Black v. Delano Reg'l Med. Ctr.
| Decision Date | 18 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:15-cv-01124(PC) |
| Parties | LACY CHARLES BLACK, Plaintiff, v. DELANO REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, ET AL., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff, Lacy Charles Black, is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 8.) No other parties have appeared in this action. Plaintiff's complaint is before the court for screening.
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous, malicious," or that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Plaintiff's claims arose at Kern Valley State Prison (KVSP), where he remains incarcerated. He names as defendants the following individuals: Martin Biter, the warden of KVSP; Bahram Ghaffari, the Chief Executive Officer of Delano Regional Medical Center (DRMC); and Bruce Peters, the Chief Executive Officer of Mercy Hospital in Bakersfield.
Plaintiff's claims may be summarized essentially as follows:
On January 29 and 30, 2013, medical staff at both Mercy Hospital and Delano Regional Medical Center X-Rayed Plaintiff's left shoulder and misdiagnosed Plaintiff with shoulder pain or a shoulder sprain. In fact, Plaintiff suffered from a severe posterior shoulder dislocation. As a result of the misdiagnosis, Plaintiff "endure[d] intolerable amounts of constant excruciating pain" for the next five months, during which time the many sick call forms he submitted were ignored. Ultimately, Plaintiff had to undergo multiple surgeries. However, the delay in treatment has led to permanent damage and deterioration of Plaintiff's bones and loss of use of his left shoulder and arm.
Plaintiff requests damages to cover future surgeries and compensate for his mental and physical anguish; injunctive relief in the form of a transfer to an institution where he would receive adequate medical care; and for "the proper personnel" to be "held accountable and penalized."
Plaintiff claims that defendants' provision of care violated the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and constituted negligence and medical malpractice under state law. Plaintiff's claims, as stated, are not cognizable here. First, Plaintiff provides no basis for his alleged Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment claims. Second, Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts for the court to determine if his treatment gives rise to an Eighth Amendment medical indifference claim. Third, Plaintiff has not adequately linked defendants to his claims: he has not shown Defendant Biter's personal involvement in his medical care; and he has not pleaded facts indicating that Ghaffari and Peters are state actors subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Finally, Plaintiff has not alleged compliance with the California Tort Claims Act, a prerequisite to bringing tort claims against public entities. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, but give him leave to amend to correct the above deficiencies that are capable of correction.
Section 1983 "provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States." Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.
Plaintiff makes conclusory allegations that Defendants' conduct violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. However, he does not specify the acts or omissions he alleges are unconstitutional, or his reasons for believing they are so. The Court can envision no Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment causes of action that would apply in this medical care context Plaintiff describes. Leave to amend these claims would be futile. The Court will dismiss them with prejudice.
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution entitles prisoners to medical care, and a prison official violates the Amendment when he acts with deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). "A medical need is serious if failure to treat it will result in significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Peralta, 744 F.3d at 1081 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). Examples of a serious medical need include "the existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain." Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014).
A prison official shows deliberate indifference to such a need if he "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health." Peralta, 744 F.3d at 1082 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). This "requires more than ordinary lack of due care." Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1066 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835). Instead, the prison official must "be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1066. Prison officials may demonstrate deliberate indifference when they "deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with medical treatment," and prison doctors can be deliberately indifferent in their provision of care. Id.
A prison official provides unconstitutional care where he or she ignores a previous treating physician's instructions, knows that a course of treatment is ineffective but continues it anyway, or delays necessary treatment without justification. See Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1097-1098 (9th Cir. 2006); Estate of Prasad ex rel. Prasad v. Cty. of Sutter, 958 F.Supp.2d 1101, 1112-1113 (E.D. Cal. 2013). Purposefulness may be inferred where a prison official is aware of the extent of the inmate's pain but declines to do anything to improve the inmate's situation. See Jett, 439 F. 3d at 1098. An inmate's harm need not be substantial, Id., at 1096 (citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1062 (9th Cir. 1992)), and even brief periods of unnecessary pain may be unconstitutional. See Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904-905 (9th Cir. 2002).
Negligence, inadvertence, or differences of medical opinion between the prisoner and health care providers, however, do not violate the Eighth Amendment. See Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); Lyons v. Busi, 566 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1191-1192 (E.D. Cal. 2008); see also Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014)(distinguishing plaintiff's long-uncorrected cataracts from "a case of ordinary medical mistake or negligence" and finding defendants deliberately indifferent). Even a showing of medical malpractice or gross negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., 609 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2010); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). Rather, "the plaintiff 'must show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances' and that the defendants 'chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff's health.'" Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2012)(overruled on other grounds by Peralta, 744 F.3d at 1083)(quoting Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332).
Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to establish that he had a serious medical need: a "severe posterior [shoulder] dislocation" leading to excruciating pain, multiple surgeries, and permanent mobility deficits. For screening purposes, the Court finds that ...
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