Blackstone v. Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 April 1889
• Citation: 42 N.W. 156,74 Mich. 592
• Parties: BLACKSTONE v. STANDARD LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

42 N.W. 156

74 Mich. 592

BLACKSTONE v. STANDARD LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO.

Supreme Court of Michigan

April 24, 1889

Error to circuit court, Lenawee county; LANE, judge.

Action by Emma W. Blackstone against the Standard Life & Accident Insurance Company. Judgment was given for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

James T. Keena, (C. E. Weaver and Atkinson, Carpenter & Brooke, of counsel,) for appellant.

Westerman & Westerman, (Seth L. Bean and Levi T. Griffin, of counsel,) for respondent.

LONG J.

Plaintiff brought her action upon a policy of insurance, the material parts relating to this case reading as follows:

"In consideration of the representations made in the application for this insurance and the sum of twenty-five dollars, this company hereby insures Daniel L. Blackstone Esq., residing at Adrian, county of Lenawee, and state of Michigan, hereinafter styled the insured, by occupation profession, or employment a traveling salesman, in the principal sum of five thousand dollars for the term of twelve months, commencing at 12 o'clock noon on the 27th day of February, 1886, the said sum to be paid to Mrs. Emma W. Blackstone, his wife, if surviving, within thirty days after the receipt of satisfactory proofs that the said insured shall have sustained during the continuance of this policy bodily injuries, effected through external, violent, and accidental means, within the intent and meaning of this contract and the conditions hereto annexed, and such injuries alone shall have occasioned death within ninety days from the happening thereof, *** provided, always, that this policy is issued and accepted subject to all the provisions and conditions herein contained and referred to. The statements and declarations of the insured, in his application for this insurance, together with the company's classification of hazard, is referred to and made a part of this contract; and if this policy, or any renewal thereof, has been made or shall be obtained through misrepresentations, fraud, or concealment, or if any attempt shall be made by false swearing or suppression of any material fact on the part of the insured or beneficiary, to obtain any sum under this policy or any renewal thereof, then the same shall be absolutely void: provided, always, that this insurance shall not extend to hernia; nor to any bodily injury of which there shall be no external or visible sign; nor to any bodily injury happening directly or indirectly in consequence of bodily infirmities or disease, or by poison in any manner or form, or by any surgical operation or medical or mechanical treatment; nor to any case except where the injury is the proximate and sole cause of the disability or death. And no claim shall be made under this policy when the death or injury has been caused by dueling, fighting, wrestling, unnecessary lifting, or by overexertion, or by suicide, or by sunstroke, freezing, or intentional injuries inflicted by or though the connivance of the insured, or when the death or injury may have happened in consequence of war. *** And this insurance shall not be held to extend to disappearances, nor to any cause of death or disability, unless the claimant under this policy shall establish by direct and positive proof that the said death or disability was caused by external, violent, and accidental means."

This policy was made subject to certain conditions, the second of which is: "The insured is required to use due diligence for personal safety and protection. In the event of any accidental injury for which claim may be made under this policy, immediate notice shall be given in writing, addressed to the company at Detroit, Michigan, stating the full name, occupation, and address of the insured, with full particulars of the accident and injury; and failure to give such immediate notice shall invalidate all claims under this policy, and unless direct and affirmative proof of the death of the insured shall be furnished to the company within ninety days from the happening of such fatal accident, or within six months in the case of non-fatal injury, then all claims accruing under this policy shall be waived, and forfeited to the company." The policy was issued upon a written application signed by the insured. The twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth clauses of the application are as follows: "(12) My habits of life are correct and temperate, and I understand the policy will not cover any accident or injury resulting from the use of intoxicating drinks, or in consequence of having been under the influence thereof, or a breach of the law, or to any injury which may result from disease or prior injury. I am aware and agree that the benefits from the company will not extend to hernia, orchites, overexertion, or strains, nor to any bodily injury which has not been effected through external and accidental violence, or of which there shall be no external and visible signs, or by poison in any form or manner, or by any surgical operation or medical or mechanical treatment, nor to any cause except where the accidental injury shall be the proximate and sole cause of the disability or death. (13) I am not suffering from any accident or wounds that would retard recovery, or be aggravated by personal injury. I am not subject to fits, or to any disorders of the brain or nervous system, or any physical infirmity which would render me liable to accident. (14) I hereby agree that the application and declaration shall be the basis of the contract; that the policy will be accepted subject to all the conditions and provisions contained therein; that any concealment of material facts, or misstatements made by me, shall work a forfeiture of all claims that may accrue under this policy."

The declaration filed in the case, after stating the issuing and the conditions of the policy, avers "that on the 28th day of October, A. D. 1886, her said husband died from bodily injuries, effected through external, violent, and accidental means, within the intent and meaning of said policy contract, and the conditions therein set forth; and that said injuries alone occasioned his death, and within ninety days from the happening of said injuries." The defendant pleaded the general issue, and gave notice that the policy declared upon was obtained by the insured upon an application,-the material portions of which have been heretofore set out,-and under an agreement that said application should be the basis of the contract. That, at the time when said application was made, the insured was subject to disorders of the brain and nervous system, and to physical infirmities which rendered him liable to accident; and the fact that he was so subject was concealed by him from the defendant. That the insured died from injuries resulting from disease. That the insured, before the time he made said application, had been for a long period insane, and at the time of making said application concealed that fact from the defendant. On the trial in the court below the plaintiff had verdict and judgment for the amount of the policy and interest. Defendant brings error.

It appeared upon the trial in the court below that the insured, Daniel L. Blackstone, was a traveling salesman, and was employed in that capacity during the spring and summer of 1886 by the Acme Hay Harvester Company, of Peoria, Ill. About September 1, 1886, he was thrown out of employment, and returned to his home in Adrian, and remained there until October 18th, when by correspondence he secured a situation with Mast, Buford & Burwell Manufacturing Company, of St. Paul, Minn. He left his home in Adrian October 18th, for the purpose of filling this engagement, and arrived in St. Paul on the 19th, and remained there until the 27th of that month, when he put an end to his life by cutting his throat with a razor. It is claimed by plaintiff that during the last two or three weeks of his remaining at home he showed evidence of mental derangement, and that during his stay in St. Paul, from October 19th to the 27th, there was evidence of insanity. The plaintiff's claim of recovery on the policy rests upon two propositions, each of which is denied by the defendant: (1) That Blackstone was insane at the time he took his life; (2) that an insane self-killing is an accident within the meaning of this policy. Was Blackstone insane at the time he took his life? At the close of the testimony the counsel submitted five special questions to the jury for their finding, as follows: (1) Did Mr. Blackstone kill himself? (2) Did he know at the time that he was committing an act which must result in death? (3) Was he conscious of what he was doing? (4) Did he intend to cut his throat, and thereby kill himself? (5) At the time Daniel L. Blackstone cut his throat was he insane? The jury answered these questions, the first and fifth in the affirmative, and the second, third, and fourth in the negative. We, have, therefore, presented to us by the record of the fifth finding of the jury that the insured was insane at the time he cut his throat, and the only inquiry for us upon this part of the case is, Was there any evidence to support this finding?

It was said by this court in Conely v. McDonald, 40 Mich 158: "We are bound in all cases to assume that the jury have done no legal wrong when acting within their province. *** The credibility of witnesses, the strength of their testimony, its tendency, and the proper weight to be given it, are matters peculiarly within their province. *** To take from them this right is but usurping a power not given." This doctrine has always been adhered to in this state, and has been stated and restated in so many cases in this court that no reference to them is necessary. The testimony relating to the insanity of Mr....