Blackwell v. Sec'y, Case No.: 3:12-cv-518-J-32JBT

• Decision Date: 22 September 2015
• Docket Number: Case No.: 3:12-cv-518-J-32JBT
• Parties: DANNY RAY BLACKWELL, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

DANNY RAY BLACKWELL, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondent.

Case No.: 3:12-cv-518-J-32JBT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

September 22, 2015

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner, an inmate of the Florida penal system who is proceeding pro se, is proceeding in this action on a Petition (Doc. # 1) for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his December 7, 2005 state court (St. Johns County) conviction for robbing a bakery. Petitioner was convicted following a jury trial, and the state court sentenced him to 30 years in prison as a habitual violent felony offender. (See Ex. F, G, H). Petitioner raises six grounds for relief. Respondents have responded. See Response to Petition (Doc. # 9) (Response); Supplemental Response to Petition (Doc. #14).¹ Petitioner has replied. SeePetitioner's Reply to Respondents' Response (Doc. # 17) (Reply). Thus, this case is ripe for review.²

II. Evidentiary Hearing

"In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Id. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because this Court can "adequately assess [Petitioner's] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir.2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

III. Standard of Review

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (hereinafter AEDPA)³, this Court's review "is 'greatlycircumscribed and highly deferential to the state courts.'" Stewart v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 476 F.3d 1193, 1208 (11th Cir.2007) (citing Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002)).

Under AEDPA, when a state court has adjudicated the petitioner's claim on the merits, a federal court may not grant habeas relief unless the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," id. § 2254(d)(2). A state court's factual findings are presumed correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.⁴Id. § 2254(e)(1); Ferrell v. Hall, 640 F.3d 1199, 1223 (11th Cir.2011).

AEDPA "imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings" and "demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1862, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, — U.S. —, —, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). "It bears repeating that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003)). The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed lower federal courts that an unreasonable application of law requires more than mere error or even clear error. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18, 124 S.Ct. 7, 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 ("The gloss of clear error fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness."); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) ("[A]nunreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.").

Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253-54 (11th Cir.2013).

In his reply brief, Petitioner contends that because the state court denied some of his claims without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the state court's factual determinations on those claims are presumably unreasonable. (See Reply at 2-3). However, the majority of courts of appeal have concluded that, under AEDPA, a state court need not conduct an evidentiary hearing for its factual determinations to be entitled to deference. Hibbler v. Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1147 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied 133 S. Ct. 1262 (2013); Cowans v. Bagley, 639 F.3d 241, 246-48 (6th Cir. 2011) ("Nothing in § 2254(d)(2) ... suggests we defer to a state court's factual findings only if the state court held a hearing on the issue."); Richards v. Quarterman, 566 F.3d 553, 563 (5th Cir. 2009) ("the state habeas court's factual determinations, including its credibility findings, are entitled to a presumption of correctness under § 2254(e)(1), regardless of whether the state court held a full and fair hearing"); Rolan v. Vaughn, 445 F.3d 671, 679-80 (3d Cir. 2006) ("AEDPA does not provide that a federal habeas court should, before affording deference to state court determinations, evaluate the procedural adequacy of state court proceedings or whether the state court properly exercised its jurisdiction. AEDPA, unlike prior law, has no requirement that the state court hold a hearing or comply with other prerequisites to deference listed in the previous habeas statute.") (quotation marks omitted); cf. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 96-100, 131 S. Ct. at 783-85 (explaining that deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) applies even to a one-line summary order). Thus, that a state court reaches certainfactual conclusions without conducting an evidentiary hearing does not mean that such determinations were per se unreasonable under § 2254(d)(2).

IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner raises several ineffective assistance of counsel claims. "To prevail on th[ese] claim[s], [Petitioner] must meet both the deficient performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland." Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 16, 130 S.Ct. 383, 175 L.Ed.2d 328 (2009) (per curiam) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).

To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a conviction must show that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance must apply a "strong presumption"⁵ that counsel's representation was within the "wide range" of reasonable professional assistance. The challenger's burden is to show "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."

With respect to prejudice, a challenger must demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." It is not enough "to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding." Counsel's errors must be "so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."

Harrington v. Richter, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787-88, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (internal citations omitted). Since both prongs of the two-part Strickland test must be satisfied to show a Sixth Amendment violation, "a court need not address the performance prong if the petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong, and vice-versa." Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1163 (11th Cir.2010) (citation omitted).

A state court's adjudication of an ineffectiveness claim is accorded great deference.

The question "is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination" under the Strickland standard "was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable-a substantially higher threshold." Schriro, . And, because the Strickland standard is a general standard, a state court has even more latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard. SeeYarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004) ("[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule's specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations").

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). Thus, the standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential, "and when the two apply in tandem, review is 'doubly' so[.]" Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 788 (quoting Knowles, 556 U .S. at 123).

V. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

A. Ground One

In his first ground, Petitioner argues that counsel gave ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate a mistaken identity defense. Specifically, Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for not presenting his eyeglasses to thejury as proof that the victim misidentified him as the robber. Whereas the victim described the robber as wearing "thick" lensed glasses (see, e.g., Ex. D at 30, 67, 137, 141), Petitioner states that he actually owned glasses with thin lenses (Petition at 4). Additionally, Petitioner states that his glasses would not stay in their frames unless he tilted his head back, such that he could not have committed the robbery without the glasses falling out. (See id.). Petitioner argues that presenting his glasses to the jury would have created a reasonable doubt as to the identity of the robber, and counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate, discover, or present the glasses to the jury. (Id.).

Peti...