Blackcrow v. Lake Cnty.
| Docket Number | CV 21-139-M-DWM |
| Decision Date | 23 December 2021 |
| Parties | ALOYSIUS BLACKCROW, Plaintiff, v. LAKE COUNTY et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Montana |
Plaintiff Aloysius Blackcrow, an inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed a Complaint alleging that the State of Montana does not have legitimate criminal jurisdiction to prosecute him, a Native American, on the Flathead Reservation. (Doc. 2). Because Blackcrow's Complaint fails to state a claim for relief, it will be dismissed.
Blackcrow's Complaint poses a legal question-does the State of Montana have criminal jurisdiction over him-without providing any facts regarding his legal status, the nature of his prosecution, or the court in which he was prosecuted, nor does it address why the Flathead Reservation's conveying of criminal jurisdiction to the State of Montana does not bar his claim. The Complaint mostly quotes verbatim, without attribution, from Justice Stewart's opinion in Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979). Blackcrow's first argument is that the State of Montana never properly amended its Constitution to assume criminal jurisdiction over Native Americans found on the Flathead Reservation of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes (“CSKT”). (Doc. 2 at 2.) Blackcrow asserts that Montana's Constitution includes a disclaimer of authority over Indian Country and therefore cannot prosecute him. Id.
Blackcrow also asserts that the State of Montana's criminal jurisdiction was withdrawn by legislative action. In 2017, Senate Bill No. 310 was introduced at the Montana Legislature and finally signed into law on May 19, 2017. (Doc. 2 at 5.) The law was called “An Act Revising Laws Related to Criminal Jurisdiction on the Flathead Indian Reservation…” (Doc. 2 at 5.) Blackcrow's Complaint then goes on to quote the law extensively. The law provided a procedure by which the CSKT could, by tribal resolution, withdraw consent to being subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the State of Montana. Blackcrow further quotes from the CSKT Tribal code, which grants jurisdiction to the tribal court over “any tribal member, American or Canadian Indian, Alaskan Native found within the Flathead reservation and accused by the Tribes of the commission, within the Flathead reservation, of an offense” found in the tribal code. (Doc. 2 at 7.)
Blackcrow's request for relief is the dismissal of all charges filed against him in Lake County District Court. (Doc. 2 at 8.) Blackcrow contends Lake County does not have criminal jurisdiction over him based on the laws identified above. Blackcrow here quotes extensively, without attribution, from Balyeat Law PC v. Pettit, which analyzed whether Lake County District Court had jurisdiction over a CSKT member on a debt collection action-a civil matter not obviously relevant to the proceedings here. Balyeat Law, P.C. v. Pettit, 1998 MT 252, 291 Mont. 196, 967 P.2d 398.
Blackcrow has also sought a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order preventing prosecution of Native Americans in Lake County Court. (Doc. 2-1 at 1.) In this request, Blackcrow names for the first time as defendants Judge Deborah Kim Christopher, Judge James Manley, Steven Eschenbacher, James Lapotka, Benjamin Ancious and Molly Owen. (Doc. 2-1 at 1 - 2.)
Blackcrow is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis so the Court must review his Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A. Sections 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B) require the Court to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis and/or by a prisoner against a governmental defendant before it is served if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. A complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). “A case is malicious if it was filed with the intention or desire to harm another.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if a plaintiff fails to allege the “grounds” of his “entitlement to relief.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotation omitted).
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a complaint “that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). That is, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). A complaint's allegations must cross “the line from conceivable to plausible.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680.
There is a two-step procedure to determine whether a complaint's allegations cross that line. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556; Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. First, the Court must identify “the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 680. Factual allegations are not entitled to the assumption of truth if they are “merely consistent with liability, ” or “amount to nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements' of a constitutional” claim. Id. at 679, 681. A complaint stops short of the line between probability and the possibility of relief where the facts pled are merely consistent with a defendant's liability. Id. at 678.
Second, the Court must determine whether the complaint states a “plausible” claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A claim is “plausible” if the factual allegations, which are accepted as true, “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. This inquiry is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679 (citation omitted). If the factual allegations, which are accepted as true, “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]' - ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Id. citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
“A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,' and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Erickson v. Pardu, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(e) ().
For the following several reasons, Blackcrow's Complaint must be dismissed.
The first issue the Court must address is the nature of Blackcrow's Complaint. Blackcrow's allegations that Montana does not have jurisdiction to prosecute him and his request for release from incarceration sound more in habeas corpus relief than a constitutional claim. “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973).
The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, states:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
Id. § 2254(a). As relevant here, federal courts may not grant a writ of habeas corpus brought by an individual in custody pursuant to a state court judgment unless “the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(1)(A). The exhaustion requirement is grounded in the principles of comity and gives states the first opportunity to correct alleged violations of a prisoner's federal rights. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Blackcrow has not alleged that he has given the State of Montana's courts the opportunity to consider his request for habeas relief or the legality of his prosecution. As such, this claim must be dismissed for failure to exhaust his state remedies, if he is proceeding on a theory of habeas corpus.
Blackcrow's allegations seem to hang on two arguments, though the Complaint is far from a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Blackcrow's quotation of a lengthy passage of Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation suggests that he believes Montana never properly assumed criminal jurisdiction over Indians on the Flathead Reservation. His second position is that after passage of Senate Bill 310, that jurisdiction was no longer valid. Neither of these arguments is legally valid, and the Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Furthermore the allegations seem more appropriate for the Montana State Courts.
Blackcrow contends that “Montana did not amend their state constitution ‘where necessary' to adequately assume criminal jurisdiction over Native American Indians on the Salish and Kootenai Reservation.” (Doc. 2 at 1.) The language he uses to make his point comes from Washington v. Yakima Nation, in the portion of the opinion in which Justice Stewart recites the positions of the parties. Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 481-483 (1979)...
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