Black v. Richfield Oil Corporation
Decision Date | 25 April 1941 |
Docket Number | No. 230.,230. |
Citation | 41 F. Supp. 988 |
Parties | BLACK v. RICHFIELD OIL CORPORATION. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
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Lyon & Lyon and Robert E. Paradise, all of Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant.
Oliver O. Clark and Philip Subkow, both of Los Angeles, for plaintiff.
The plaintiff in this action seeks relief under three separate counts. All three counts revolve around a certain licensing agreement for use of inventions entered into by the plaintiff with the Pan American Petroleum Company, under date of September 15, 1925. Under the first count, plaintiff seeks, through declaratory relief, to have the rights of the parties under said agreement determined. The second count is brought for the purpose of reforming said agreement so that it will include certain inventions of plaintiff not specifically described therein. The third count seeks an accounting. By stipulation the trial of the third count was continued until after a determination of the first two counts, consequently, this opinion is confined solely to the first two counts.
The main difficulty between the parties arises over the fact that the licensing agreement omitted to specifically mention patent application No. 599,403, filed November 6, 1922, which culminated in patent No. 2,075,164, issued March 30, 1937. This patent covers the use of chrome alloy tubing used in the cracking of oil and is described in the said patent as "Method and Apparatus for Converting Hydrocarbons". The nature of the patent is not necessarily material to this opinion but a detailed description of the same and its importance in the refining of oil is fully set forth in Gasoline Products Co., Inc. v. Coe, 66 App. D.C. 333, 87 F.2d 550.
From the evidence it appears that on January 1, 1920, the plaintiff commenced his employment as General Superintendent of Refineries for the Doheny interest, which at the time controlled the Pan American Petroleum and Transport Company and the Pan American Petroleum Company. At the time of his employment he had developed a high pressure process for the cracking of oil, commonly known in the industry as "Black's Process".
On October 30, 1924, plaintiff licensed in writing to the Pan American Petroleum and Transport Company certain patents described therein. In 1925 the Doheny interest disposed of the Pan American Petroleum and Transport Company but retained the Pan American Petroleum Company, and on August 25, 1925, Olin Wellborn, acting for the latter named company wrote to the plaintiff, who was then in New York, asking that a licensing agreement be executed between the plaintiff and the said Petroleum Company. The proposed agreement was enclosed in the letter and among other things Mr. Wellborn stated:
Thereupon plaintiff executed the said agreement and inserted therein two additional application numbers and returned the same to Mr. Wellborn. Thereafter, Mr. Wellborn redrafted the agreement and sent the same to the plaintiff for signature, which was duly executed by the plaintiff. As a result the evidence disclosed two agreements executed between the same parties, both bearing the date of September 15, 1925. The court is of the opinion that the later agreement is the real agreement between the parties and therefore finds that the agreement between the parties is plaintiff's Exhibit 5, which in part provides:
Then follow provisions for the computation and payment of royalties and other provisions not pertinent to this action.
Thereafter on or about June 21, 1928, the Richfield Oil Company of California acquired the controlling interest in the Pan American Petroleum Company. Later a receiver was appointed for the Richfield Oil Company of California and in due time, it, together with the Pan American Petroleum Company, were brought under the provisions of § 77B of the National Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 207.
In due time defendant corporation was organized and submitted a plan to the court whereby it proposed to purchase the assets of the old Richfield Company and its subsidiaries and assume certain existing liabilities of the trustee, including such contracts that had been affirmed by the court. To this end, the new Richfield Company raised some $20,000,000.00 in cash and acquired by purchase the assets of the old company and entered into an agreement assuming certain liabilities, including the licensing agreement of September 15, 1925.
Defendant contends that the licensing agreement involved in this litigation was never affirmed by the court and was never specifically assumed under the reorganization agreement. The evidence clearly indicates that the trustee recognized the agreement and the conduct of the defendant corporation establishes that it too assumed the said licensing agreement had been affirmed by the court and that they were bound by the terms of the same. For the purposes of this opinion, I have acted on the assumption that the new corporation specifically assumed the said agreement and is bound by the terms thereof, to the same force and effect as if the said agreement had been specifically affirmed by the court in accordance with the usual procedure under § 77B.
At the time of the reorganization, the new company contemplated the abandonment of the "Black Process" of refining and planned entering into a refining management contract with the Sinclair Refining Company. To this end Mr. Ragland, attorney for the new company, employed a patent attorney to examine the license agreement in litigation for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the new company would be liable for the payment of royalties if in the operation of a new plant, it ceased using the plaintiff's process.
The sale under the provisions of § 77B was completed and the new company thereupon entered into a refining management contract with the Sinclair Refining Company and under the said contract constructed a new refinery, and upon its completion abandoned the old plant using the "Black Process". The new company continued the payment of the royalties to the plaintiff up to the time of such abandonment.
Upon the ceasing of the payment of royalties, plaintiff had an interview with representatives of the defendant and was thereupon advised by the defendant that it was no longer using any of the inventions described in the licensing agreement of...
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