RCW 82.44.041 (1991).

¶ 4 In 1993, the King, Pierce, and Snohomish county councils voted to create Sound Transit. In 1996, voters in these counties approved an MVET to fund express bus services and rail lines through Sound Transit. In 1999, Sound Transit then issued $350 million in bonds to finance a portion of the initial construction of these projects. Pierce County v. State, 159 Wash.2d 16, 24, 148 P.3d 1002 (2006) (hereinafter Pierce County II ). In its bond contracts, Sound Transit pledged revenues from the 1996 MVET toward the payment of these bonds. The bonds expire in 2028.

¶ 5 In 2002, voters approved Initiative 776 (1-776), which sought to repeal both the local MVETs for transit funding and the vehicle depreciation schedule used to calculate MVETs, as well as to amend Sound Transit’s authority to levy and collect MVETs.

¶ 6 In 2006, the legislature enacted the current depreciation schedule, which results in a lower motor vehicle valuation than the former depreciation schedule. SUBSTITUTE S.B. 6247, at 1, 3, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006). That same year, we held that 1-776 "impermissibly impair[ed] the contractual obligations between Sound Transit and [its] bondholders. Thus, 1-776 has no legal effect of preventing Sound Transit from continuing to fulfill its contractual obligation to levy the MVET for so long as the bonds remain outstanding." Pierce County. II, 159 Wash.2d at 51, 148 P.3d 1002. In response, the legislature passed Senate Bill 6379, which stated all MVETs must be calculated using the former depreciation schedule for bond contracts issued before 1-776 was passed. LAWS OF 2010, ch. 161, § 903.

¶ 7 In 2015, the legislature passed the statute in question, RCW 81.104.160(1), stating that any MVET imposed by a regional transit authority (including Sound Transit) must use the former depreciation schedule until it pays off its bond contracts issued before 1-776; after Sound Transit pays off its bond contracts, Sound Transit must then use the current depreciation schedule. Specifically, the legislature stated the following:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection or chapter 82.44 RCW, a motor vehicle excise tax imposed by a regional transit authority before or after July 15, 2015, must comply with chapter 82.44 RCW as it existed on January 1, 1996, until December 31st of the year in which the regional transit authority repays bond debt to which a motor vehicle excise tax was pledged before July 15, 2015. Motor vehicle taxes collected by regional transit authorities after December 31st of the year in which a regional transit authority repays bond debt to which a motor vehicle excise tax was pledged before July 15, 2015, must comply with chapter 82.44 RCW as it existed on the date the tax was approved by voters.

RCW 81.104.160(1) (emphasis added).

2. Procedural History

¶ 8 In 2018, Black, along with a class of licensed motor vehicle owners, filed a complaint against Sound Transit and the State in Pierce County Superior Court seeking declaratory judgment that the MVET statute violates article II, section 37 of the Washington Constitution because it does not set forth at full length either the former or the current depreciation schedule. Furthermore, Black argues the MVET statute improperly amended the current depreciation schedule without setting forth the amended provision in full.

¶ 9 Both parties filed a motion for summary judgment. Sound Transit argued that the MVET statute properly adopts by reference other existing statutes; thus, it is constitutional. The superior court granted Sound Transit’s motion and dismissed Black’s claim with prejudice. Black appealed the superior court’s order to Division Two of the Court of Appeals. Sound Transit filed a motion to transfer the appeal to our court, which we granted.

¶ 10 Shortly before oral argument on September 10, 2019, the State filed a notice indicating the State’s response brief and responses to amici contained an inaccurate factual statement. Specifically, the State notified us that the depreciation schedule Sound Transit has been applying is found in Referendum 49, chapter 321, Laws of 1998—not the depreciation schedule that existed on January 1, 1996, as reflected by the MVET statute. However, because Sound Transit’s actions do not have any bearing on the constitutionality of the MVET statute itself, this notice does not impact our holding.

ISSUE

¶ 11 Is RCW 81.104.160(1) constitutional if it does not set forth at full length either the former 1996 depreciation schedule or the current 2006 depreciation schedule but references both?

ANALYSIS

¶ 12 We review a trial court’s decision granting summary judgment de novo. Pierce County II, 159 Wash.2d at 27, 148 P.3d 1002. Summary judgment is properly granted where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

¶ 13 We also review constitutional questions and statutory interpretation de novo. Pierce County v. State, 150 Wash.2d 422, 429, 78 P.3d 640 (2003) ( Pierce County I ). " ‘A party challenging a statute’s constitutionality bears the heavy burden of establishing its unconstitutionality.’ " Pierce County II, 159 Wash.2d at 27, 148 P.3d 1002 (quoting Larson v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 156 Wash.2d 752, 757, 131 P.3d 892 (2006) ).

¶ 14 Article II, section 37 of the Washington Constitution provides that "[n]o act shall ever be revised or amended by mere reference to its title, but the act revised or the section amended shall be set forth at full length." Article II, section 37 was drafted to protect the legislature and the public against fraud and deception. Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 149 Wash.2d 622, 640, 71 P.3d 644 (2003) (hereinafter CRWM ). Relatedly, "a significant purpose of article II, section 37 is to ensure that those enacting an amendatory law are fully aware of the proposed law’s impact on existing law." Wash. Citizens Action of Wash. v. State, 162 Wash.2d 142, 152, 171 P.3d 486 (2007).

¶ 15 To determine whether a statute violates article II, section 37, the first question we must answer is whether the statute is a " ‘complete act,’ " such that the rights or duties under the statute can be understood without referring to another statute; complete acts that adopt other statutes by reference satisfy this question under article II, section 37. El Centro de la Raza v. State, 192 Wash.2d 103, 129, 428 P.3d 1143 (2018) (plurality opinion) (quoting State v. Manussier, 129 Wash.2d 652, 663, 921 P.2d 473 (1996) ).¹

¶ 16 The second question we answer is whether...