Black v. Nogan

• Decision Date: 29 November 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 16-9171 (MCA)
• Parties: JONATHAN BLACK, Petitioner, v. PATRICK NOGAN, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

JONATHAN BLACK, Petitioner, v. PATRICK NOGAN, et al., Respondents.

Civil Action No. 16-9171 (MCA)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

November 29, 2022

OPINION

HON MADELINE COX ARLEO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

This matter has been opened to the Court by Petitioner Jonathan Black's (“Petitioner,” “defendant,” or “Black”) filing of a Petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2254. Having reviewed the Amended Petition Respondent's Answer, Petitioner's Reply Brief, and the relevant record, the Court denies the Petition for the reasons stated in this Opinion, and also denies Petitioner's request for a hearing and a certificate of appealability (“COA”).

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A jury found Black guilty of second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1); first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); and third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) in connection with his shooting of a gas station attendant in the course of a robbery. The trial judge sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of sixteen years with an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier pursuant to the No Early Release Act (“NERA”), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.

Defendant appealed his convictions and the Appellate Division affirmed the convictions but remanded for resentencing. See State v. Black, 2009 WL 348548 (N.J.Super. App. Div. Feb. 13, 2009) (Black I). The Supreme Court denied petition for certification. State v. Black, 199 N.J. 132 (2009).

After the judge resentenced Petitioner to the original term following remand, see 11T, Petitioner appealed the sentence, and the Appellate Division affirmed by order dated December 16, 2010.^[1] See Petitioner's Exhibit A, State v. Black (Black II), A-6136-08 (App. Div. Dec. 16, 2010).

On July 10, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief (“PCR”). See Ra5. On December 16, 2013, the PCR court denied Petitioner's PCR without an evidentiary hearing. Ra8. Petitioner appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the PCR on May 19, 2016. See State v. Black, No. A-3608-13T3, 2016 WL 2903612, at *4 (N.J.Super. App. Div. May 19, 2016). On October 14, 2016, the New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification. State v. Black, 228 N.J. 50 (2016).

Petitioner submitted his original habeas petition for filing on December 2, 2016. See ECF No. 1. Petitioner subsequently submitted an Amended Petition on September 13, 2017. ECF No. 4. Respondents submitted their Answer on March 13, 2020. ECF No. 13. Petitioner submitted his Reply Brief on June 19, 2020.^[2] ECF Nos. 15, 16.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Section 2254(a) permits a court to entertain only claims alleging that a person is in state custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

Petitioner has the burden of establishing each claim in the petition. See Eley v. Erickson, 712 F.3d 837, 846 (3d Cir. 2013). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, tit. I, § 101 (1996), 28 U.S.C. § 2244, federal courts in habeas corpus cases must give considerable deference to determinations of state trial and appellate courts. See Renico v. Lett, 599 U.S. 766, 772 (2010).

Section 2254(d) sets the standard for granting or denying a writ of habeas corpus:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Where a state court adjudicated a petitioner's federal claim on the merits,^[3] a federal court “has no authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus unless the [state c]ourt's decision ‘was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,' or ‘was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'” Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 40-41 (2012) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).

“[C]learly established law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of t[he Supreme Court's] decisions,” at of the time of the relevant statecourt decision. White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). A decision is “contrary to” a Supreme Court holding within 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1) if the state court “contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases” or if it “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of th[e Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a [different] result.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 40506. Under the “‘unreasonable application' clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from th[e] [Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. As to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a federal court must confine its examination to evidence in the record. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180-81 (2011).

Where a petitioner seeks habeas relief, pursuant to § 2254(d)(2), on the basis of an erroneous factual determination of the state court, two provisions of the AEDPA necessarily apply. First, the AEDPA provides that “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct [and] [t]he applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 29 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005). Second, the AEDPA precludes habeas relief unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

A petition for a writ of habeas corpus “shall not be granted unless ... the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Wilkerson v. Superintendent Fayette SCI, 871 F.3d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 2017). This Court may, however, deny petitioner's unexhausted claim on the merits. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.”).

III. DISCUSSION

a. Ground One-Fourth Amendment Illegal Search and Seizure

In Ground One, Petitioner argues that his Fourth Amendment Rights were violated after an illegal search and seizure. Petitioner was apprehended following another armed robbery of a Foot Locker store and confessed to the earlier crime but repudiated his confession at trial. See Black, 2009 WL 348548 at *1. In his confession, defendant admitted to participation in armed robberies at ¶ 7-Eleven, a Quick Chek, the Exxon gas station, a Foot Locker, a Chinese restaurant, and a Kids R Us and that he and his accomplices were contemplating another robbery.^[4] Id. at *3, n.1.

On direct appeal, the Appellate Division summarized the facts surrounding Petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim and rejected it as follows:

Prior to trial for the gas station armed robbery, defendant challenged the admissibility of his confession, arguing that it should be suppressed as the fruit of an illegal search and seizure. A hearing occurred, at which evidence was presented which established that, during the evening of April 26, 2004, a Foot Locker store located on Morris Avenue in Union was robbed. Following the robbery, the victims reported that the crime had been committed by four masked and gloved black men, one wearing a black hoodie and one wearing a green camouflage jacket. On the day after the robbery, a customer who had attempted to enter the store while the robbery was in progress, but had been turned away, informed the police that, upon leaving the location, he had seen a 1995 silver Mitsubishi Galant with gray tinted windows, a damaged front fender and a broken right front headlight partially blocking the exit to the parking lot where the Foot Locker was situated.

Shortly after midnight on April 28, a car matching the description given by the customer was sighted by two police officers, Pietro DiGena and his partner, Barry Coleman, driving west on Morris Avenue in the vicinity of the Foot Locker store. They stopped it. Following the stop, the officers ordered the car's occupants to roll down the windows and, while waiting for a backup unit to arrive, the officers observed the car's passengers to be passing something from the front to the back seat, and then they observed the back seat passengers to be turning as though placing an object or objects behind them. After the arrival of the second police unit, DiGena approached the driver's side of the car, and at that time, he noted that the driver was wearing a black hooded sweatshirt and the occupant of the front passenger seat was wearing a green military jacket. Both items of clothing matched descriptions of clothing worn by the perpetrators of the Foot Locker

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