Blackburn v. Mann

• Decision Date: 31 January 1877
• Citation: 85 Ill. 222,1877 WL 9528
• Parties: DAVID S. BLACKBURNv.MARY JANE MANN.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

85 Ill. 222

1877 WL 9528 (Ill.)

DAVID S. BLACKBURN

v.MARY JANE MANN.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

January Term, 1877.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Vermilion county; the Hon. OLIVER L. DAVIS, Judge, presiding.

This action was brought by Sarah Jane Mann against David S. Blackburn, to recover damages for a breach of a marriage contract, alleged to have existed between the parties. The declaration is in assumpsit, and contains three counts. In the first count it is averred, in consideration plaintiff had, on request of defendant, promised to marry him when thereunto requested, he promised to marry her when he should be requested. Both in the second and third counts the promise is laid as a mutual promise to marry each other “within a reasonable time” after making the contract. The third count avers seduction, by way of aggravation of damages. Breaches assigned in all the counts are, defendant refused to marry plaintiff, and in disregard of his promise married another woman.

Only the general issue was pleaded, but a stipulation was signed by counsel as follows: “It is also agreed, that, under the above plea, any evidence may be introduced which would be competent under any pleading well pleaded in this cause.”

An unusual amount of evidence was heard on the trial, much of it conflicting in the extreme, and the jury, under instructions from the court, found the issues for plaintiff, and assessed her damages at $15,000. Motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, were severally overruled, and judgment pronounced on the verdict. Defendant brings the case to this court on appeal.

Mr. J. W. GORDON, and Messrs. ALLEN, MACK & DAVIS, for the appellant.

Messrs. BISHOP & MANN, for the appellee. Mr. JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the Court:

That a promise by defendant to marry plaintiff was proven by the testimony of plaintiff and other witnesses, must be conceded. It was met by a broad and unequivocal denial by defendant, except as to a promise dependent on a contingency that never happened. On the mere weight of the evidence, if it shall be found applicable to the issues made by the pleadings, counsel make no question against the verdict.

The assumption, there is a variance between the contract as stated in the several counts of the declaration, and the proof adduced on the trial in support of it, arises from a misconception of the evidence. Regarding, as we must do, the finding of the jury as establishing the truth of plaintiff's testimony, our understanding is, it is sufficient to sustain either count of the declaration. It was a general promise to marry, and the law implies it should be performed within a reasonable time. As to the time when the marriage should be solemnized, it was said, “it might be one year or it might be ten,” but that did not qualify the contract itself. That, as we have seen, was general, although the day upon which it should be celebrated was left as a matter for future mutual arrangement. It is a subject about which parties engaged to be married might be expected to converse frequently, and perhaps to change plans agreed upon to suit each other's convenience. It is doubtful whether the parties, in discussing the time when they would celebrate their marriage, understood the indefinite expressions “it might be one year or it might be ten,” in the sense of fixing any definite time. It was simply an expression of an opinion on a question they had not then fully considered, but would be a subject of future agreement. That is all these phrases mean in this connection, and the sequel shows that is the sense in which the parties themselves understood them.

But, aside from the question of any express promise, the relations of the parties were such as warranted the inference a general engagement to marry existed between them. Their social relations continued through a period of many years, during all which time defendant was constantly giving plaintiff assurances of his affectionate regard. His attentions to her during that protracted period, so far as she could know or believe, were exclusive, and of that cordial character not to be expected from one not intending to make her his wife. Appealing to everything sacred that could give sanctity to assurrance, he solemnly avowed “he would never disown” her. She had given birth to a child, of which he was the father. Both before and after the birth of the child, he made her the most positive pledges that could be given, he would make her his wife so soon as some obstacles, which he alleged then existed, should be removed. When she pleaded with him to remove the stain from her character, and the great sorrow that pressed so heavily upon her, he again and again asseverated his constancy and honorable intentions towards her. These repeated declarations may, with great propriety, be regarded as renewals of his earlier express promise to marry plaintiff. Although denied by...