Black v. Victoria Lloyds Ins. Co., B14-87-794-CV
| Decision Date | 30 March 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. B14-87-794-CV,B14-87-794-CV |
| Parties | Randal F. BLACK, C.O. Daniel and Lisa Jeanine Sudderth, Appellants, v. VICTORIA LLOYDS INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. (14th Dist.) |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Kathryn A. Knobloch, Jimmy Williamson, Houston, for appellants.
Michael C. Neel, Robert L. LeBoeuf, Charles Seymore, Houston, for appellee.
Before PAUL PRESSLER, DRAUGHN and ELLIS, JJ.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment. On January 20, 1982, Appellee Victoria Lloyds Insurance Company issued to Statewide Trucking, Inc., d/b/a Wood Brothers Transfer, Inc., policies of liability insurance covering vehicles owned or leased and operated by those entities in their business of providing motor carrier transportation services. Statewide and Wood Brothers were the named insureds on those policies which complied with the requirements of TEX.REV.CIV.ST.ANN. art. 911b (Vernon Supp.1989), the Motor Carriers Act. Coverage specifically excluded the owner, lessor or any agent or employee thereof while the vehicle was not being used exclusively in the business of the named insured and over a route the named insured was authorized to serve.
On February 23, 1982, Appellant C.O. Daniel "leased on" with Wood Brothers. Under the lease arrangement, the truck which he owned was leased to Wood Brothers for Daniel's use as an independent contractor in conducting Wood Brothers' business. While the lease is silent on the subject of liability insurance, all parties agree that Daniel's truck was covered under Wood Brothers' liability insurance policy. Daniel was responsible for payment of the premium, however, which Wood Brothers deducted from his pay checks. In compliance with the insurance requirements of the Texas Railroad Commission and article 911b, supra, Daniel was given a "cab card." This card, which is to be carried by all motor carriers, is issued only after proof of required minimum liability insurance has been furnished to the Railroad Commission by a registered motor carrier. In addition, Daniel received an insurance "identification card" which is reproduced below:
2) Statewide Trucking
2410 Commerce
Houston, Texas 77003
Agent SUMMIT GENERAL AGENCY, INC.
(BACK)
THIS POLICY COMPLIES WITH THE COMPULSORY AUTO LAWS OF THE STATE OF TEXAS
1. Stay calm. DO NOT leave the scene.
2. Do not discuss the accident with anyone but the police or an authorized representative of Victoria Lloyds.
3. Be sure to obtain: The owner and driver's name, address, license number, both plate and driver's license number, their insurance company, name and address of injured persons and extent of injury and witnesses' names and addresses.
4. Write down the details.
5. As soon as possible, notify your agent or the Insurance Company, 1-713/527-0444, 3131 W. Alabama, Houston, Texas 77098.
On October 6, 1982, Appellant Lisa Sudderth, daughter of C.O. Daniel, was driving Daniel's truck on a personal errand. She was involved in an accident with Appellant Randal F. Black who was seriously injured as a result. Victoria Lloyds denied coverage. Black sued Sudderth, Daniel, Wood Brothers, Statewide and Victoria Lloyds. Sudderth and Daniel filed a cross action against the other defendants. Upon motion, the parties were realigned and the cross action, now with Black, Sudderth and Daniel against Wood Brothers, Statewide Trucking, and Victoria Lloyds, was severed. The auto collision case against Daniel and Sudderth then proceeded to trial. A jury awarded Black judgment against Sudderth.
In the cross action, Black, Sudderth and Daniel eventually nonsuited Wood Brothers and Statewide. The trial court then granted a final summary judgment in favor of Victoria Lloyds. It is that summary judgment which is before us on appeal.
A defendant who moves for summary judgment has the burden to show as a matter of law that no material issue of fact exists as to each of the plaintiff's causes of action. Citizens First National Bank v. Cinco Exploration Co., 540 S.W.2d 292, 294 (Tex.1976). In other words, the defendant must show that the plaintiff could not prevail at trial on any theories pleaded. Delgado v. Burns, 656 S.W.2d 428 (Tex.1983); Smith v. Muckelroy Enterprises, 537 S.W.2d 104, 105-106 (Tex.Civ.App.--Tyler 1976, no writ). The defendant may accomplish this by showing that at least one element of each of the plaintiff's causes of action has been established against the plaintiff. When a summary judgment order does not state the specific grounds upon which it is granted, a party appealing from such order must show that each of the independent arguments alleged in the motion is insufficient to support the order. McCrea v. Cubilla Condominium Corporation, 685 S.W.2d 755, 757 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). On review, evidence favorable to the non-movant will be taken as true and every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom will be indulged in his favor. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex.1985).
In this case, the relevant facts are not disputed. Neither are the terms of the coverage provided by the Victoria Lloyds insurance policy which actually was in effect at the time of the collision. Daniel claims that when he leased on with Wood Brothers a representative of Wood Brothers provided him with the ID. He was told that Wood Brothers had liability but not collision insurance on their "hired" trucks. He was not told that the coverage was limited to only those times when the truck was being used for Wood Brothers' business, nor was he informed of the existence of "bob-tail" coverage to supplement the company's policy. Wood Brothers also told Daniel that he was responsible for payment of the insurance premium which would be deducted from his pay. He believed, without making inquiry, that the insurance provided by Wood Brothers included liability for all uses of the truck, both business and personal. He does not claim, however, that anyone at Victoria Lloyds represented this to be the case. In fact, neither Daniel nor Victoria Lloyds claim to have had any direct contact with each other. The only "representation" made to Daniel by Victoria Lloyds was the ID card issued to Wood Brothers and supplied to him by them. Daniel was not given a copy of the insurance policy nor did he request one prior to the occurrence of the accident.
Plaintiffs pleaded that the gratuitous issuance of the identification card in a form substantially similar to that suggested by the Safety Responsibility Act, TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN., art. 6701h § 1B(b) (Vernon, 1981) and in addition to the "cab card" required by art. 911b § 13, constituted a misrepresentation by the insurance company that the truck was insured under both statutes. Daniel claims he relied on this misrepresentation in not obtaining additional insurance to cover the use of his truck for personal errands. In addition to pleading this misrepresentation which allegedly violated the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act and Section 21.21 of the Insurance Code, plaintiffs also alleged that Victoria Lloyds was negligent (1) in its failure to inform Daniel of the policy terms and limitations; (2) in its failure to defend Daniel or Sudderth; (3) in its failure to agree to a consent judgment; and (4) in its failure to notify the excess carrier and offer it the opportunity to defend or settle the case. Plaintiff also claimed Victoria Lloyds breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by virtue of its failure to settle or defend.
As grounds for summary judgment, Victoria Lloyds contended (1) that there was no misrepresentation as a matter of law, (2) that there was no coverage for the accident in question, and (3) that Black and Sudderth had no standing to bring actions for misrepresentation since, if any misrepresentation were made, it was not made to them. In granting the summary judgment without specifying the grounds therefor, the trial court impliedly relied on all the arguments presented in the motion.
Appellants bring seven points of error challenging the judgment. In points one and two appellants argue that the court erred in granting the summary judgment because appellee's motion failed to address all causes of action and to negate fact issues as to one essential element in each cause of action plead by appellants. Points three and four challenge the court's finding that there was no misrepresentation as a matter of law alleging that the insurance card represented that the policy was issued pursuant to art. 6701h when it was not. This misrepresentation, according to appellants, was a violation of art. 17.46 of the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act and art. 21.21 of the Insurance Code. Points five and six challenge the holding that Sudderth and Black lacked standing. Point five alleges that Sudderth is a consumer under the DTPA, a person injured under art. 21.21, an insured on the policy under certain circumstances and an assignee of Daniel and Black. Similarly, point six claims Black had standing because he is a statutorily intended beneficiary of an automobile liability insurance contract, a person injured under art. 21.21, a judgment creditor of Sudderth and an assignee of Daniel. Point of error seven contends that the court erred in holding there was no coverage for Sudderth.
Section 1A(a) of the Safety Responsibility Act, art. 6701h, as amended in 1981, provides as follows:
On and after January 1, 1982, no motor vehicle 1 may be operated in this state unless a policy of automobile liability insurance in at least the minimum amounts to provide evidence of financial responsibility under this Act is in effect to insure against potential losses which may arise out of the operation of that...
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Black v. Victoria Lloyds Ins. Co.
...Victoria Lloyds' motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment against Black, Daniel and Sudderth. The court of appeals affirmed. 769 S.W.2d 949. For the reasons explained herein, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the trial court for further The iss......