Black v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 03 January 1907
• Citation: 79 N.E. 797,193 Mass. 448
• Parties: BLACK v. NEW YORK, N.H. & H. R. CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

193 Mass. 448

79 N.E. 797

BLACK v. NEW YORK, N.H. & H. R. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

January 3, 1907

COUNSEL

H. W. Dunn and C. H. Walker, for plaintiff.

Choate Hall & Stewart, for defendant.

OPINION

KNOWLTON, C.J.

This action was brought to recover for an injury alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant's servants. The plaintiff was a passenger on the defendant's train which ran from Boston through Ashmont on the evening of February 7, 1903. He testified to having become so intoxicated that he had no recollection of anything that occurred after leaving a cigar store in Boston, until he awoke in the Boston City Hospital, about 4 o'clock the next day. One Thompson testified 'that he took the 9:23 train on the evening of February 7, 1903, at the South Station in Boston, for Ashmont, and occupied a seat near the rear of the last car of the train; that there were about 20 passengers in the car, and he noticed Black sitting in the seat opposite, very erect, with his eyes closed. When the conductor came through Mr. Black went through his pockets as if he were looking for a ticket, and not being able to find it, tendered a 50-cent piece in payment for his fare. The conductor began to name off the stations, from Field's Corner first, and then Ashmont, and when he said Ashmont Mr Black nodded his head. The conductor gave him his change and his rebate check. At Ashmont, where the train stops, there is a gravel walk running the whole length as a platform, then there is a flight of steps--10 or 12--that leads up to the asphalt walk around the station; so when you go up from the steps you have to walk along this walk. The conductor and brakeman took Black out of the car, one on each side. The distance from the steps of the car to the steps that lead up to the station was 25 feet. As they went along the platform the conductor and trainman were on each side of him. They tried to stand him up, but his legs would sink away from him. They sort of helped him up, and carried him to the bottom of the steps. When they went to the bottom of the steps they continued one on each side of him. Then one of the men got on one side, with his arm around him, and the other back of him sort of pushing him, and they took him up about the fifth or sixth step, and after they got him up there they turned around and left him and went down the steps. Mr. Blck sort of balanced himself there, just a minute, and then fell completely backward. He turned a complete somersault, and struck on the back of his head. The railroad men just had time to get down to the foot of the steps. There was a railing that led up those steps and the steps were about 10 feet wide. Mr. Black was upon the right-hand side, going up, and he was left right near the railing. When he fell he did not seize hold of anything. His arms were at his side.'

On this testimony the jury might find that the plaintiff was so intoxicated as to be incapable of standing, or walking, or caring for himself in any way, and that the defendant's servants, knowing his condition, left him near the top of the steps, where they knew, or ought to have known, that he was in great danger of falling and being seriously injured. They were under no obligation to remove him from the car, or to provide for his safety after he left the car. But they voluntarily undertook to help him from the car, and they were bound to use ordinary care in what they did that might affect his safety. Not only in the act of removal, but in the place where they left him, it was their duty to have reasonable regard for his safety in view of his manifest condition. The jury might have found that they were negligent in leaving him on the steps where a fall would be likely to do him much harm. Moody v. Boston & Maine R. R., 189 Mass. 277, 75 N.E. 631.

The defense rests principally upon the fact that the plaintiff was intoxicated, and was incapable of caring for himself after he was taken from the train, and therefore was not in the exercise of due care. If his voluntary intoxication was a direct and proximate cause of the injury, he cannot recover. The plaintiff contends that it was not a cause, but a mere condition, well known to the defendant's servants, and that their act was the direct and proximate cause of the injury, with which no other act or omission had any causal connection. The distinction here referred to is well recognized in law. Negligence of a plaintiff at the time of an injury caused by the negligence of another is no bar to his recovery from the other, unless it was a direct, contributing cause to the injury, as distinguished from a mere condition, in the absence of which the injury would not have occurred. This is pointed out in Steele v. Burkhardt, 104 Mass. 59, 6 Am. Rep. 191, and Murphy v. Deane, 101 Mass. 455, 3 Am. Rep. 390. It is also considered at some length in Newcomb v. Boston Protective Department, 146 Mass. 596, 16 N.E. 555, 4 Am. St. Rep. 354. See, also Marble v. Ross, 124 Mass. 44; Spofford v. Harlow, 3 Allen, 176; Hall v. Ripley, 119 Mass. 135; Stone v. Boston & Albany R. R. Co., 171 Mass. 536-544, 51 N.E. 1, 41 L. R. A. 794.

The application of this rule sometimes gives rise to difficult questions. But in this connection the doctrine has been established that, when the plaintiff's negligence or wrong-doing has placed his person or property in a dangerous situation which is beyond his immediate control, and the defendant, having full knowledge of the dangerous situation and full opportunity, by the exercise of reasonable care, to avoid any injury, nevertheless causes an injury, he is liable for the injury. This is because the plaintiff's former negligence is only remotely connected with the accident, while the defendant's conduct is the sole, direct and proximate cause of it. The principle was recognized by Mr. Justice Wells in Murphy v. Deane, 101 Mass. 455, 3 Am. Rep. 390, in these words: 'The last part of the instructions prayed for suggests another question which, in certain conditions of facts, may require care and consideration, to wit: how far the obligations and liabilities of one party are modified towards the other, after knowledge of a negligent exposure by the latter, to danger from the acts or neglect of the former. In such case, what would otherwise have been mere negligence may become willful or wanton wrong, or may take the place of the sole, direct or proximate cause, the negligence of the other party being then regarded as a remote, and not a contributory cause.' In Hibbard v. Thompson, 109 Mass. 286, we find this language: 'A physician may be called to prescribe for cases which originated in the carelessness of the patient, and though such carelessness would remotely contribute to the injury sued for, it would not relieve the physician from liability for his distinct negligence and the separate injury occasioned thereby. * * * In such cases the plaintiff's fault does not directly contribute to produce the injury sued for.' So in Pierce v. Cunard Steamship Company, 153 Mass. 87, 26 N.E. 416, this court said: 'But here the ground is not the fire, but an act done by the defendant after Pierce had got...