Blackhawk Dev. Corp. v. Village of Dexter

• Decision Date: 13 July 2005
• Docket Number: Docket No. 126036.
• Citation: 473 Mich. 33,700 N.W.2d 364
• Parties: BLACKHAWK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and Dexter Crossing, L.L.C., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. VILLAGE OF DEXTER and Dexter Development, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

700 N.W.2d 364

473 Mich. 33

BLACKHAWK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and Dexter Crossing, L.L.C., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. VILLAGE OF DEXTER and Dexter Development, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 126036.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

July 13, 2005.

Berry Reynolds & Rogowski, P.C. (by Ronald E. Reynolds), Farmington Hills, for the plaintiffs.

Dykema Gossett, P.L.L.C. (by Bradley L. Smith), Ann Arbor, for the village of Dexter.

Conlin, McKenney & Philbrick, P.C. (by Allen J. Philbrick), Ann Arbor, for Dexter Development.

OPINION

MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, J.

Plaintiffs sought leave to appeal from the Court of Appeals decision affirming the trial court's grant of summary disposition to defendants village of Dexter and Dexter Development. Rather than grant leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case requires us to examine the scope of an easement granted by a private party to a public entity. Specifically, we must determine whether allowing a private property owner to construct access roads and related amenities on property subject to an easement that was granted to a municipality for the express purpose of relocating and improving a public road is within the scope of that easement. Because there is no evidence in the record that the proposed developments fall within the scope of the express easement, we hold that the trial court erred by holding otherwise. Thus, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for further proceedings.

II. BACKGROUND

In 1990, defendant village of Dexter ordered approximately one acre of a portion of land owned by the Kingsley Trust, which was administered by John Kingsley, condemned. The village intended to use the land to improve Dan Hoey Road, which was, at the time, a gravel road that intersected with Dexter-Ann Arbor Road in an unsafe manner. The village planned to pave and widen Dan Hoey Road, as well as move it slightly south. In lieu of condemning the land, the village and the Kingsley Trust entered into a settlement agreement through which the trust granted the village an easement to a portion of approximately one acre in size. The settlement agreement stated that the trust would transfer "an easement for public roadway purposes...." The easement grant read that the trust granted "an easement for the purposes of relocating, establishing, opening and improving Dan Hoey Road. . . ."

The village relocated Dan Hoey Road and completed its project, but the project did not consume the entire area subject to the easement. Eventually, the trust sold the burdened parcel to plaintiff Blackhawk Development Corporation, which then developed a commercial complex, plaintiff Dexter Crossing, L.L.C., on a portion of the property.¹ The portion subject to the easement was not developed.

Thereafter, John Kingsley, through his corporation, defendant Dexter Development, purchased additional land that adjoined the old Dan Hoey Road but was separated from the new Dan Hoey Road by land subject to the easement. Kingsley then submitted a proposal for developing his land to the village. However, Kingsley's plan included using portions that were subject to the village's easement for the purpose of constructing access drives, building a pond, and making other developments on that parcel.

The village informed Kingsley that he would have to buy the affected land before it would approve the development, but plaintiff rejected Kingsley's purchase offers. Consequently, Kingsley's attorney advised Kingsley to revise his proposal by removing from the plans affecting plaintiff's parcel anything that could be construed as a "private" development, but leaving developments such as utilities, sidewalks, and access roads. Kingsley resubmitted his revised plan and proposed to "dedicate" the developments on the affected parcel to the village for public use. In other words, Kingsley proposed to create purportedly "public" developments on plaintiff's land, which the village could then justify by way of its easement.

The village authorized the proposal, giving Kingsley permission to construct developments on the subject property, including two access roads, light poles, trees, landscaping, pond grading, sidewalks, pipes, conduit, sewer lines, and water lines. The access roads would use the land subject to the easement to transect plaintiff's property and connect Kingsley's property to the new Dan Hoey Road. As part of their agreement, Kingsley indemnified the village against legal action.

Neither the village nor Kingsley informed plaintiff of their arrangement, leaving plaintiff to discover it when construction began. After plaintiff's objections to the village and to Kingsley proved unsuccessful, plaintiff sued for injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, and trespass.

Among the facts that emerged during discovery were the following. In a memorandum addressing the matter, village zoning officer Janet Keller wrote that because Kingsley's land was "landlocked," the village might be "in jeopardy" if it did not approve the access road. Kingsley, however, acknowledged that his land was not landlocked because of two ingress and egress points at Dexter-Ann Arbor Road. Further, Kingsley testified that he could have built his commercial development without using the land covered by the easement, but that he never submitted plans that did not include land covered by the easement. He also testified that the access drives served no other purpose than access to the commercial development and that he only built the west driveway because he believed the village required it.

Zoning officer Keller testified that the village did not request either road, but after reviewing where Kingsley proposed to place the roads, the village asked Kingsley to align the center road with an opposing road to form a four-way intersection. Keller stated that the village was never presented with a plan that did not include the roads and that she did not know why the development could not proceed without them. Keller testified that the access roads were not an "improvement" to Dan Hoey Road. However, both she and other village officials agreed that the access roads contributed to the safety of the area and that Kingsley's development as a whole contributed to the general public good.

Evidence from the village planner showed that the access roads did not meet public road standards and that the entrances were designed to meet commercial standards. Moreover, the village attorney testified that when Dan Hoey Road was realigned in 1990, all four of the purposes stated in the easement grant, "relocating, establishing, opening, and improving Dan Hoey Road," were fulfilled. According to the testimony, village officials had no intention to further utilize the easement in the foreseeable future.

Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10),² arguing that the proposed developments were within the scope of the village's easement because the access roads promoted public safety and welfare. Defendants also argued that the utilities were permissible because the permissible uses of a public road easement encompass more than mere surface travel. Further, defendants contended that the use of the land covered by the easement would serve primarily public, rather than private, purposes.

The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary disposition, ruling that the terms "roadway purposes" in the settlement agreement and "improvement" in the actual easement grant were ambiguous. However, it found that the developments benefited the public and were thus within the scope of the easement.

Plaintiffs appealed the trial court's ruling. In a split decision, the Court of Appeals majority held that the trial court reached the correct result, albeit for the wrong reason. Blackhawk Dev Corp v. Village of Dexter, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued January 27, 2004 (Docket No. 240790), 2004 WL 134014. The majority held that the language at issue was not ambiguous, but that the proposed developments were within the scope of the easement because they benefited the public. Notably, the Court of Appeals examined the language of both the easement grant and the settlement agreement. The dissenting judge agreed that there was no ambiguity in the language, but he believed that the changes were not "improvements" to Dan Hoey Road and, thus, were outside the scope of the easement. Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration was denied, and plaintiffs sought leave to appeal in this Court. In lieu of granting plaintiffs' application for leave to appeal, we ordered oral argument on the application. 471 Mich. 905, 688 N.W.2d 90 (2004).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The extent of a party's rights under an easement is a question of fact, and a trial court's determination of those facts is reviewed for clear error. Unverzagt v. Miller, 306 Mich. 260, 266, 10 N.W.2d 849 (1943), citing Harvey v. Crane, 85 Mich. 316, 322, 48 N.W. 582 (1891). A trial court's dispositional ruling on equitable matters, however, is subject to review de novo. Stachnik v. Winkel, 394 Mich. 375, 383, 230 N.W.2d 529 (1975). The decision to grant or deny summary disposition is also reviewed de novo. Stewart v. Michigan, 471 Mich. 692, 696, 692 N.W.2d 376 (2004).

IV. ANALYSIS

This case presents the straightforward question whether Dexter Development's desired developments fall within the scope of the village of Dexter's easement. The inquiry does not center, as defendants seem to suggest, on whether defendants' proposed developments afford the public at large some general benefit. Further, the analysis of this issue is not affected by the fact that a private developer instituted the proposed developments. Rather, this Court must analyze simply whether the developments are within the scope of the granted easement.

The existence of an easement...