Black v. Reynolds
Decision Date | 24 June 1988 |
Citation | 528 So.2d 848 |
Parties | Robin D. BLACK v. Lucile B. REYNOLDS. 86-1160. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Sidney W. Jackson III, Mobile, for appellant.
Robert H. Rouse and Sandy J. Grisham of Coale, Helmsing, Lyons & Sims, Mobile, for appellee.
Lucile B. Reynolds brought this action against Robin D. Black to enforce a promissory note payable to her and assumed by Black in connection with the purchase of a business formerly owned by Mrs. Reynolds. Black alleged that the note was procured by fraud and was therefore not enforceable. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Reynolds.
The issue is whether the affidavit presented by Black in opposition to Reynolds's motion for summary judgment is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Rule 56(c), Ala.R.Civ.P.
Reynolds owned a business known as Parkway Service Store, located on Dauphin Island Parkway in Mobile County, Alabama. On February 17, 1983, she sold the business to Roy Herby Chestang in consideration of a promissory note and a security agreement executed by Chestang. The promissory note was subsequently modified by instruments dated February 4, 1984, and November 4, 1984.
On November 29, 1984, Black agreed to purchase the Parkway Service Store from Chestang. The agreement signed by Chestang and Black provided that Black would assume and become personally liable for the debt to Reynolds. Reynolds executed a "written approval of sale of assets and release" approving the sale and releasing Chestang from all obligations on the note and the security agreement. This litigation resulted when Black defaulted on the note.
Black contends that summary judgment was improper because allegations of fraud in his answer and affidavit were sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. He further claims that Reynolds's alleged participation in the fraud perpetrated against him prevents his contract with Chestang from operating as a novation and making him liable to Reynolds.
Reynolds contends that Black's affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary judgment is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 56, which requires the nonmovant to bring forth admissible evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Reynolds also contends that Black's affidavit was not based on matters within his personal knowledge, as required by Rule 56.
Black's affidavit states in pertinent part:
Under Rule 56, summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party...
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