Blackman v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 29 August 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 97–1629 PLF
• Citation: 56 F.Supp.3d 19
• Parties: Mikeisha Blackman, et al., Plaintiffs, v. District of Columbia, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

56 F.Supp.3d 19

Mikeisha Blackman, et al., Plaintiffs

v.District of Columbia, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 97–1629 PLF

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed August 29, 2014

Carolyn W. Houck, Law Offices of Carolyn W. Houck, Ira A. Burnim, Julia Marie Graff, Lewis L. Bossing, Jr., Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Myrna Lee Fawcett, Bonita A. Jones–Moon, Fawcett & Fawcett, Jane Irene Ryan, Latoya Brisbane, Lindsey Bishop Lang, Steptoe & Johnson, L.L.P., Margaret A. Kohn, Law Office of Margaret Kohn, Donna L. Wulkan, Law Offices of Donna L. Wulkan, Travis A. Murrell, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Amy Caspari, Charlotte A. Abel, Robert C. Utiger, Victoria Lynne Healy, Cathye Hopkins, Chad Wayne Copeland, Ellen A. Efros, Laura George, Maria L. Merkowitz, Peter J. Nickles, Richard Allan Latterell, Veronica A. Porter, Office of the Attorney General, Jeffery Thomas Infelise, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Robert Ray Rigsby, Veleter Mazych, Office of Corporation Counsel, D.C., Washington, DC, Laurie Pouzzner McManus, Arlington, VA, for Defendants.

Claim of LaShawn Smith, parent and next friend of A.J.

OPINION AND ORDER

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, United States District Court

This action was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce the rights of the plaintiff class members under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. Now before the Court are motions of class member LaShawn Smith for attorneys' fees and costs totaling $504,492.61. Defendant, the District of Columbia, opposes the motions. Upon consideration of the parties' papers, the relevant legal authorities, and pertinent portions of the record in this case, the Court will grant plaintiff's motion in part and deny it in part, and will award attorneys' fees in the amount of $321,355.14.¹

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff LaShawn Smith is the parent and next friend of A.J., an eleven-year-old student eligible to receive special education and related services from the District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”). At the beginning of the 2012–2013 school year, A.J. was enrolled at Cesar Chavez Public Charter School (“Chavez”), a public charter school that had designated DCPS as its local educational agency under the IDEA. R & R at 2. After Chavez expelled A.J. on April 17, 2013, plaintiff filed a due process complaint on April 18, 2013, and A.J. resumed attending Chavez under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j)'s “stay-put” provision. Id. at 2–3. After A.J. was expelled again on April 30, 2013, plaintiff sought an interim placement at another school pending resolution of plaintiff's due process claim. Id. at 3. On May 31, 2013, an administrative hearing officer issued a hearing officer determination (“HOD”) directing DCPS/Chavez to return A.J. to Chavez within five school days and to implement the services necessary to address A.J.'s disabilities within fifteen school days. Id. A second hearing was held on June 19, 2013, to address issues remaining from the April 18 complaint. Id. at 4. On July 3, 2013, the hearing officer issued another HOD ordering DCPS/Chavez to provide and fund—as compensatory education for the denial of a free appropriate public education to A.J.—36 hours of independent tutoring and 36 hours of independent counseling. Id. at 5.

When DCPS did not secure a place for A.J. at Chavez for the 2013–2014 school year by August 7, 2013, plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction. R & R at 6. In her motion, plaintiff sought “(1) an order that A.J. be allowed to attend Chavez for the 2013–2014 school year, (2) an order that DCPS and Chavez fund the [Functional Behavioral Analysis] FBA and compensatory education hours ordered by the July 3 HOD, and (3) an order that Chavez hold an IEP meeting prior to the first day of school, to discuss, inter alia, how the 20 hours of interim services authorized by DCPS will be used, in compliance with the Jones ADR agreement.” Id. In reply, the District argued, inter alia, that DCPS “had no authority to force Chavez to accept A.J. as a returning student” because Chavez is a charter school. Id.

The Court referred the preliminary injunction motion to Special Master Elise Baach. See Minute Order dated August 7, 2013. The parties presented their arguments to the Special Master on August 12, 2013. R & R at 6. The Special Master concluded that the motion required further briefing from the parties, which could not be prepared, submitted and reviewed in time for a decision from the Court before the start of the 2013–2014 school year. Id. at 6–7. In the interim, A.J. and DCPS, through its General Counsel's Office, agreed that A.J. was to return to Chavez beginning on August 26, 2013, the first day of school; but Chavez refused to accept A.J. as a returning student. Id. at 7. Plaintiff then filed a motion before this Court for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”), which sought an order that DCPS and Chavez implement the May 31 and July 3 HODs. Id. DCPS and Chavez filed separate oppositions and plaintiff filed a reply; a hearing was convened before the Court on August 22, 2013. Id. At the hearing, the Court converted the TRO motion into a motion for preliminary injunction with respect to A.J.'s placement at Chavez, found that the District's position was meritless, and ordered DCPS/Chavez to re-enroll A.J. at Chavez by August 26, 2013, the first day of school.See Aug. 23, 2013 Order at 2. The Court also noted the importance of the case, observing that the matter “ha[d] implications for all the charter schools in the District of Columbia[.]” Aug. 22, 2013 Tr. at 4.²

On August 26, 2013, the parties presented their arguments to the Special Master who ultimately recommended that the request for injunctive relief be granted. See R & R at 8, 14. The Court subsequently approved the Special Master's Report and Recommendations and granted the motion for preliminary injunction. See Jan. 31, 2014 Order.³

Plaintiff now moves for an award of $501,812.00 in attorneys' fees and $2,680.61 in costs for the time and effort involved in obtaining injunctive relief and implementation of the HODs.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the IDEA, plaintiffs are entitled to reimbursement of “reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs ... to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.” See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) ; see also Blackman v. District of Columbia, 633 F.3d 1088, 1089 (D.C.Cir.2011). When determining the award of attorneys' fees and costs in special education cases like this one, the Court must decide whether the fees sought are reasonable by calculating “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate”—the so-called “lodestar” fee. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). See e.g.,In re Olson, 884 F.2d 1415, 1423 n. 13 (D.C.Cir.1989) ; Sierra Club v. Jackson, 926 F.Supp.2d 341, 346 (D.D.C.2013).

A plaintiff must submit supporting documentation with the motion for attorneys' fees, providing sufficient detail so that the Court can determine “with a high degree of certainty ” that the hours billed were actually and reasonably expended, that the hourly rate charged was reasonable in view of the attorney's reputation and level of skill and experience with respect to this type of case, and that the matter was appropriately staffed to do the work required efficiently and without duplicative billing. In re Olson, 884 F.2d at 1423, 1428–29 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation omitted); see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ; Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C.Cir.1995) ; Blackman v. District of Columbia, 397 F.Supp.2d 12, 14 (D.D.C.2005). At a minimum, a fee applicant must provide some information about the attorney's billing practices, hourly rates, and skill and experience, as well as the nature of the attorney's practice as it relates to this kind of litigation and the prevailing market rates in the community. Rooths v. District of Columbia, 802 F.Supp.2d 56, 60 (D.D.C.2011) ; Blackman v. District of Columbia, 397 F.Supp.2d at 14–15.

Once a plaintiff has provided such information, there is a presumption that the number of hours billed and the hourly rate are reasonable, and the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the plaintiff's showing of reasonable hours and reasonable hourly rates for attorneys of the relevant level of skill and expertise. See Watkins v. Vance, 328 F.Supp.2d 23, 26 (D.D.C.2004). “[I]n the normal case the Government must either accede to the applicant's requested rate or provide specific contrary evidence tending to show that a lower rate would be appropriate.” Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d at 1109–10 (quoting Nat'l Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec'y of Def., 675 F.2d 1319, 1326 (D.C.Cir.1982) ); see also Rooths v. District of Columbia, 802 F.Supp.2d at 60.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks fees, costs, and expenses for work done by twelve attorneys and one paralegal at the Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law (“Bazelon Center”), University Legal Services (“ULS”), Crowell & Moring, and Steptoe & Johnson. In support of her motion for fees, plaintiff has submitted declarations attesting to the experiences and billing practices of the attorneys and the paralegal who worked on this case. See First Declaration of Emily B. Read (“First Read Decl.”), Fee Mot. Ex. 3; Declaration of Shawn R. Ullman (“Ullman Decl.”), Fee Mot. Ex. 2; Declaration of Laurel Pyke Malson (“Malson Decl.”), Fee Mot. Ex. 4; Declaration of Jane I. Ryan (“Ryan Decl.”), Fee Mot. Ex. 5; Supplemental Declaration of Emily B. Read (“Supp. Read Decl.”), Supp. Fee Mot. Ex. 2; Second Supplemental Declaration of Emily B. Read (Second Supp. Read Decl.”), Fee Reply Ex. 1. Most of the declarations include or have as attachments invoices documenting the hours billed and the bill of costs....