Blackman v. Dist. of Columbia, Civil Action No. 97–1629PLF
Decision Date | 04 November 2014 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 97–1629PLF |
Citation | 72 F.Supp.3d 249 |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Parties | Mikeisha Blackman, et al., Petitioners, v. District of Columbia, et al., Defendants. |
Carolyn W. Houck, Law Offices Of Carolyn W. Houck, Myrna Lee Fawcett, Bonita A. Jones–Moon, Fawcett & Fawcett, Jane Irene Ryan, Lindsey Bishop Lang, Matthew R. Mazgaj, Steptoe & Johnson, L.L.P., Margaret A. Kohn, Law Office of Margaret Kohn, Donna L. Wulkan, Law Offices of Donna L. Wulkan, James E. Brown, James E. Brown & Associates, PLLC, Ellen Douglass Dalton, Friendship Public Charter School, Carolyn W. Houck, Law Offices of Carolyn W. Houck, Jesse P. Goode, Department of Human Services, Joseph B. Tulman, University of DC, Roberta L. Gambale, James Brown and Associates, PLLC, Steve Nabors, Moran and Associates, Ira A. Burnim, Julia Marie Graff, Lewis L. Bossing, Jr., Travis A. Murrell, Anna Elizabeth Jenefsky, Karen D. Alvarez, Laura Nicole Rinaldi, Matthew I. Fraidin, Tracy L. Goodman, Emily B. Read, Julia Marie Graff, Washington, DC, Angela Leigh Lipscomb, Austin, TX, Latoya Brisbane, Holland & Knight LLP, Atlanta, GA, James E. Williams, Elizabeth T. Jester, Jester & Willams, Great Falls, VA, Diana Marjorie Savit, Savit & Szymkowicz, LLP, Bethesda, MD, Haylie Michelle Iseman, Michael J. Eig, Michael J. Eig & Associates, PC, Matthew B. Bogin, Law Office of Matthew B. Bogin, Paula Amy Rosenstock, Michael J. Eig & Associates, PC, Chevy Chase, MD, Kimberly Glassman, Kimberly Glassman, Esquire LLC, Gaithersburg, MD, for Petitioners.
Julius Lyons, pro se.
Laurie Pouzzner McManus, Arlington, VA, Robert C. Utiger, DC Office of the Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
This spring, a hearing officer in the District of Columbia's Office of the State Superintendent of Education ordered the District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”) to hold an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) team meeting to review and revise petitioner Jayshawn Douglas' educational services. DCPS held a meeting, but forcibly excluded Douglas' attorney and failed to properly implement the recommendations in his various assessments, in clear violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(vi).
Petitioner filed this motion seeking a preliminary injunction to require DCPS to convene a proper IEP team meeting with his counsel present. DCPS ultimately did hold a proper IEP team meeting, correcting their previous failures. This motion was referred to the Special Master who recommends denying the motion. Douglas filed objections to the Special Master's Report, to which the District of Columbia filed a response. Upon careful consideration of the parties' papers, the Special Master's Report and Recommendation, and the entire record, the Court will deny Douglas' motion for a preliminary injunction as moot because he has already received his requested relief.1
The Special Master and the parties generally agree on the relevant facts. Douglas is an eighteen-year-old student with disabilities who is entitled to special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. ; Mot. at 2.2 After an administrative due process hearing, a hearing officer ordered DCPS to, among other things, convene a meeting of Douglas' Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) team by May 23, 2014 to: (1) review his various assessments; (2) determine whether additional assessments are warranted; (3) review and revise his IEP; and (4) discuss and determine an appropriate location of services. Mot. at 5.3
Douglas agreed to extend the date of the IEP meeting to May 27, 2014, but was unable to attend after his daughter fell ill. Mot. at 5; Rep. at 3. Douglas instructed Steve Nabors, his attorney and a member of the IEP team, to attend the meeting in his absence. Mot. at 5. DCPS, however, refused to admit Mr. Nabors to the meeting. Id. DCPS's attorney then instructed the case compliance manager to call the Metropolitan Police Department, who removed Mr. Nabors from the premises. Id. The meeting then proceeded without Douglas or his attorney. Id.4 Afterwards, DCPS even refused to provide Mr. Nabors with Douglas' educational records, although they did send an email “requesting a follow-up meeting to ensure Mr. Douglas' participation in his educational program.” Rep. at 8. In the meantime, an IEP deemed legal by the District was developed from the May 27 meeting. Id. at 5.
Shortly thereafter, Douglas filed this motion for a preliminary injunction. In response, DCPS contacted Douglas directly, without the knowledge of his counsel, and offered him an “alternative compensatory education package,” i.e., an Apple iPad, if he attended an IEP meeting scheduled for June 5, 2014. Rep. at 4. DCPS did not inform Mr. Nabors of that meeting. Id. After learning of the planned meeting from his client, Mr. Nabors alerted the Special Master who arranged for the IEP meeting to be rescheduled to June 12, 2014. Id. at 6. Mr. Nabors, the Special Master, and Douglas attended the meeting. Id. at 6–7. Douglas' IEP was substantially amended as follows:
“adversely affects his educational performance,” instead of Douglas' truancy, which had previously been listed;
The Special Master issued her recommendation soon after and concluded that DCPS had complied with the February 24, 2014 hearing officer decision (“HOD”). Rep. at 9. The Special Master recommended that Douglas' motion be denied, noting that, despite the “egregious” and “indefensible” conduct of counsel for DCPS, “the injunctive process is not the appropriate forum to address the ethical behavior of DCPS employees, substantive effects of the IEP, or failures in internal administrative procedures.” Id. at 8–9.
Douglas seeks an injunction ordering DCPS to implement the provisions of the February 24, 2014 HOD, which ordered DCPS to “conduct a battery of assessments and ‘convene a meeting of student's IEP team.’ ” Mot. at 1, 5. Neither party disputes that the proper assessments eventually were conducted. Douglas, however, argues that the District failed to properly convene a meeting of his IEP team when DCPS forcibly excluded his attorney, who had represented Mr. Douglas for eight months, from the May meeting. Id. at 8. The Court agrees. Because Douglas designated Mr. Nabors to attend the meeting as an “individual who ha[s] knowledge or special expertise regarding the child,” Mr. Nabors is a member of the IEP team.See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(vi). The “IEP team” therefore did not meet as required by the HOD when DCPS barred Mr. Nabors from attending. The Court therefore disagrees with the Special Master's conclusion that “an IEP meeting was convened on May 27th.” Rep. at 9. The May 27, 2014 meeting was a nullity. See, e.g., M.L. v. Fed. Way Sch. Dist., 387 F.3d 1101, 1115 (9th Cir.2004) ( ).
A meeting of the IEP team did occur, however, on June 12, 2014, although DCPS missed the deadline imposed by the HOD. Rep. at 6–7. As noted, supra at 4, Douglas' IEP was substantially amended as a result of that meeting. Douglas' motion therefore is moot because he has already received the relief he requests: a proper meeting of the IEP team that correctly implements the recommendations of Douglas' assessments. See Rep. at 6–7 ( ); see also Monzillo v. Biller, 735 F.2d 1456, 1459 (D.C.Cir.1984) ().
Douglas nevertheless argues that he is entitled to relief because DCPS failed to implement the HOD within the allotted time frame. Obj. at 4–7. He also argues that an injunction is still necessary because DCPS has not updated Douglas' IEP to reflect the changes made at the June 12, 2014 IEP meeting. Id. at 7. An injunction, however, would not be a proper remedy for any harm caused by DCPS's delay in updating the IEP. See 11 A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948.1 (2d ed. 1995) (). And it appears that DCPS has now corrected the IEP to properly reflect the increase in Douglas' services as a result of the June 12 IEP team meeting. Obj. Opp. Ex. 1.
The Court agrees with the Special Master that defendants' conduct in this case was “totally indefensible” and “egregious.” Rep. at 8. Enlisting the police to forcibly remove a disabled student's attorney from a meeting concerning that student's special education needs—a meeting that the attorney has a statutory right to attend—is deplorable, particularly when a lawyer for the...
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