Blackstock v. Astrue

• Decision Date: 06 December 2007
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. H-06-3364.
• Citation: 527 F.Supp.2d 604
• Parties: Mary L. BLACKSTOCK, Plaintiff, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

527 F.Supp.2d 604

Mary L. BLACKSTOCK, Plaintiff, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.

Civil Action No. H-06-3364.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division.

December 6, 2007.

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William C. Herren, Herren Law Office, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff.

Jose Ricardo Hernandez, SSA Office of the General Counsel, Dallas, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CALVIN BOTLEY, United States Magistrate Judge.

Pending before tie Court is Plaintiff Mary L. Blackstock's ("Blackstock") motion for summary judgment and Defendant Michael J. Astrue's, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner"),¹ response to Blackstock's motion for summary judgment. Blackstock appeals the determination of an Administrative Law Judge ("the ALP) that she is not entitled to receive Title II disability insurance benefits or Title XVI supplemental security income benefits. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 216(i), 226, and 1614(a)(3)(A). Having reviewed the pending motion, the submissions of the parties, the pleadings, the administrative record, and the applicable law, this Court is of the opinion that Blackstock's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 13) should be denied, and the ALJ's decision denying benefits be affirmed.

I. Background

On August 25, 2003, Blackstock filed applications for supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits, alleging that she had been disabled and unable to work since May 1, 2000. (R. 15, 60). Blackstock alleged that she suffers from high blood pressure (hypertension),² breathing problems, dizzy spells, back pain, and depression. (R. 71). Both applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. (R. 15, 23, 24). Blackstock requested, and was granted, an administrative hearing before an ALJ to review the decisions. (R. 38-41).

A hearing was held on March 6, 2006, in Houston, Texas, at which time the ALJ heard testimony from Blackstock and Lorie McQuade, a vocational expert ("YE"). (R. 329-46), In a decision dated April 10, 2006, the ALJ denied Blackstock's application for benefits. (R. 18-24). Blackstock appealed the decision to the Appeals Council of the SSA's Office of Hearings and Appeals, which, on August 25, 2006 (R. 5-7), declined to review the ALJ's determination, rendering the ALJ's opinion the final decision of the Commissioner. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 107, 120 S.Ct. 2080, 147 L.Ed.2d 80 (2000). Blackstock filed her original complaint in this case on October 23, 2006, seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of her claims for benefits. See Docket Entry No. 1.

II. Analysis

A. Statutory Bases for Benefits

SSI-benefits are authorized by Title XVI of the Act and are funded by general tax revenues. See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY HANDBOOK, § 2100 (14th ed.2001). The SSI Program is a general public assistance measure providing an additional resource to the aged, blind, and disabled to assure that their income does not fall below the poverty line. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.110. Eligibility for SSI is based upon proof of indigence and disability. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382(a), 1382c(a)(3)(A)-(C). A claimant applying to the SR program cannot receive payment for any period of disability predating the month in which she applies for benefits, no matter how long she has actually been disabled. See Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 495 n. 1 (5th Cir.1999); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.335. The applicable regulation provides:

When you file an application in the month that you meet all the other requirements for eligibility, the earliest month for which we can pay you benefits is the month following the month you filed the application. If you file an application after the month you first meet all the other requirements for eligibility, we cannot pay you for the month in which your application is filed or any months before that month.

20 C.F.R. § 416.335. Thus, the month following an application, here, September 2003, fixes the earliest date from which benefits can be paid. (R. 60). Eligibility for SSI payments, however, is not dependent on insured status. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a).

Social Security disability insurance benefits are authorized by Title II of the Act and are funded by Social Security taxes. See also SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY HANDBOOK, § 2100. The disability insurance program provides income to individuals who are forced into involuntary, premature retirement, provided they are both insured and disabled, regardless of indigence. A claimant for disability insurance can collect benefits for up to twelve months of disability prior to the filing of an application. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.131, 404.315; Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1005, 1007 n. 1 (5th Cir.1975); see also Perkins v. Chater, 107 F.3d 1290, 1295 (7th Cir.1997). For purposes of Title II disability benefits, Blackstock was last insured on December, 31 2003. (R. 15). Consequently, to be eligible for disability benefits, Blackstock must prove that she was disabled prior to that date. (R. 15).

While these are separate and distinct programs, applicants seeking benefits under either statutory provision must prove "disability" within the meaning of the Act, which defines disability in virtually identical language for both programs. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d), 1382c(a)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(G); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a). Under both provisions, disability is defined as the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). Moreover, the law and regulations governing the determination of disability are the same for both disability insurance benefits and SSI. See Greenspan v. Skalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1120, 115 S.Ct. 1984, 131 L.Ed.2d 871 (1995).

B. Standard of Review

1. Summary Judgment

The court may grant summary judgment under FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c) when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. The burden of proof, however, rests with the movant to show that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. If a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving patty, then a motion for summary judgment cannot be granted because there exists a genuine issue of fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

An issue of fact is "material" only if its resolution could affect the outcome of the case. See Duplantis v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 948 F.2d 187, 189 (5th Cir.1991). When deciding whether to grant a motion for summary judgment, the court shall draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and deny the motion if there is some evidence to support the nonmoving party's position. See McAllister v. Resolution Trust Corp., 201 F.3d 570, 574 (5th Cir.2000). If there are no issues of material fact, the court shall review any questions of law de novo. See Merritt-Campbell, Inc. v. RxP Prods., Inc., 164 F.3d 957, 961 (5th. Cir.1999). Once the movant properly supports the motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who must present specific and supported material facts, of significant probative value, to preclude summary judgment. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, TN S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de C.V., 199 F.3d 796, 798 (5th Cir.2000).

2. Administrative Determination

Judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of disability benefits is limited to whether the final decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and whether the proper legal standards were applied to evaluate the evidence. See Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2002). "Substantial evidence" means that the evidence must be enough to allow a reasonable mind to support the Commissioner's decision; it must be more than a mere scintilla and less than a preponderance. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971).

When applying the substantial evidence standard on review, the court "scrutinize[s] the record to determine whether such evidence is present." Myers v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 617, 619 (5th Cir.2001) (citations omitted). If the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive and must be affirmed. See Watson v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 212, 215 (5th Cir.2002). Alternatively, a finding of no substantial evidence is appropriate if no credible evidentiary choices or medical findings support the decision. See Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 704 (5th Cir.2001). The court may not, however, reweigh the evidence, try the issues de novo, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. See Masterson, 309 F.3d at 272. In short, "[c]onfilets in the evidence are for the Commissioner and not the courts to resolve." Id. at 272.

C. ALI's Determination

An ALJ must engage in a five-step inquiry to determine whether the claimant is capable of performing "substantial gainful activity," or is, in fact, disabled:

1. An individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be found disabled regardless of the medical findings. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b).

2. An individual who does not have a "severe impairment" will not be found to be disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c).

3. An individual who "meets or equals a listed impairment in Appendix 1" of the regulations will be considered disabled without consideration of vocational factors. See 20 C.F.R....