Black v. Leatherwood Motor Coach Corp.

Decision Date01 September 1991
Docket NumberNo. 1320,1320
Citation92 Md.App. 27,606 A.2d 295
PartiesEstella BLACK, et al. v. LEATHERWOOD MOTOR COACH CORPORATION. ,
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Toni S. Lifshotz, argued (Henry I. Greenberg, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellants.

Jeffrey R. DeCaro, argued (Deborah E. Kane and O'Malley & Miles, on the brief), Upper Marlboro, for appellee.

Argued before ROSALYN B. BELL, FISCHER and DAVIS, JJ.

ROSALYN B. BELL, Judge.

Appellants/cross-appellees Estella Black and Mary Martinez brought an action against appellee Leatherwood Motor Coach Corporation (Leatherwood) and others for injuries they sustained in a bus accident on September 29, 1986 on Interstate 295 in Salem County, New Jersey. Joe Martinez, Mary Martinez's husband, also brought suit for damages to their marital relationship. Prior to trial, the parties agreed that the substantive tort law governing the case would be that of New Jersey.

A jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City returned verdicts for all three plaintiffs, but declined to award punitive damages. Estella Black was awarded $370,022.12, Mary Martinez $1,053,773.08, and Joe Martinez $53,312.82. Following the trial, Leatherwood requested that the jury's award to Mary and Joe Martinez be consolidated and reduced pursuant to Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann., § 11-108 (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol.) (the $350,000 "cap" on noneconomic damages in personal injury cases). The trial judge declined to make any adjustment to the judgment awarded by the jury.

Both sides have appealed from the judgment of the circuit court. Appellants contend that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury on the issue of punitive damages. Leatherwood, on the other hand, claims that the trial judge erred when he failed to apply the "cap" on noneconomic damages and reduce the jury's award to Mary and Joe Martinez. Leatherwood then argues that, assuming that the cap should have been applied, the loss of consortium claim of Mary and Joe Martinez should have been consolidated with Mary's individual claim and then reduced pursuant to the cap. Finding no error in the trial judge's rulings on the issues raised, we will affirm.

The facts are briefly stated. Appellants, residents of the District of Columbia and Virginia, were passengers on a bus owned by Leatherwood, then a Virginia corporation. The bus was travelling to Atlantic City, New Jersey, on September 29, 1986. An accident occurred which resulted in serious injuries to appellants. Appellants brought suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against appellee and several other defendants, including the driver and the charter company. 1 Appellants filed a Notice of Intent to Rely on Foreign Law, specifically New Jersey law. All parties agreed from the outset that the case was to be governed by New Jersey substantive law. The trial judge granted summary judgment to appellants on the issue of liability, and the case proceeded to trial solely on the issue of damages. The jury returned the verdicts described supra, but declined to award any punitive damages. Following the trial, the trial judge declined Leatherwood's request, pursuant to Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann., § 11-108, to reduce the noneconomic damages awarded by the jury. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.

JURY INSTRUCTION ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES 2

Following the trial judge's instructions to the jury, Leatherwood requested that the trial judge provide an additional instruction to the jury on the issue of punitive damages. Leatherwood argued that the trial judge's original instruction on the issue was inadequate because it failed to point out that negligence, even gross negligence, was insufficient to support an award of punitive damages. During a lengthy argument prior to the trial judge's additional instruction, appellants argued that no such additional instruction was necessary because Leatherwood's requested instruction was fairly covered in the trial judge's original charge to the jury. Appellants alternatively argued that, if the proposed instruction were given, some definition of the term "gross negligence" was required.

After initially indicating that he would not provide any additional instructions on the issue of punitive damages, the trial judge changed his mind. He stated to the jury:

"Counsel have asked that I clarify two things, so let me do that now. With regard to the punitive damages that I instructed you on, I want to make it clear that for you to find that punitive damages are supportable, something more than the mere commission of a wrong is required for punitive damages. Mere negligence is not enough, even if the negligence is so extreme in degree as to be characterized as gross negligence.

"For you to find that punitive damages are supported, it must go beyond even that."

Appellants excepted to this instruction, raising two issues: that the instruction was unnecessary because the trial judge's original instructions fairly covered the issue; and that the instruction was improper and confusing because it was taken out of context from a New Jersey appellate opinion on punitive damages. 3

On appeal, appellants contend (1) that the challenged instruction was covered in the trial judge's original instructions on the issue; (2) that the challenged instruction failed to provide a definition of the term "gross negligence"; (3) that, by stating that "counsel have asked," the trial judge implied that both sides requested the additional instruction; and (4) that by quoting one sentence from a New Jersey case out of context, the trial judge's additional instruction increased the likelihood of confusion on the part of the jury.

Leatherwood argues that the second and third issues raised by appellants were not preserved for our review because appellants did not raise these grounds when they excepted to the trial judge's additional instruction on punitive damages. Based on our review of the record, as outlined earlier, we agree that the second and third issues were not properly preserved. We explain.

Rule 2-520 sets forth the procedures for a trial judge's instructions to the jury in a civil case. Rule 2-520(a) mandates that the trial judge instruct the jury at the conclusion of the evidence and before closing arguments by counsel. The instructions may be given orally or in writing, verbatim as requested by counsel or in the court's own words, or by any combination of these methods. Rule 2-520(b).

In objecting to instructions as given, counsel must object "on the record promptly after the court instructs the jury, stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection." Rule 2-520(e). The purpose of this requirement is to allow the trial judge an opportunity to correct or supplement his instructions. Barone v. Winebrenner, 189 Md. 142, 145, 55 A.2d 505 (1947).

Upon objection to the instructions given, the trial judge has the power and discretion to amplify his or her charge to the jury to cover the law of the case. Wood v. Abell, 268 Md. 214, 235, 300 A.2d 665 (1973). In the event additional instructions are given, once again, the trial judge is not bound to use the words of counsel, but may orally express the additional instructions to the jury in his or her own words. Rule 2-520(c).

Upon the giving of additional instructions, the requirements of Rule 2-520(e) remain fully applicable; that is, "a party must fully comply with the requirements of the rule at every stage of the instructions in order to preserve his rights; otherwise there is nothing for us to consider on an appeal." Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 217 Md. 595, 612, 143 A.2d 627 (1958).

In this case, although appellants objected to Leatherwood's proposed additional instruction before it was given on the second issue raised on appeal (that no definition of gross negligence was provided), they failed to renew the objection on this ground in their post-instruction exceptions to the additional instruction as given. Thus, this issue is not preserved for our review. Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 253 Md. 324, 380, 252 A.2d 755 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 398 U.S. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1537, 26 L.Ed.2d 6 (1970); Morris v. Peace, 14 Md.App. 681, 687, 288 A.2d 600, cert. denied, 266 Md. 740 (1972) (appellate court will only address those objections made at the conclusion of the trial judge's charge to the jury). 4

With respect to appellants' third point discussed supra, that the trial judge's language left the impression with the jury that both parties requested the additional instruction, this argument was never raised at all in the trial court and was certainly not preserved. Rule 8-131(a).

Appellants did preserve their first and fourth arguments about the trial judge's additional instruction to the jury on punitive damages. First, appellants argued that the additional instruction had already been covered by the trial judge's previous instruction. While this assertion is arguably correct, appellants have failed to demonstrate on appeal how this repetition resulted in prejudice to their case. Trial judges, in their discretion, may decline to give a requested instruction when the substance of the instruction was fairly covered by other instructions. Myers v. Estate of Alessi, 80 Md.App. 124, 132, 560 A.2d 59, cert. denied, 317 Md. 640, 566 A.2d 101 (1989). This discretion, however, runs both ways; a trial judge may also, in his or her discretion, repeat an instruction which the trial judge feels may have been insufficient or erroneous when originally given. Wood, 268 Md. at 235, 300 A.2d 665; Fisher v. Baltimore Transit Co., 184 Md. 399, 402, 41 A.2d 297 (1945). In the absence of some claim of prejudice, we see no error in the trial judge's instruction based on appellants's first argument.

Appellants's fourth argument is that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury based on a single...

To continue reading

Request your trial
34 cases
  • U.S. ex rel. Ackley v. Intern. Business Machines, No. Civ. PJM 97-3189.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • 27 Julio 2000
    ...General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Interstate Serv. Co., 118 Md.App. 126, 130, 701 A.2d 1213, 1215 (1997); see Black v. Leatherwood Motor Coach Corp., 92 Md.App. 27, 37, 606 A.2d 295, 300 (1992); see also Grombach v. Oerlikon Tool & Arms Corp. of Am., 276 F.2d 155, 164 (4th 9. A cause of action und......
  • Erie v. Heffernan
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 13 Junio 2007
    ...to include damages recoverable in a wrongful death action).11 The Court of Special Appeals' decision in Black v. Leatherwood Motor Coach Corp., 92 Md.App. 27, 606 A.2d 295 (1992), is particularly illustrative for present purposes. In Black, Virginia and District of Columbia residents brough......
  • Goren v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 1 Septiembre 1996
    ...an instruction unless the party objects on the record promptly after the court instructs the jury ...." In Black v. Leatherwood Motor Coach Corp., 92 Md.App. 27, 606 A.2d 295, cert. denied sub nom., Leatherwood Motor Coach v. Martinez, 327 Md. 626, 612 A.2d 257 (1992), we held that the appe......
  • May v. Giant Food, Inc.
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 1 Septiembre 1997
    ...though appellant excepted at trial on ground that an unavoidable accident instruction was inappropriate); Black v. Leatherwood Motor Coach Corp., 92 Md.App. 27, 34, 606 A.2d 295 (same, regarding definition of "gross negligence"), cert. denied, 327 Md. 626, 612 A.2d 257 (1992); see also gene......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT