Bladen v. First Presbyterian Church of Sallisaw, 76870
| Decision Date | 20 July 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 76870,76870 |
| Parties | , 1993 OK 105 Ron BLADEN and Pam Bladen, Appellants, v. FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF SALLISAW, Oklahoma, a domestic corporation, Appellee, and Reed Montgomery, an individual, Defendant. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Certiorari to the Oklahoma Court of Appeals, Division IV.
Husband and wife brought an action in the District Court for Sequoyah County against their church and former minister because the couple had been counseled by the minister and the wife and minister had an affair. The Honorable Bill Ed Rogers, District Judge, sustained the church's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the church from the action. The husband and wife appealed and the Court of Appeals reinstated the church as a party. The church sought certiorari.
Certiorari Previously Granted, Opinion of the Court of Appeals Vacated, Judgment of District Court Affirmed.
Clark S. Wood, Sallisaw, for appellants.
David R. Scott, McGivern, Scott, Gilliard, McGivern and Robinson, Tulsa, for appellee.
This is a suit by a married couple against their church and former minister. Although several theories of liability are advanced, all grow out of the fact that the preacher initiated and consummated an adulterous affair with the wife. This occurred within a few months after marital counseling with the wife had ended, but while the preacher was still providing such counseling to the husband.
The trial court sustained the church's motion for summary judgment, determining that the law of Oklahoma does not allow such a suit against a church. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, and we have granted certiorari. We now affirm the trial court.
The husband was active in the local church as a governing elder. His wife was the church secretary. The wife and husband received marital counseling, and after their counselor moved they decided to seek counseling from their minister, who agreed. In the summer of 1985 they received such counseling in some five to ten sessions at both the church and in their home. The joint counseling was discontinued in September 1985 and the wife was not counseled further. The husband continued the counseling, although it was of a non-scheduled, informal nature, and was unbeknownst to the wife.
In January or February of 1986 the wife and the minister commenced an affair that When the husband communicated this discovery to others the church determined it no longer needed the wife's services as a secretary, and the minister resigned. The husband and wife separated for a time, and then reunited and obtained counseling independent of the church.
lasted into June of that year. She stated that to her knowledge no one in the church knew of the affair, and that the church would not have condoned it. The affair ended when her husband discovered it in June of 1986 and confronted her and the minister.
The husband's claim was against the minister for giving him marital counseling while having an affair with his wife. He claimed that the particular advice given to him was to aid the minister in the seduction, and was bad advice for marital counseling. He stated that he couldn't remember all of the advice he received, but he did remember that he was advised in October 1985 to give his wife less attention. He stated that he tried it but it didn't work.
The minister stated that providing marital counseling to church members was one of his duties of a minister, and that he had counseled other church members with marital problems. He stated that his advice to the husband included prayer, involvement in the church school, and things to ease the tension at home. The minister also admitted that at a prior post at a church in Texas he had had a consensual affair with a church secretary.
One claim against the church was that it knew or should have known about the affair and the past affair in Texas, and that the church negligently hired and supervised the minister. The wife stated that her claim against the church was because of the affair, and because the church had not offered her additional counseling after the affair was discovered. Both claimed that they suffered emotional distress because of the incident. They claimed that as the employer of the minister, the church should be held accountable for his actions.
The church responded that it did not know of the affair or of the prior one in Texas, and that it did not condone such goings on. The church also stated that marital counseling was not one of the duties of a minister of the Presbyterian Church, and that the minister was acting beyond the scope of his contract by providing such. However, the minister stated that he was not subject to any higher authority as to the content of his religious instruction.
The husband's and wife's second amended petition made the allegations referred to herein concerning the affair, but made no allegations as to any act of the church injurious to them independent of those of the minister. However, in their response to the defendants' motions to dismiss the plaintiffs argued that "The plaintiffs in the present action are clearly not bringing an action for criminal conversation or alienation of affection; but their claim is based totally upon the Church's failure to properly supervise its employee; and upon the employee's breach of fiduciary duty in misusing the confidential information obtained during counseling sessions." O.R. at 84. The motions to dismiss were overruled, but when the church moved for summary judgment, the court sustained it, and dismissed the church from the suit on November 29, 1990. 1 The question, then, is whether on these facts the couple may proceed to trial against the church.
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment may shield a church from tort liability on a parishioner's suit when the church's act occurs in the context of the church's ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 2
In Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766 (Okl.1989) we explained that the plaintiff's recovery on the basis of the torts of outrage and invasion of privacy could not be sustained in a civil court when the acts alleged to be tortious were the ecclesiastical disciplinary acts of a church against its member. We followed this rule in Hadnot v. Shaw, 826 P.2d 978 (Okl.1992).
The First Amendment does not shield a religious institution from all tort liability. Tort liability for a church may arise from acts unrelated to religious practices protected by the First Amendment. For example, where the degree of care a church uses in maintaining property is unrelated to its religious beliefs and practices, and a person is damaged as a result of the church's maintenance of the property, a tort action may proceed. 3 Some jurisdictions have determined that a church may likewise be liable under some circumstances for the intentional torts of its employees. 4 Similarly, tort liability may be imposed upon the Elders of a church for tortious acts beyond the constitutionally protected religious practices of a church. 5
The parties, of course, agree that the affair had nothing to do with the doctrine of the church. Although there is a dispute between the church and the minister as to whether marital counseling is one of the duties of a minister, there is no doubt that the minister as well as the plaintiffs considered marital counseling as one of the duties of the minister. The husband's claims against the church are based upon theories that the church negligently supervised the minister, and is liable for the acts of its employee pursuant to respondeat superior. 6 Because the claims against the church are intertwined with, and partially dependent upon, those against the minister, we must examine the claims against the minister.
Many jurisdictions have recognized claims for therapist malpractice when a therapist engages in sexual conduct with a patient of the therapist. For example, one court has stated that "Where a therapist mishandles transference and becomes sexually involved with his patient, courts commonly hold such action to constitute malpractice." Lenhard v. Butler, 745 S.W.2d 101, 103 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1988). Similar language is used in Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1365 (9th Cir.1986), where the court stated that "When the therapist mishandles transference and becomes sexually involved with a patient, medical authorities are nearly unanimous in considering such conduct to be malpractice." Other courts agree. 7 Some jurisdictions have recognized claims for negligent supervision for this type of malpractice of an employee and allowed claims under the theory of respondeat superior. Andrews v. United States, 732 F.2d 366, 371 (4th Cir.1984), (claim for negligent supervision against doctor for malpractice of Physician's Assistant); Cotton Kambly, 101 Mich.App. 537, 300 N.W.2d 627 (1980), (respondeat superior claim).
Courts do not appear to have been as quick in recognizing a malpractice action for other professionals who give advice and then engage in sexual intimacy with their patients or clients. For example, in Simmons v. United States, supra, the court stated:
We note that courts do not routinely impose liability upon physicians in general for sexual contact with patients. See The crucial factor in the therapist-patient relationship which leads to the imposition of legal liability for conduct which arguably is no more exploitative of a patient than sexual involvement of a lawyer with a client, or a priest or minister with a parishioner, or a gynecologist with a patient is that lawyers, ministers and gynecologists do not offer a course of treatment and counseling predicated upon handling the transference phenomenon. See A. Stone, M.D., Law, Psychiatry, and Morality, 199 (1984).
e.g., Smith v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 353 N.W.2d 130, 132 (Minn.1984...
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