Blackwell v. Harris Chemical North America, Inc.
| Decision Date | 18 June 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A. 98-2003-KHV.,Civ.A. 98-2003-KHV. |
| Citation | 11 F.Supp.2d 1302 |
| Parties | Susan and Jerry BLACKWELL, Plaintiffs, v. HARRIS CHEMICAL NORTH AMERICA, INC., and Harris Chemical Group, Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
R. Douglas Gentile, Douthit, Frets, Rouse & Gentile, Kansas City, MO, Colleen L. Kallas, Kansas City, MO, for Plaintiffs.
Henry R. Cox, The Campbell Law Firm, Kansas City, MO, Thomas S. Giotto, Jill M. Lashay, Klett, Lieber, Rooney & Schorling, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendant.
Plaintiffs Susan and Jerry Blackwell claim that Harris Chemical North America, Inc. and Harris Chemical Group, Inc. intentionally or negligently inflicted emotional distress on Susan Blackwell and caused loss of consortium for her husband Jerry Blackwell. Plaintiffs also claim that defendants invaded Susan Blackwell's right of privacy and violated her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 [FMLA], 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. The matter comes before the Court on Defendants Harris Chemical North America, Inc. and Harris Chemical Group, Inc.'s Motion To Dismiss Doc. # 5) filed March 18, 1998, and Plaintiffs Susan and Jerry Blackwell's Motion For Leave To File A First Amended Complaint (Doc. # 22) filed May 4, 1998. For the following reasons, the Court finds that defendants' motion should be sustained in part and overruled in part, and that plaintiffs' motion should be sustained.
Defendants ask the Court to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must assume as true all well pleaded facts in plaintiffs' complaint and view them in a light most favorable to plaintiffs. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 118, 110 S.Ct. 975, 979, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990); see also Swanson v. Bixler, 750 F.2d 810, 813 (10th Cir.1984). The Court must make all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiffs, and the pleadings must be construed liberally. Id.; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a); Lafoy v. HMO Colorado, 988 F.2d 97, 98 (10th Cir.1993). The issue in reviewing the sufficiency of plaintiffs' complaint is not whether they will prevail, but whether they are entitled to offer evidence to support their claims. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The Court may not dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their theory of recovery that would entitle them to relief Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-03, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see also Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs, Co. v. City of Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 1991). Although plaintiffs need not precisely state each element of their claims, they must plead minimal factual allegations on those material elements that must be proved. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.1991).
Plaintiffs allege the following facts, which we deem to be true for the purposes of the pending motion to dismiss:
Susan Blackwell worked for defendants from November 1992 through January 1996. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 13(y). Jerry Blackwell is her husband. Id. at ¶ 3. Between November 1992 and March 1995, Susan moved from a temporary to a permanent position and achieved promotion to a management position, with eligibility for bonuses. Id. at ¶ 11-12. During 1994, Susan also received "very good" and "good" performance reviews. Id. at ¶ 12. Nevertheless, while on vacation in March 1995, Susan was demoted. Id. at ¶ 13(a) and (b).
After Susan's demotion, defendants subjected Susan to demeaning and humiliating conduct. Id. at ¶ 13. Although she had a primarily managerial position, they forced her to perform clerical tasks, data entry, "busy work," and additional tasks unrelated to existing duties, and prevented her from completing other job duties. Id. at ¶ 13(b). They constantly harassed her for not completing managerial tasks. Id. They also assigned her a personal computer that did not work, while her previous working computer sat on the floor in a supervisor's office. Id. at ¶ 13(d). During her appraisal in May of 1995, Susan endured yelling, name calling, and indefensible accusations. Contrary to company procedure, defendants refused to provide copies of the appraisal and made dramatic changes from the original version to the version from which they eventually allowed plaintiff to make notes. Id. at ¶ 13(e)(f).
In August 1995, defendants assigned Susan to work under supervisor Bruce Nied, even though they knew that she had previously complained to upper management about his performance. Id. at ¶ 13(g). The assignment to Nied produced most of the degrading conduct, including requirements that Susan keep a written log of daily activities, formally ask permission to leave her office, and perform an unreasonable work load. Id. at ¶ 13(h). Nied falsely accused Susan of incompetence and violations of company policy, but refused her requests for documentation of the shortcomings in her performance. Id. at ¶ 13(h), (m), and (k). Defendants knew some of the alleged conduct, but failed to do anything. Id. at ¶ 13(i).
From September to October 1995, Susan suffered a serious medical condition which rendered her unable to complete job duties. Id. at ¶ 13(p). She requested and received leave under the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2612. Id. During her leave, defendants badgered and harassed a nurse at the office of plaintiff's physician, in an attempt to get confidential information regarding plaintiff's illness and treatment. Id. Defendants also released detailed information of plaintiff's illness to fellow employees. Id. at ¶ 13(q). On return from leave, Susan was placed on probation for "productivity issues" under allegations which defendants knew to be false. Id. at ¶ 13(r).
On Thanksgiving Day, 1995, knowing that Susan's father was terminally ill and near death in the hospital, Nied required Susan to work a full day. Id. at ¶ 13(s). Susan's father died the following day. Id. Upper management met with Susan concerning some of Nied's conduct and assured her that the meetings were confidential. Id. at ¶ 13(t). Nied later confronted plaintiff, however, regarding the details of the meetings. Id.
Susan's working conditions continued to decline after she put defendants on notice regarding discrimination issues. Id. at ¶ 13(v). Defendants forced Susan to move into a cubicle and allowed a lower level warehouse clerk to move into her former office. Id. at ¶ 13(w). In January 1996, Human Resources told plaintiff that she had ten days to complete certain reports or be terminated. Id. at ¶ 13(x). Human Resources intentionally made this demand in order to terminate Susan. Id. Upon learning that Susan had been taking meeting notes on the advice of legal counsel, defendants terminated her employment on the basis of false accusations. Id. at ¶ 13(y).
As a result of defendants' conduct, Susan suffered severe mental and emotional distress with accompanying physical injury and ailments. Id. at ¶ 15. Jerry sustained the loss and impairment of his wife's services and domestic duties, as well as her companionship. Id. at ¶ 16. Following her termination, Susan became a disabled person within the meaning of K.S.A. § 60-515 and was disabled for a period of time following January 12, 1996. Id. at ¶ 18. Plaintiffs claim that defendants intentionally or negligently inflicted emotional distress on Susan, resulting in damages to Susan and the loss of Susan's services and companionship for her husband. Plaintiffs also claim that defendants invaded Susan's right of privacy and violated her rights under the FMLA.
Defendants assert several defenses, beginning with the argument that plaintiffs have sued the wrong defendants. Defendants assert that neither defendant employed Susan at any time, and submit the affidavit of Keith Clark, General Manager for North American Salt Company ("NASC") in support of this assertion. Defendants also seek to convert their motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that defendants were Susan's employers, however, and the Court therefore overrules defendants' motion to dismiss.1
Defendants assert that plaintiffs' state law claims are time barred by the two-year statute of limitations under K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4). Except for one incident on January 5, 1996 and Susan's termination on January 12, 1996, all of the challenged conduct occurred in 1995. Plaintiffs filed suit on January 6, 1998, pleading the tolling provision of K.S.A. § 60-515(a), which provides in part as follows:
Except as provided in K.S.A. § 60-523, if any person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery of real property or a penalty or a forfeiture, at the time the cause of action accrued or at any time during the period of the statute of limitations is running, is less than 18 years of age, an incapacitated person or imprisoned for a term less than such person's natural life, such person shall be entitled to bring such an action within one year after the person's disability is removed....
Plaintiffs allege that Susan was legally incapacitated within the meaning of K.S.A. § 60-515, for a period following her termination. Defendants contend that to invoke the tolling provision of § 60-515, plaintiff must plead facts to support her allegation of legal incapacity. Defendants cite Gardner v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 793 F.Supp. 287, 289-90 (1992), which states that to raise the tolling provisions of § 60-515, plaintiff must assert facts which justify a finding of legal incapacity. Gardner relies on Seymour v. Lofgreen, 209 Kan. 72, 77, 495 P.2d 969, 974 (1972), which holds that where a party does not assert legal incapacity, the party will be presumed...
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