Blackwell v. State, F-80-680

Decision Date20 April 1983
Docket NumberNo. F-80-680,F-80-680
PartiesDavid Michael BLACKWELL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
OPINION

BRETT, Judge:

David Michael Blackwell, the appellant, was charged in Cleveland County District Court Case No. CFR-79-643 with First Degree Murder in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.1979, § 701.7. He was found guilty by a jury and punishment was set at life imprisonment in the State penitentiary. The trial court sentenced the appellant in accordance with the jury verdict, and he has perfected his appeal to this Court.

A summary of the testimony indicates that the victim, Leslie Gail Buford, was driving on an interstate in Oklahoma City late in the evening on August 23, 1979, when she had a flat tire on her car. The appellant was one of four men in a car who stopped to help her. Ms. Buford apparently agreed to accompany the driver, Brogie, to a phone when it was suggested that the other men, the appellant, Webster, and Owens, would stay with her car. Not being able to reach anyone by phone, Ms. Buford accepted a ride home from Brogie. They drove back to her car on the interstate and picked up the other three men. Brogie explained to the men, out of the presence of Ms. Buford, that they would take the girl home "but not until after we've had some fun with her."

As they proceeded on the interstate, the victim was threatened with knives by Brogie and the appellant who demanded her money and jewelry. Her clothing was removed, she was forced to have sexual intercourse repeatedly with the different men, and was sodomized, while driving in the car and after stopping at a secluded area of town. Ms. Buford's throat was slashed and each of the men stabbed her. To insure the victim was dead, the appellant threw asphalt at her head before dumping her body in a ditch.

I

Within a few weeks of the murder, the appellant and Webster entered the police department in Bethany, Oklahoma, and informed Officer Watkins that they had information concerning a crime committed in the Oklahoma City area, which they would reveal if given "amnesty". Officer Watkins immediately informed the appellant that only the district attorney's office was empowered to grant immunity from prosecution and furthermore, more information would be needed to even establish that a crime had been committed. The appellant told Officer Watkins that the crime involved the homicide of a white girl and volunteered that he could possibly direct the officer to the body. All three drove to a location where the appellant thought the homicide occurred, but the body could not be found.

Officer Watkins testified at trial that it became apparent to him that the appellant might be more involved in the homicide than was initially indicated, and after arriving back at the police station, he read the appellant his rights. At that point the appellant gave a statement that he was "forced by an unnamed subject to participate in the rape and homicide," and requested to talk to the D.A. Officer Watkins called Andrew Coats, the district attorney, and let the appellant talk with him. That conversation was not revealed at trial. However, Detective Lewis, the Oklahoma City detective assigned to Ms. Buford's case, came to the Bethany station later that day to talk to the appellant. After talking a few minutes, Detective Lewis read the appellant his rights. The appellant stated he wanted to talk to the D.A., but gave an incriminating statement to the detective anyway about the events leading up to Ms. Buford's death. At trial, the detective testified that he made no promises in return for the statement. Later that night the appellant gave another statement upon being asked to by Detective Lewis.

During the trial, both Officer Watkins and Detective Lewis were permitted to testify over the appellant's objections to the events of September 4, 1979 and statements, admissions, and confessions, made by the appellant. The appellant claims that this testimony was in contravention of 12 O.S.1981, § 2410, which provides that "[e]vidence of ... statements made in connection with, and relevant to, any ... pleas or offers [to plead guilty to a crime] is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer." The appellant cites numerous cases from other jurisdictions to support his contention that the statements and confessions made by him were plea related. The appellant has correctly isolated the crucial issue as whether the conversations held between himself and the officers were a part of plea negotiations. If they were, this Court recognizes that they should have been excluded from evidence. See Shriver v. State, 632 P.2d 420 (Okl.Cr.1980).

In the present case the record gives no indication that the statements made by the appellant were part of plea negotiations. Instead, they were admissible as admissions or confessions voluntarily made to the police officers. Peters v. State, 586 P.2d 749 (Okl.Cr.1978). The testimony was clear that the appellant was informed of his rights several times in addition to initially being told by Officer Watkins that only the district attorney was empowered to offer immunity. With the knowledge that he had not only the right to remain silent, and have an attorney, but also anything he said could be used against him, the appellant chose to offer admissions and then a full confession to persons he knew could not negotiate a plea bargain with him. Although this Court recognizes that the plea negotiation process may involve more than a formal discussion across a table from the district attorney, that process will not be extended to the situation presented in this case. The appellant may have had the expectation that his actions would lead to the negotiation of a plea bargain, but that expectation was not reasonable given the circumstances surrounding the giving of those statements.

II

Related to his first proposition is the appellant's assertion that an instruction should have been delivered to the jury informing them that a defendant's statements made in conjunction with plea negotiations are inadmissible at trial. The issue of whether the appellant's statements were made in conjunction with plea negotiations has been disposed of above. A review of the instructions given the jury regarding the voluntariness of the appellant's statements accurately cover the applicable law. This proposition of error is meritless.

III

After disposing of the victim's body, the appellant and his accomplices cleaned the blood from themselves, picked up some gasoline in containers from a convenience store, and proceeded back to the victim's car. They drove the car to a remote part of town, doused it with gasoline and set it on fire, apparently in an effort to extinguish the possibility of fingerprints on the car. The appellant argues that it was error to allow evidence of another crime, arson, to be admitted at trial.

As a general rule, the appellant has correctly stated that evidence of other crimes is inadmissible, and an accused put on trial for an offense is to be convicted, if at all, by evidence which proves him guilty of that offense alone. Allen v. State, 611 P.2d 254 (Okl.Cr.1980); Burks v. State, 594 P.2d 771 (Okl.Cr.1979). However, the evidence of the burned car can be properly viewed as part of the entire transaction surrounding the events...

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18 cases
  • Brogie v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
    • January 2, 1985
    ...burning of the car was part of the entire transaction surrounding the victim's death, and was properly admitted. See Blackwell v. State, 663 P.2d 12, 15 (Okl.Cr.1983). The plot to shoot Owens was admissible under Wills v. State, 636 P.2d 372 (Okl.Cr.1981). The plot was hatched during the te......
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    ...guilt or innocence of the crime charged and not with respect to alternative means by which the crime was committed. Blackwell v. State, 663 P.2d 12, 16 (Okl.Cr.1983). We find the child abuse murder statute should be interpreted in the same manner as § 701.7(B). Proof of the underlying act o......
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    • July 26, 2000
    ...guilt or innocence of the crime charged and not with respect to alternative means by which the crime was committed. Blackwell v. State, 663 P.2d 12, 16 (Okl.Cr.1983). ¶ 41 We find the child abuse murder statute should be interpreted in the same manner as § 701.7(B). Proof of the underlying ......
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