Black v. Young
| Decision Date | 10 July 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 19294,19294 |
| Citation | 122 Idaho 302,834 P.2d 304 |
| Parties | Glen R. BLACK and Peggy A. Black, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Lawrence J. YOUNG, Mayor of the City of Ketchum, Idaho; Thomas F. Held, Suzanne Orb, Guy P. Coles, and Susan H. Wolford, individually and in their capacities as City Councilmen of the City of Ketchum, Idaho; the City Council of Ketchum, Idaho; and the City of Ketchum, Idaho, Defendants-Respondents. Twin Falls, April 1992 Term |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Lawson, Peebles, Ballard & Edsson, Ketchum, for defendants-respondents. Edward A. Lawson, argued.
In August of 1987, the Blacks purchased a portion of a city block located in the City of Ketchum. An alley ran through the middle of the city block, and the Blacks owned property on both sides of the alley. This alley had been blocked off on one end by the only other property owner on the block. The Blacks intended to build a motel on this property.
On November 30, 1987, the Blacks applied to the Ketchum Planning and Zoning Commission ("Commission") for vacation of the portion of the alley that runs adjacent to their property. The Commission recommended that the Ketchum City Council ("City Council") vacate the alley.
On December 21, 1987, the matter came up before the City Council. After some discussion, the City Council tabled the matter for a special session to be held on December 29, 1987.
On December 29, 1987, the City Council took up the matter again in special session. At this meeting, the Blacks offered the On January 18, 1988, the City Council took up the matter again. After some discussion, the City Council tabled Ordinance Number 471, the proposed ordinance to vacate the alley.
[122 Idaho 304] City of Ketchum $5,000.00, an old log cabin on the property, and any salvageable material from the service station located on the property.
On February 1, 1988, the City Council again took up consideration of the proposed ordinance. At this meeting, the Blacks expressed concerns about the proposed ordinance. Specifically, the Blacks were concerned with the vacation of the alley being tied to approval of the design of the project and that the alley would not be vacated until the City of Ketchum issued a certificate of occupancy for the motel. The matter was tabled again.
On February 16, 1988, the City Council met and discussed the Black's redesign of the motel project. The Blacks remained firm that the City Council's requirements for vacation of the alley were unacceptable to them.
On April 4, 1988, and after submission of the design plan, the City Council unanimously adopted Ordinance Number 471. 1
[122 Idaho 305] Sections 2 and 3 of Ordinance Number 471 conditioned vacation of the alley upon the issuance of a building permit and the funding of a construction loan in the amount of $2,500,000.00. In addition, Ordinance Number 471 §§ 2 and 3 gave the City of Ketchum a right of reversion if a certificate of occupancy was not issued for the motel. On the same day, the Blacks signed an estoppel affidavit which provided that the conditions of the ordinance were acceptable to them and would not be challenged by them.
On August 1, 1988, the City Council considered and approved a one year extension of time for the Blacks to apply for a building permit.
The Commission approved the revised plans for the motel, including reduced underground parking spaces and increased above-ground parking spaces. The City Planning Department appealed this decision to the City Council. The appeal came up on May 15, 1989. After this hearing, the City Council reversed the decision of the Commission.
On December 4, 1989, the Blacks presented new plans for the project to the City Council. Without vote, the City Council advised the Blacks that the new plans were unacceptable. The focus was on the lack of underground parking in the new plan.
On February 20, 1990, the City Council again took up the matter, this time discussing with the Blacks the parking arrangements. The parties scheduled a work session for a later date.
On March 7, 1990, the work session was held. However, on June 18, 1990, the City Council denied the Commission's recommendation to approve the new plan.
On December 3, 1990, the Blacks filed a complaint against the mayor and city council members of the City of Ketchum. The complaint described the property in question, alleged that the mayor and city council members enacted Ordinance Number 471, that § 2 of Ordinance Number 471 was ultra vires, that the defendant's requirement that the Blacks sign an estoppel affidavit was ultra vires, that the right of reversion contained in Ordinance Number 471 was ultra vires, and that these conditions were ultra vires because of I.C. § 50-311. The Blacks prayed for title to the property, delivery of a quitclaim deed from defendants, and costs and fees, including development costs.
On December 21, 1990, the Blacks filed an amended complaint. The only change in the amended complaint was the addition of the City Council of Ketchum and the City of Ketchum as defendants. These new defendants, along with the original defendants, comprise the respondents, City of Ketchum.
On January 29, 1991, the original defendants filed an answer to the complaint. In the answer, the original defendants listed nine affirmative defenses: (1) failure to state a claim; (2) waiver; (3) estoppel; (4) consent; (5) laches; (6) failure to satisfy conditions precedent; (7) fraud; (8) authority of statute or ordinance; and (9) immunity.
Also on January 29, 1991, the original defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. In their motion for summary judgment, the original defendants asserted that the city has the authority to impose conditions upon ordinances to vacate streets or alleys, that the Blacks are estopped to deny the validity of the ordinance On January 31, 1991, the Blacks filed an application for the entry of default as to the City of Ketchum and the City Council. The application for the entry of default was filed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 55(a)(1). The district court entered an order granting the application on the same day conditioned upon proper service.
[122 Idaho 306] and that the Blacks' claim is barred by I.C. § 67-6521(d). The original defendants also filed a supporting memorandum.
On February 11, 1991, the Blacks filed a motion for summary judgment. In their motion for summary judgment, the Blacks asserted that the City of Ketchum had no authority to impose conditions, that the conditions were ultra vires, in violation of I.C. § 50-311, that they were not estopped to deny the validity of the conditions, that the Local Planning Act does not bar their claim, and that the City of Ketchum did not plead fraud with particularity. The Blacks also filed a supporting memorandum.
On February 15, 1991, the Blacks filed a motion for the entry of default judgment against the City of Ketchum and the City Council. In addition, the Blacks filed a supporting memorandum, which stated "[a]s of February 11, 1991, neither the City Council of Ketchum nor the City of Ketchum has made an appearance or filed an answer in this matter."
On February 22, 1991, the City of Ketchum filed an amended answer to the complaint. The amended answer listed all parties comprising the respondents, City of Ketchum, as defendants.
After various supporting and opposing memorandums were filed, the district court entered an order denying the Blacks' motion for entry of default judgment, and granting the City of Ketchum's motion to set aside the entry of default.
On April 1, 1991, the district court entered its memorandum decision and order regarding the cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court denied the Blacks' motion for summary judgment and granted Ketchum's motion for summary judgment. In the memorandum decision and order, the district court reasoned as follows:
The Court finds that the parties in this action were competent and represented by counsel when they arrived at a meeting of the minds regarding the vacation of the alley in question. All legal and practical aspects of the agreement were negotiated in good faith, were agreed upon and were set forth in a contract that is clear and concise. The terms of the contract were set forth in Ketchum City Ordinance 471, section 2. Under the terms of this section the vacation of the alley was conditioned upon plaintiffs obtaining two specific items; a building permit for the motel approved under Plan No. CR-88-002, and the funding of a construction loan in the amount of at least $2,500,000.00. The Court finds that at the time of the hearing of these motions neither of the two conditions set forth in Ordinance 471, section 2 have been completed.
Plaintiffs now petition this Court to have their required performance under the contract waived while continuing to hold defendants to their agreed performance. The basis for the plaintiffs' position is that the City acted without the authority to impose such conditions on the vacation of the alley in question. If this position were sustained it would result in a financial windfall for plaintiffs, and an equal financial detriment to the City. Not only would the City suffer financially, but the health, safety and welfare of the citizens would be effected and deterred through the loss of a valuable thoroughfare. The Court finds that pursuant to statutory mandate the City was within its' authority imposing such conditions for the public good.
Plaintiffs have also attempted to convince the Court that the City sold the alley in question for the consideration of an old cabin of limited value. The Court finds that this transaction was not a part of the parties original contract as set forth in Ordinance 471, section 2. This transaction was separate and distinct from the parties original agreement.
Since plaintiffs have not performed...
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