Black v. Interstate Commerce Commission

• Decision Date: 12 May 1948
• Docket Number: No. 12208.,12208.
• Parties: BLACK v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

167 F.2d 825

335 US 818

BLACK v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

No. 12208.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

May 12, 1948.

Joseph H. Blackshear, of Gainesville, Ga., and Elliott Goldstein, of Atlanta, Ga., for appellant.

James A. Murray, Chief Atty., Bureau of Motor Carriers, Interstate Commerce Commission, of Washington, D. C., and Lou H. Pou, Atty, Interstate Commerce Commission, J. Ellis Mundy, U. S. Atty., and Harvey H. Tisinger, Asst. U. S. Atty., all of Atlanta, Ga., for appellee.

Before SIBLEY, McCORD, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

McCORD, Circuit Judge.

The Interstate Commerce Commission brought this proceeding against R. Q. Black, doing business as Superior Trucking Company, alleging that the defendant was engaged in transporting and holding out to transport automobile parts, accessories, and supplies in interstate commerce, for compensation, as a common carrier by motor vehicle without having first secured a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing him to engage in such operations, in violation of Section 206(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act. 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 306(a), 322(b). An injunction was sought to restrain the defendant from continuing such operations unless he should obtain authority therefor from the Commission.

In answer, defendant admitted the allegations of the complaint as to transporting and holding out to transport automobile parts, but contends that he is authorized to engage in such operations under and by virtue of a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Commission which, with the Commission's approval, he had acquired by purchase from one Grady Russell Wallace, and which authorized the holder thereof to transport:

"Machinery and machinery parts, road construction machinery, contractor's equipment structural and reinforcing steel, and commodities requiring special equipment, over irregular routes, between points and places in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee."

It was stipulated that the defendant had been and was engaged in the transportation of certain automobile accessories and supplies, such as wood alcohol, wax and other polishing compounds, and anti-freeze preparations, without authority; at the trial defendant, through his counsel, consented to be enjoined against any further unauthorized transportation of such articles.

The case was tried by the court without a jury, upon a stipulation and the testimony of three witnesses. The court held that defendant's operations in transporting automobile parts, accessories and supplies were not authorized by his certificate of public convenience and necessity, and issued an injunction restraining him from continuing such unauthorized operations. From the order granting the injunction defendant brings this appeal.

Appellant here contends that the trial court erred (1) in admitting testimony as to the technical or trade meaning in the transportation industry of the phrase "machinery and machinery parts," when such meaning was plain and unambiguous; (2) in finding that transportation of automobile parts was not, in fact, the transportation of "machinery and machinery parts," as specified in the certificate of convenience and necessity issued by the Commission; (3) in admitting testimony as to whether appellant's transferor, Wallace, was engaged in transporting automobile parts before filing his application with the Commission for a certificate; (4) in finding as a fact that Wallace was not so engaged; and (5) in concluding that the certificate of convenience and necessity did not authorize the transportation of automobile parts.

The only question presented for our determination is whether the transportation of automobile parts, as engaged in by appellant, is in fact the transportation of "machinery and machinery parts," so as to be embraced within the certificate of convenience and necessity issued to appellant's transferor by the Commission.

We are clearly of...