Blackledge v. Simmons

• Decision Date: 08 December 1920
• Docket Number: 172.
• Citation: Blackledge v. Simmons, 180 N.C. 535, 105 S.E. 202 (N.C. 1920)
• Parties: BLACKLEDGE v. SIMMONS.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

105 S.E. 202

180 N.C. 535

BLACKLEDGE v. SIMMONS.

No. 172.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

December 8, 1920

Appeal from Superior Court, Craven County; Connor, Judge.

Action by C. D. Blackledge against F. M. Simmons. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

A will "I give unto my daughter M. for and during her natural life the plantation and land whereon I now live with 'the Haywood' and at her death I give the said Haywoods lands unto the heirs of her body lawfully begotten and in case my said daughter M. shall die without heirs of her body as aforesaid then the said Haywoods land I give to my heirs at law," gave the daughter only a life estate; the remainder being not to the heirs by descent from the first taker but to them as purchasers under the will, the rule in Shelley's Case not applying.

This is a civil action to settle the title to the land in dispute the parties agreeing as to the facts of the case. It will suffice to state, as briefly as we can, their respective contentions, as they will fully disclose the nature of the controversy.

On January 26, 1821, Edmund Hatch devised the land in controversy by his will, which is duly recorded in the clerk's office of Craven county, N.C. It is under this will that both plaintiff and defendant claim title.

Item 3 of the will is as follows:

"I give unto my daughter Mary Blackledge for and during her natural life the plantation and land whereon I now live with 'the Haywood' and at her death I give the said Haywoods lands unto the heirs of her body lawfully begotten and in case my said daughter Mary shall die without heirs of her body as aforesaid then the said Haywood land I give to my heirs at law."

Item 6. "The lands which I have herein given to my daughter Mary during her life is to be in the possession of my executor until the same is paid for by the said Mary; and when the said Mary shall pay for the said lands, that is to say, shall pay the balance I now owe for its purchase, then my said executor shall give up to her its possession."

Plaintiff's claim of title is as follows:

(1) Item 3 of the will of Edmund Hatch above quoted.

(2) Deed by Buckner Hatch and Samuel or Lemuel Hatch to Mary Blackledge, daughter of Edmund Hatch and wife of William S Blackledge.

(3) Deed from W. S. Blackledge and Mary, his wife, to John H. Bryan.

(4) Deed from John H. Bryan to William S. Blackledge.

(5) Will of W. S. Blackledge.

(6) The plaintiff is the son of R. B. Blackledge named n the foregoing will, item 3. R. B. Blackledge died January 14, 1916, and suit was started in November, 1917.

Defendant's claim of title:

(1) Will of Edmund Hatch, item 3 above quoted.

(2) R. B. Blackledge and wife by mortgage to W. G. Brinson.

(3) W. G. Brinson, mortgagee, by deed to J. L. Hahn.

(4) J. L. Hahn by deed to R. B. Blackledge.

(5) R. B. Blackledge mortgage to A. Hahn.

(6) Proceedings of foreclosure, A. Hahn against R. B. Blackledge.

(7) L. J. Moore, commissioner, deed to F. M. Simmons.

(8) F. M. Simmons has been in possession of the land under the Moore deed since 1887 and has enjoyed solely the rents, profits, and possession since that date.

Plaintiff claims that the defendant, F. M. Simmons, was in possession holding the life estate of R. B. Blackledge and that his possession did not become adverse to plaintiff until the death of R. B. Blackledge on January 14, 1916, as will more fully appear.

The common source of title is item 3 of the will of Edmund Hatch which is quoted above. Edmund Hatch died leaving a daughter, Mary Hatch, and three sons, Buckner, Samuel (or Lemuel), and John. Buckner Hatch and Samuel (or Lemuel) Hatch joined in a deed for this land to their sister, Mary, who married R. B. Blackledge, and she and her husband both died in 1856, leaving two children, R. B. Blackledge, the father of the plaintiff, and Virginia Harrison. R. B. Blackledge died intestate January 14, 1916, leaving him surviving the plaintiff, his son, and three other children. If plaintiff is entitled to recover at all, he is entitled to recover an undivided one-fourth interest in the property; the first and most important question for the consideration of the court being the proper construction to be placed upon item 3 of the will of Edmund Hatch.

If the rule in Shelley's Case applies, then Mary, the daughter of Edmund Hatch, took the fee, as contended by plaintiff, and not a life estate, as contended by defendant.

Her brothers, Buckner and Samuel (or Lemuel), afterwards conveyed to her, and she and her husband, W. S. Blackledge, conveyed to John H. Bryan, and John H. Bryan at the same time reconveyed to W. S. Blackledge; the effect of these deeds being to take the title out of the wife and put it in the husband. W. S. Blackledge then made his will in which he devised the lands to his son Richard (R. B. Blackledge) for life, and after his death to be equally divided among his children. If W. S. Blackledge had the fee, then his son R. B. Blackledge took only a life estate, under the will of his father, and the plaintiff under said will took an undivided one-fourth interest in the property as he was one of the children of R. B. Blackledge. The plaintiff contends that, if R. B. Blackledge only had a life estate, the deeds made by him and his wife above set forth only conveyed a life estate, and that, when the defendant Simmons bought at the foreclosure sale in the proceedings brought by A. Hahn and others against R. B. Blackledge, he only got such estate as R. B. Blackledge had, which was only a life estate under the will of his father, W. S. Blackledge, and that the possession of the defendant since 1887 up to January 14, 1916, when R. B. Blackledge died, was the possession of a life tenant and did not become adverse to the plaintiff until after the death of R. B. Blackledge in 1916. So the plaintiff contends that the important and material question to be decided by the court is: "What estate passed under item 3 of the will of Edmund Hatch?" This item in brief gives to Mary Blackledge for and during her natural life the Haywood lands and remainder at her death unto the heirs of her body lawfully begotten, and in case she dies without heirs then to the heirs of Edmund Hatch.

Defendant's claim:

(1) Will of Edmund Hatch, item three hereinbefore set out.

(2) R. B. Blackledge and wife by mortgage to W. G. Brinson.

(3) W. G. Brinson, mortgagee, by deed under sale to J. L. Hahn.

(4) J. L. Hahn by deed to R. B. Blackledge.

(5) R. B. Blackledge, mortgage to A. Hahn.

(6) Proceedings of foreclosure in superior court entitled A. Hahn v. R. B. Blackledge.

(7) L. J. Moore, commissioner, deed to F. M. Simmons. Sale made under Blackledge mortgage to Hahn by court decree.

(8) F. M. Simmons has been in possession of the land in controversy under the deed from L. J. Moore, commissioner, since 1887 and has enjoyed solely the rents, profits, and possession since that date.

(9) In the event plaintiff is entitled to recover, it is agreed that he shall recover a one-fourth undivided interest in and to the lands described in the deed from L. J. Moore, commissioner, to F. M. Simmons, and it is agreed that the value of the rents and profits since 1916 amounts to $400, and that the value of the permanent improvements made by F. M. Simmons on the lands since 1887 amounts to $400. If plaintiff is entitled to recover, that he recover one-fourth of rents and profits to be set off by one-fourth of value of permanent improvements, and that F. M. Simmons is the owner absolutely and in fee simple of three-fourths undivided interest in the lands described in said deed. In the event plaintiff is not entitled to recover, that the defendant is owner absolutely of the entire interest.

The court gave judgment for the defendant, and plaintiff appealed.

D. L. Ward, of Newbern, for appellant.

Ward & Ward, Moore & Dunn, and Guion & Guion, all of Newbern, for appellees.

WALKER, J. (after stating the facts as above).

This appeal requires that we should determine again, as this court has in many similar cases before, whether the rule in Shelley's Case applies to its facts. This rule is considered to be of the highest antiquity, Judge Blackstone having so stated in his argument of Perrin v. Blake, 4 Burr. 2579 (1 Blackstone's Rep. 672; Doug. Rep. [3d Ed.] 343, and note 1; Hargr. Law Tracts, 490), and added that the same principle was first established in a case reported as far back as 18 Edward, 2. 1 Fearne on Remainders, p. 85 (4th Am. Ed. & 10th London Ed.). He held it by no means clear that the rule took its rise merely from feudal principles and was rather inclined to believe that it was first adopted to obviate the mischief of too frequently putting the inheritance in suspense or obeyance. Another foundation of the rule was probably laid in a principle diametrically opposed to the genius of feudal institutions, namely, a desire to facilitate the alienation of land, and to throw it into the track of commerce, one generation sooner, by vesting the inheritance in the ancestor, than if he continued tenant for life, and the heir was declared a purchaser. It appears that Blackstone held to the latter view, and, upon the whole, he inferred that the rule was of remote antiquity, and was known and applied long before the decision of the case from which it derived its name; that it was not merely grounded on any narrow feudal reason, but applied, in the very first recorded instance, to the liberal and conscientious purpose and policy of making easier the conveyance of the land by charging it with debts of the ancestor. Now in regard to the rule of law, or legal construction, whereby the limitation to the heirs, etc., is executed in the ancestor, though should we admit...