Blackburn v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 14 February 1985
• Docket Number: No. 15142,15142
• Citation: Blackburn v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 697 P.2d 425, 108 Idaho 85 (Idaho 1985)
• Parties: Von C. BLACKBURN, as an Individual and as Guardian ad litem for Alan Von Blackburn, Lori Jo Blackburn and Thomas Von Blackburn, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant- Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 425

697 P.2d 425

108 Idaho 85

Von C. BLACKBURN, as an Individual and as Guardian ad litem for Alan Von Blackburn, Lori Jo Blackburn and Thomas Von Blackburn, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant- Respondent.

No. 15142.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Feb. 14, 1985.

Larry Robert Duff, of Goodman & Duff, Rupert, for plaintiff-appellant.

John A. Doerr, of Doerr & Trainor, Twin Falls, for defendant-respondent.

Kim Jay Trout and Stephan C. Rice, Lewiston, for amicus curiae, Idaho Trial Lawyers Association.

SHEPARD, Justice.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment rendered against plaintiff-appellant Blackburn in an action brought by Blackburn against his insurance carrier under the uninsured motorist coverage of an insurance policy.We affirm.

The facts are stipulated and we are presented solely with a question of law.Two cars containing members of the Blackburn and Day (not parties to this action) families were stopped in a highway emergency lane when a car driven by Ellsworth struck them.The negligence of Ellsworth was the proximate cause of the accident.Blackburn's wife and one of his children were killed and two of his other children injured.One member of the Day family was killed and others were injured.Ellsworth carried liability insurance with Farmers Insurance Exchange in the minimum amounts of $10,000 per person, $20,000 per occurrence, as then required by the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, I.C. § 49-1505(d)¹.Blackburn brought suit against Ellsworth and recovered a judgment in the amount of $150,000.Farmers Insurance Exchange tendered the $20,000 policy limits through settlement agreements with the Blackburn and Day families.Blackburn received $10,000 of that settlement.

Blackburn had purchased an insurance policy from respondentState Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, which contained uninsured motorist protection of $15,000 per person, $30,000 per occurrence.That policy was in effect on the day of the accident, and provided coverage for Blackburn's family when they were passengers in a non-owned vehicle.Blackburn made a claim against State Farm under the uninsured motorist provision of his policy, and when that claim was denied, Blackburn initiated this action on behalf of himself and his children against State Farm on the theory that since Ellsworth had insufficient funds to compensate Blackburn for his damages, Ellsworth was an uninsured motorist.State Farm moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the trial court based on the ground that Ellsworth's compliance with the financial responsibility law precluded the conclusion that he was "uninsured."Upon appeal, the Idaho Trial Lawyers Association sought and was granted permission to appear as amicus curiae.

The sole question to be determined is whether, as Blackburn asserts, the district court erred in its determination that the Ellsworth vehicle was not an "uninsured vehicle."The substance of the claim here is that the word "uninsured," as used in the applicable statutes and the insurance policy at issue here, must be construed to mean "underinsured" in relation to Blackburn's damages.²We disagree.

I.C. § 41-2502 requires a motor vehicle liability insurance policy to provide protection from injury by uninsured vehicles in amounts not less than the minimum limits for bodily injury or death required by the Motor Vehicle Safety and Responsibility Act, I.C. § 49-1505(d), which coverage an insured may only expressly reject in writing.At the time of the accident, the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, I.C. § 49-1505(d), required coverage of at least $10,000 for bodily injury to or death of one person and $20,000 for bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident.Hence, Blackburn's damages were caused by a motorist who had in effect at the time of the accident a policy that fully complied with I.C. § 41-2502 and the tortfeasor's insurer did not deny coverage, but rather tendered the $20,000 per occurrence limit.

A basic tenet in statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent in passing a statute.Webster v. Board of Trustees of School District No. 25, Bannock County, 104 Idaho 342, 659 P.2d 96(1983).In 1947, the legislature enacted the "Idaho Safety Responsibility Act," supplementing the motor vehicle laws of the State of Idaho.Proof of financial responsibility was defined under that act in "per occurrence" terms, and required $5,000 insurance coverage for bodily injury to or the death of one person in any one accident and $10,000 for bodily injury to or the death of two or more persons in any one accident.In 1961, the legislature increased the minimum amounts required for proof of financial responsibility to $10,000/$20,000.1961 Idaho Sess.Laws, ch. 136, § 2, p. 198.In 1967, the legislature enacted I.C. § 41-2502, making it mandatory that motor vehicle insurance policies provide each policyholder with coverage for bodily injury or death by uninsured motor vehicles in the minimum amounts required by the financial responsibility law.I.C. § 41-2503, § 41-2504 were also added defining "uninsured motor vehicle" to include one covered by an insurer who is or becomes insolvent within one year after an accident.1967 Idaho Sess.Laws, ch. 61, § 1-3, pp. 124-126.In 1983, the legislature again increased the minimum amounts required for proof of financial responsibility to insurance coverage of $25,000/$50,000, still couching the amount in "per occurrence" terms. 1983 Idaho Sess.Laws, ch. 199, § 3, p. 539.

We find nothing to indicate any legislative intent that the term "uninsured" should be construed to mean "underinsured" as asserted by the appellant here.To the contrary, the plain meaning of the statutes would appear to militate against the argument of Blackburn since the tortfeasor Ellsworth was covered with statutorily sufficient insurance, was thus "insured" rather than "uninsured."

The question presented has been the subject of substantial litigation.SeeAnnot., 24 A.L.R. 4th 13(1983).Blackburn argues that this Court should follow the reasoning of the Arizona and Hawaii Supreme Courts which have held that their uninsured motorist insurance statutes require coverage by a claimant's own insurer whenever the per person minimum required by their state's financial responsibility laws is unavailable from the tortfeasor's insurer due to the number of claimants seeking recovery.SeePorter v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 106 Ariz. 274, 475 P.2d 258(1970), modified on other grounds, 106 Ariz. 345, 476 P.2d 155(1970);Palisbo v. Hawaiian Ins. & Guaranty Co., 57 Hawaii 10, 547 P.2d 1350(1976).

In Porter, the plaintiff was one of several victims of an accident caused by a negligent motorist who carried only the minimum amount of insurance required by the Arizona statute.Porter's pro rata recovery from the tortfeasor's insurer was $2,500.That amount was insufficient to compensate Porter for his damages, and he then sought to recover under his own policy which covered him against damage by an uninsured motorist, arguing that he was entitled to the difference between the statutory minimum of $10,000 and the $2,500 he had recovered from the tortfeasor's insurer.The Arizona Court agreed and held that the tortfeasor was "uninsured" as to the amount available to the claimant as contrasted with the minimum amount of the financial responsibility act and thus permitted recovery.The Hawaii Court in Palisbo followed the Porter rationale and adopted that judicially defined concept of "uninsured."The Palisbo Court in dicta also indicated that in cases of a contractual agreement between the insurance carrier and the uninsured motorist policyholder for coverage in excess of the minimum amount specified by the financial responsibility law, recovery of that greater amount would follow.

The reasoning of the Court in Porter as approved in Palisbo, see also, Yamamoto v. Premier Ins. Co., 668 P.2d 42(Hawaii App.1983), is powerful and persuasive, particularly wherein it is observed that those plaintiffs would have been in a better position if the tortfeasor had carried no liability insurance whatsoever rather than carrying the statutory minimum amount of coverage.It is our view, however, that the reasoning of the Arizona and Hawaii Courts is seriously flawed in ignoring the clear language of the legislation.It is argued that the legislature could not have intended such an anomolous result.On the other hand, it can be argued with equal force that the legislature had the opportunity to consider the result that would flow from its use of specific language, as is reflected by the legislative amendment which considers the circumstance of a tortfeasor's insurance carrier becoming insolvent.The legislature has provided for a different result in that circumstance.The anomoly which is present in cases such as this is a result of the unfortunate legislative policy of tying the uninsured motorist statute directly to the financial responsibility law, which provides for a "per accident" limit.

A host of courts has considered the problem and an overwhelming majority of those courts have rejected the rationale adopted in Porter and Palisbo.Chafin v. Aetna Ins. Co., 550 F.2d 575(10th Cir.1976)(applying New Mexico law);Criterion Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 347 So.2d 384(Ala.1977);Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bouzer, 39 Cal.App.3d 992, 114 Cal.Rptr. 651(1974);Simonette v. Great American Ins. Co., 165 Conn. 466, 338 A.2d 453(1973);State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hallowell, 426 A.2d 822(Del.1981), aff'd, 443 A.2d 925(Del.1982);Golphin v. Home Indemnity Co., 284 So.2d 442(Fla.App.1973);Cotton States Mutual Ins. Co. v. Austin, 143 Ga.App. 309, 238 S.E.2d 253(1977);Ripley Resin Eng'r Co. v. Great American Ins. Co., 70 Ill.App.3d 619, 27 Ill.Dec. 209, 388 N.E.2d 1258(1979);Detrick v. Aetna...