Blackburn v. Michael

• Decision Date: 29 June 1999
• Docket Number: Record No. 0259-98-3.
• Citation: Blackburn v. Michael, 515 S.E.2d 780, 30 Va.App. 95 (Va. App. 1999)
• Parties: Robert A. BLACKBURN v. Joan Lavonne MICHAEL.
• Court: Virginia Court of Appeals

515 S.E.2d 780

30 Va. App. 95

Robert A. BLACKBURN v. Joan Lavonne MICHAEL.

Record No. 0259-98-3.

Court of Appeals of Virginia, Salem.

June 29, 1999.

Franklin R. Blatt, Harrisonburg (Christopher J. Smith, on brief), for appellant.

Walter F. Green, IV (Green & O'Donnell, on brief), Harrisonburg, for appellee.

Present: FITZPATRICK, C.J., and COLEMAN and LEMONS, JJ. COLEMAN, Judge.

Robert A. Blackburn (husband) moved the trial court to reduce his spousal support obligation, which amount had been agreed upon in a property settlement agreement incorporated by reference into the divorce decree, and to increase Joan Lavonne Michael's (wife's) child support obligation. He based both motions upon the fact that wife's earning capacity had increased. Although the trial court imputed income to wife for the purpose of increasing her child support obligation, the court declined to impute income to her for the purpose of reducing husband's spousal support obligation and determined that wife's change in circumstance did not warrant modification of spousal support. Husband contends the trial court erred in not imputing income to wife for the purpose of determining spousal support and applied the wrong standard for determining whether to modify the spousal support award. We agree that the court erred in not imputing income to the wife for purposes of determining spousal support and in the standard it applied. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the case for further consideration.

BACKGROUND

Robert A. Blackburn and Joan Lavonne Michael were divorced by a decree that incorporated their property settlement agreement. That agreement provided in relevant part as follows:

Husband shall pay to Wife spousal support in the monthly amount of $642.00, payable on September 1, 1996, and continuing each and every month thereafter until the death of either party, the remarriage of Wife, or modified by a Court of competent jurisdiction.

The agreement also awarded the wife custody of the party's minor child and provided an amount for child support, which provisions the court also incorporated in the decree. Several months after entry of the decree, the juvenile and domestic relations district court transferred child custody to the husband and ordered wife to pay husband $122 a month in child support.

Approximately eight months after the divorce decree, husband filed a motion for the court to reduce his spousal support obligation. The motion alleged as the ground for modification that wife's earnings and earning capacity had increased. After entry of the divorce decree, wife had received diplomas certifying her as a "computer operations specialist" and a "legal secretary."

After hearing the motion, the trial court made two separate and distinct findings. First, the court found that a material change in circumstances had occurred because, by completing her training, wife had increased her earning capacity. Thus, the court imputed to her income of $1,039 per month for the purpose of determining child support. Based on the imputed income, the trial court increased wife's child support obligation in accordance with the guidelines from $122 per month to $222.45 per month.

Next, the court held that wife's change in circumstances did not warrant a modification of the amount of spousal support which had been incorporated from the property settlement agreement. In deciding to modify child support but not spousal support, the trial court emphasized the significance of the parties' recently-executed property settlement agreement, which fixed the amount of spousal support. The trial court ruled that although the language of the property settlement agreement and Code § 20-109 expressly authorized it to modify the agreed upon spousal support award, considering the language of the property settlement agreement, its comprehensive nature, and considering how recently the parties had executed the agreement, a change in circumstances would have to be "very dramatic" or a "real clear, meaningful, significant material change" to warrant modification of the amount of spousal support. The trial court concluded that "there ha[d] been no material change of circumstances regarding spousal support."

ANALYSIS

Code § 20-109(A) empowers trial courts to modify a spousal support award, but Code § 20-109(C) expressly limits the court's authority to modify an agreed upon spousal support award according to the terms of a stipulation or contract signed by the parties. See e.g., Pendleton v. Pendleton, 22 Va.App. 503, 506-07, 471 S.E.2d 783, 784-85 (1996) (holding that parties may bind themselves to a spousal support agreement which limits the judicial authority to modify). Divorcing spouses who are sui juris may bind themselves by contract to pay a specified amount of spousal support and may specify the extent to which a court may modify a spousal support award. Here, while the parties agreed upon the amount of spousal support that husband would pay wife, they expressly granted the trial court the authority, without specified limitation, to modify spousal support.

On the other hand, parties may not by contract limit their responsibility to support a child or a court's authority to determine the amount of child support. See Featherstone v. Brooks, 220 Va. 443, 446, 258 S.E.2d 513, 515 (1979). While a court is not bound by an agreement between parents to pay child support, the court may approve and incorporate the terms of an agreement setting child support, provided the court determines that the terms of the agreement are in a child's best interest. See Scott v. Scott, 12 Va.App. 1245, 1248, 408 S.E.2d 579, 582 (1991). Thus, although agreements for child and spousal support are to be treated differently by trial courts, where, as here, the spousal agreement provided no separate criteria for determining how or when to modify support, we hold that the statutory standard, which is whether a material change of circumstances has occurred, applies to a request to modify child support and to modify spousal support. See MacNelly v. MacNelly, 17 Va.App. 427, 430, 437...