Blackledge v. State

• Decision Date: 05 July 2016
• Docket Number: S16A0354
• Citation: Blackledge v. State, 299 Ga. 385, 788 S.E.2d 353 (Ga. 2016)
• Parties: Blackledge v. The State.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

299 Ga. 385

788 S.E.2d 353

Blackledge

v.The State.

S16A0354

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: July 5, 2016

Ashleigh Bartkus Merchant, for Appellant.

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula Khristian Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Jason Matthew Rea, Assistant Attorney General, Benjamin M. First, Amelia Greeson Pray, Assistant District Attorneys, D. Victor Reynolds, District Attorney, Jesse David Evans, Assistant District Attorney, for Appellee.

Blackwell, Justice.

Along with several co-defendants, Milton Blackledge was tried by a Cobb County jury and convicted of murder, violation of the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act (the “Street Gang Act”),¹ and other crimes, all in connection with the killing of Justin Brown. Blackledge appeals, contending that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for violation of the Street Gang Act, that the trial court erred when it refused to sever his trial from that of his co-defendants, and that the trial court erred when it admitted certain evidence. We find no error and affirm.²

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that on the evening of August 1, 2007, Blackledge, David Hayes, Miracle Nwakanma, Louis Francis, and Muhammed Abdus–Salaam made plans to rob Dylan Wattecamps, who recently had been involved in a dispute with Abdus–Salaam concerning a sale of marijuana. Early on the morning of August 2, Hayes gave Nwakanma a .380 caliber pistol (which Nwakanma later gave to Francis), and Blackledge drove Nwakanma, Francis, and Abdus–Salaam to the Smyrna apartment complex in which Wattecamps lived. Hayes drove there separately in his pickup truck, arranged entry for the other four men through a resident that he knew, parked his truck across the street from the entry gate, and waited there as the others entered the apartment complex. Blackledge parked his car near Wattecamps's apartment, and Blackledge and his passengers exited the car, with Blackledge and Nwakanma carrying silver semi-automatic handguns.

Unbeknownst to the would-be robbers, Wattecamps was having a party in his apartment, and as Blackledge and his three passengers approached the door, a guest came out, and Blackledge hit him in the face. The four men then ran away, pursued by Wattecamps and several of his guests. Brown, Scott Keller, and Josh Washington, who were walking to the party, heard Wattecamps yell “get them,” and they began to chase the four men. Blackledge and Francis then fired several shots at Brown, Keller, and Washington, one of which fatally wounded Brown. Blackledge and his friends were able to climb over a fence and escape in Hayes's truck. Both Francis and Blackledge claimed to have shot Brown, and Hayes drove everyone to Abdus–Salaam's apartment. Six matching .380 caliber shell casings and three .380 caliber projectiles, including the one that fatally wounded Brown, were recovered. All of the shell casings came from the same gun, and two of the projectiles, including the one that killed Brown, were fired from the same pistol. When questioned by investigators, Blackledge initially denied any involvement and provided an alibi, but he later admitted that he was present at the apartment complex at the time that Brown was shot. We previously considered the evidence in this case when we heard appeals by Nwakanma, Francis, and Hayes, whose convictions we affirmed. See Nwakanma v. State , 296 Ga. 493, 494–495, 768 S.E.2d 503 (2015) ; Hayes v. State , 298 Ga. 339, 781 S.E.2d 777 (2016). We now consider this evidence anew with respect to Blackledge.

Blackledge claims that the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain his conviction for violation of the Street Gang Act.³ In Nwakanma , we indicated that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, showed that Blackledge and his three co-defendants were associated with “a criminal street gang known as ‘MPRC 300,’ ” 296 Ga. at 494 (1), 768 S.E.2d 503, and we confirmed that finding in Hayes , 298 Ga. at 341 (a), 781 S.E.2d 777. Our present review of the evidence, viewed in the same light, confirms that the evidence was sufficient to show that “MPRC 300” was a “criminal street gang,” that Blackledge was associated with that gang, and that the planned robbery was intended to further the interests of the gang.⁴ As a result, the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Blackledge was guilty of violating the Street Gang Act. See Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B), 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. Blackledge contends that the trial court erred when it denied his pretrial motion to sever his trial from that of Hayes, Nwakanma, and Francis. When several defendants are indicted together for a capital crime, but the State does not seek the death penalty, whether the defendants are to be tried together or separately is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. OCGA § 17–8–4 (a). “In ruling on a severance motion, the court should consider: (1) the likelihood of confusion of the evidence and law; (2) the possibility that evidence against one defendant may be considered against the other defendant; and (3) the presence or absence of antagonistic defenses.” Hicks v. State , 295 Ga. 268, 278, 759 S.E.2d 509 (2014) (citation omitted). And to require a severance, “the burden is on the defendant requesting the severance to do more than raise the possibility that a separate trial would give him a better chance of acquittal. He must make a clear showing that a joint trial would lead to prejudice and a consequent denial of due process.” Thomas v. State , 293 Ga. 829, 830–831, 750 S.E.2d 297 (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted). We already considered Francis's claim that his case should have been severed. See Nwakanma , 296 Ga. at 498–499 (3), 768 S.E.2d 503. And just as we did with respect to Francis in his case, we conclude that Blackledge has made no “clear showing of prejudice and a consequent denial of due process.” Thomas , 293 Ga. at 831 (2), 750 S.E.2d 297 (punctuation omitted).

Blackledge argues that he was prejudiced by a joint trial because the jury might have been confused by the number of co-defendants. But only three co-defendants were tried with Blackledge, and the law and evidence that applied to each of them were substantially identical. See Nwakanma , 296 Ga. at 498 (3), 768 S.E.2d 503. “They were jointly tried for almost the same offenses, which involved the same witnesses, whose credibility the co-defendants jointly attacked, and the State's evidence indicated that they acted in concert.” Id. (citations omitted). “In addition, the trial court properly instructed the jury that it was to independently determine the guilt or innocence of each defendant as to each count, and the court provided separate verdict forms for each defendant in order to avoid the potential for confusion.” Id. (citations omitted). Blackledge also contends that he was prejudiced by the admission of similar transaction evidence against Hayes and evidence that his co-defendants had gang affiliations. That evidence, however, did not directly implicate Blackledge, and the trial court gave appropriate limiting instructions about the purposes for which the jury could consider the evidence of Hayes's similar transaction and the gang affiliations. See id.⁵

Blackledge claims that he was prejudiced because he and his co-defendants presented antagonistic defenses. But this argument is belied by the record, which shows that the defenses presented by Hayes, Nwakanma, and Francis were, almost exclusively, supportive of Blackledge. While none of the co-defendants presented any evidence, the closing arguments on behalf of Hayes, Nwakanma, and Francis consistently attacked the credibility of the State's witnesses, and particularly the credibility of Abdus–Salaam, who testified against the other co-defendants. Blackledge “has completely failed to show any specific prejudice such that the joint trial denied him due process.” Nwakanma , 296 Ga. at 499 (3), 768 S.E.2d 503 (citations and footnote omitted).

3. Blackledge contends that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence that he also was involved in a North Carolina murder. That murder was committed in October 2006, less than a year before Brown was killed. A police investigator from North Carolina testified that Blackledge gave a statement in November 2006 in which he admitted that he agreed to drive a friend—who was a member of the Crips gang—to an apartment complex so that his friend could engage in a sex act with someone with whom his friend had communicated online (and whom his friend believed was a woman). According to Blackledge's statement, his friend discovered during their drive that the person he had arranged to meet was a man, his friend reacted angrily and expressed his desire to seek retribution, Blackledge continued to drive his friend to the apartment complex, his friend shot the man who approached them when they arrived at the rendezvous location, and Blackledge then drove his friend home from the crime scene.⁶

Under our old Evidence Code,⁷ a similar transaction was admissible if the State showed that

(1) it seeks to introduce the evidence not to raise an improper inference as to the accused's character, but for some appropriate purpose which has been deemed to be an exception to the general rule of inadmissibility; (2) there is sufficient evidence to establish that the accused committed the independent offense or act; and (3) there is a sufficient connection or similarity between the independent offense or act and the crime charged so that proof of the former tends to prove the latter.

Lamar v. State , 297 Ga. 89, 90–91, 772 S.E.2d 636 (2015) (citation omitted). Here, the trial court admitted the evidence of the North Carolina murder to show Blackledge's intent...