Blackwell v. Laird and Laird

• Decision Date: 25 May 1942
• Docket Number: No. 20114.,20114.
• Citation: 163 S.W.2d 91
• Parties: FELIX G. BLACKWELL, APPELLANT, v. JOHN M. LAIRD AND G. THOMAS LAIRD, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME OF LAIRD BROTHERS LIVE STOCK COMMISSION COMPANY, RESPONDENTS.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

163 S.W.2d 91

FELIX G. BLACKWELL, APPELLANT, v. JOHN M. LAIRD AND G. THOMAS LAIRD, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME OF LAIRD BROTHERS LIVE STOCK COMMISSION COMPANY, RESPONDENTS.

No. 20114.

Kansas City Court of Appeals, Missouri.

May 25, 1942.

Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court. — Hon. Thomas J. Seehorn, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Cornelius Roach and Daniel L. Brenner for appellant.

(1) The respondents, as sellers of the stolen cattle, are liable for their value. Mohr v. Langan, 77 Mo. App. 481; Mohr v. Langan, 163 Mo. 474, 501; Koch v. Branch & Crooks, 44 Mo. 542; Kramer v. Faulkner, 9 Mo. App. 34, 35; Laughlin v. Barnes & Parrott, 76 Mo. App. 258; Bank v. Metcalf, Moore & Co., 40 Mo. App. 484; Ess v. Griffith, 128 Mo. 50; Michael-Swanson-Brady Produce Co. v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. et al., 271 S.W. 854.

C.G. Myers, Leslie A. Welch and Clyde J. Linde for respondent.

(1) Since the Packers' and Stock Yards Act, merchants at regulated markets who are "market agencies," are required to receive and sell all live stock consigned to them for sale. They are therefore public utilities, must carry the attending burdens of such, but are entitled to the benefits and protection of such status. 7 U.S.C.A., secs. 201 to 217; R.C. White Live Stock Comm. Co. v. Ry., 87 Mo. App. 330, 336-338; Nanson v. Jacob, 93 Mo. 331, 339; Highland Dairy Farms Co. v. Helvetia Milk Condensing Co., 308 Ill. 294, 139 N.E. 418; Inter-Ocean Publishing Co. v. Associated Press, 184 Ill. 438, 56 N.E. 822; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 74 L. Ed. 524; Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 80 L. Ed. 1288; Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 66 L. Ed. 735; U.S. v. Donahue Bros., Inc., 59 Fed. (2d) 1019. (2) The defendant, being a market agency and a public utility, having received the cattle in question without knowledge of any kind of the plaintiff's claim of ownership therein, and having merely rendered the service it was required to render under the "Packers' and Stock Yards Act," its action did not constitute a conversion. The defendant was entitled to all the benefits and protection given by law to such a public utility. White Live Stock Comm. Co. v. Ry., supra; Nanson v. Jacob, supra; Abernathy et al. v. Wheeler et al., 92 Ky. 320, 17 S.W. 1858; Hall v. Cumberland Pipe Line Co., 193 Ky. 728, 237 S.W. 405; Shellnut v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 131 Ga. 404, 62 S.E. 294; Gurley v. Armstead, 148 Mass. 267, 19 N.E. 389; A.T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. International Land & Investment Co., 247 Fed. 265.

CAVE, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County against plaintiff (appellant), and in favor of defendants (respondents). The cause was tried to the court sitting as a jury and on an agreed statement of facts. The essential facts, briefly stated, are:

The plaintiff was a farmer in Jackson County, and one of his farm hands stole ten head of his cattle and transported them by truck from his farm to the Kansas City Stock Yards, and sold them to two established live stock traders, Cahill and Swoboda; thereafter, Cahill, in the usual course of business at the stock yards, consigned these cattle, along with some other cattle, to respondents (John M. Laird and G. Thomas Laird, doing business under the name of Laird Brothers Live Stock Commission Company), to sell for Cahill's account and remit the proceeds, less commission charges, to him. Accordingly, Laird Brothers sold the cattle, deducted from the sale price the commission, and remitted the balance of $459.36 to Cahill. Thereafter, plaintiff (appellant) sued Cahill, Swoboda and Laird Brothers for the value of the cattle, claiming his hired man had sold his cattle without his authority. Upon a jury verdict for plaintiff against Cahill and Swoboda, but in favor of Laird Brothers, an interlocutory judgment for $545 was rendered against Cahill and Swoboda, and subsequently a new trial was granted as to Laird Brothers. On a retrial before the court without a jury, the court found for Laird Brothers and rendered judgment accordingly, from which this appeal was perfected. It was admitted that at all times here involved, Laird Brothers Live Stock Commission Company acted as a "market Agency," under the Packers and Stockyards Act (7 U.S.C.A., secs. 201 to 217), and under the rules and regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture of the United States, and in the usual course of business. It was further admitted that Laird Brothers had no notice of any interest, right or title of plaintiff in and to the cattle.

The respondents pleaded and now urge by way of defense that under the "Packers and Stockyards Act" above referred to, they were required to render market service to all persons applying for such service, and promptly receive and sell for a commission, without discrimination, all live stock consigned to them for sale and to immediately account to the consignors of said live stock for the proceeds of such sales; that the business of respondents under said Act was a "public utility," and that the operator of a public utility must render service to all who apply for the same, absent actual notice that an applicant was legally not entitled to same.

The sole question presented is whether the respondents, as sellers of the stolen cattle, are liable to the appellant, as owner, for their value, even though respondents had no notice or knowledge of appellant's interest in said cattle.

Appellant contends that respondents, as sellers of the stolen cattle, are liable for their value, even though they had no knowedge that the cattle had been stolen; and to support that contention, cites and relies upon the general rule that a seller of stolen property, even though innocent, is liable for the value of the property; citing Mohr v. Langan, 77 Mo. App. 481, 162 Mo. 474; Koch v. Branch & Crooks, 44 Mo. 542; Kramer v. Faulkner, 9 Mo. App. 34; Laughlin v. Barnes & Parrott, 76 Mo. App. 258; Bank v. Metcalf, Moore & Co., 40 Mo. App. 494; Ess v. Griffith, 128 Mo. 50; Michael-Swanson-Brady Produce Co. v. Oregon Short Line R.R. Co. et al., 271 S.W. 854; and Mason City Production Credit Association v. Sig. Ellingson & Co., 286 N.W. 713, 308 U.S. 599, 60 Sup. Ct. 130.

The Packers and Stockyards Act, supra, among other things, provides:

Section 201 (c): "The term `market agency' means any person engaged in the business of (1) buying or selling in commerce live stock at a stock yard on a commission basis, or (2) furnishing stock yards services; ..."

Section 205 provides:

"It shall be the duty of every stock yard owner and market agency to furnish upon reasonable request, without discrimination, reasonable stock yard services at such stock yard." (Italics ours.)

Section 201 (b) provides:

"The term `stock yard services' means services or facilities furnished at a stock yard in connection with the receiving, buying or selling on a commission basis or otherwise, marketing, feeding, watering, holding, delivery, shipping, weighing or handling in commerce of live stock." (Italics ours.)

The United States Supreme Court has held that the various stock yards of the country, coming within the Act, and the marketing agencies connected therewith, are public utilities and must comply with rules prescribed by the Secretary of Agriculture. [Tagg Brothers & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420; Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468; Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495.] The court, in the last cited case, said of the Act:

"The Act, therefore, treats the various stock yards of the country as great national public utilities to promote the flow of commerce from the ranges and farms of the west to the consumers in the east. It assumes that they conduct a business affected by public use of a national character and subject to national regulation. That it is a business within the power of regulation by legislative action needs no discussion."

It being admitted in the stipulation of facts that the respondents herein were a "market agency" under said Act and were subject to said Act and the rules and regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture for the United States, it follows as a matter of course that they must render to an applicant upon reasonable request and "without discrimination" the services which they are authorized to perform, to-wit: the selling of live stock for a commission, and under the regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture, remit the net proceeds to the shipper. [United States v. Donahue Brothers, Inc., 59 Fed. (2d) 1019, l.c. 1023.] Therefore, it would seem to be clear that the stock yards and market agencies which are subject to and are operating under the above Act are public utilities and are bound to reder to the public the services therein required. If that be true, then we are confronted with the question — Is a "market agency," which is bound to render the services of selling, for a commission, live stock upon application of a person presenting himself, in possession of such live stock, liable in conversion if the person delivering the property and demanding the service is not the true owner? It seems to be the generally accepted rule that "where one is in possession of personal property, such possession is prima-facie evidence of ownership in him." [White Live Stock Commission Company v. Ry., 87 Mo. App. 330; Nanson v. Jacob, 93 Mo. 331; Smith v. Colby, 67 Maine 169, and Gurley v. Armstead, 148 Mass. 267.] In this case, there is no question but what Cahill was in possession of the cattle at the time he made application to the respondents to sell the same, and there is no evidence or intimation that Cahill knew the cattle had been...