Blair v. City of Hannibal

• Decision Date: 13 April 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:15CV00061 ERW
• Citation: 179 F.Supp.3d 901
• Parties: Jacob Blair, et al., Plaintiffs, v. City of Hannibal, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

179 F.Supp.3d 901

Jacob Blair, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.City of Hannibal, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:15CV00061 ERW

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Northern Division.

Signed April 13, 2016

Nathan D. Sturycz, Sturycz Watts LLC, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiffs.

Edward V. Crites, Timothy J. Reichardt, W. Dudley McCarter, III, Behr, McCarter & Potter, P.C., Joann Tracy Sandifer, Omri E. Praiss, Husch Blackwell, LLP, St. Louis, MO, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

E. RICHARD WEBBER, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc.'s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF No. 19].

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Jacob Blair and Sarah Blair (“Plaintiffs”) filed a Class Action Complaint in this Court on August 25, 2015, against Defendants City of Hannibal (“Hannibal”), Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc. (“Redflex”) and Does 1 through 24 alleging Hannibal's red light camera program is unconstitutional [ECF No. 1]. On November 16, 2015, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint against Defendants asserting the following eight counts: (1) Declaratory Judgment and Injunction pursuant to Missouri Revised Statute § 527.010 et seq . ; (2) Violation of Plaintiffs' Constitutional Rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I § 10 of the Missouri Constitution ; (3) Unjust Enrichment, (4) Abuse of Process; (5) Civil Conspiracy; (6) Aiding and Abetting against Redflex; (7) Damages for Violation of Missouri Revised Statute § 484.010, et seq., against Redflex; and (8) Money Had and Received [ECF No. 16]. On November 20, 2015, Redflex filed the pending Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings requesting the Court dismiss all claims against Redflex with prejudice.

The Court adopts the following statement of facts as well-pleaded allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint [ECF No. 16]. Ginsburg v. Inbev NV/SA , 623 F.3d 1229, 1233 n. 3 (8th Cir.2010) ; Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). On or about May 18, 2007, Hannibal and Redflex entered into a contract for Redflex to install and operate a red light camera system in Hannibal. In December 2011, Plaintiff Joseph Blair received a ticket as a result of the red light camera system, was issued a fine, and paid the fine. At the end of 2012, or beginning of 2013, Plaintiff Sarah Blair received a ticket as a result of the red light camera system, was issued a fine, and paid the fine. Defendants shared revenue of approximately $500,000 annually since 2007, a sum greater than the cost of the program.

Redflex played an integral role in the program including advising Hannibal about the program, analyzing and making judgments regarding whether a violation occurred, sending notices of violations, collecting fines, and providing a customer service line. Redflex advised persons who had received notices of violation to pay the fine. Redflex and its paid employees are not attorneys licensed in the State of Missouri.

On June 19, 2007, the Hannibal City Council passed Ordinance 4412 which allowed for detection of violations of traffic control ordinances through an automated red light enforcement system.¹ On March 6, 2012, the Hannibal City Council revoked Ordinance 4412 and replaced it with Ordinance 4599 which governed the use of the automated red light enforcement system. On November 12, 2013, Hannibal City Council revoked Ordinance 4599 and replaced it with Ordinance 4652 to govern the use of the automated red light enforcement system.²

Redflex filed the pending Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings asserting the following arguments: (1) Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the government contractor defense; (2) Plaintiffs' claim for violation of constitutional rights fails because Redflex did not engage in any conduct which caused Plaintiffs to suffer injury; (3) Plaintiffs' claim for abuse of process fails because Redflex did not issue process; (4) Plaintiffs' claim for unauthorized practice of law fails because Plaintiffs did not pay Redflex any consideration for legal advice; (5) Plaintiffs' claims for unjust enrichment and money had and received fail because Plaintiffs did not pay Redflex anything and the voluntary payment doctrine bars these claims; (6) Plaintiffs' claim for civil conspiracy fails because Plaintiffs fail to plead sufficient facts to support a conspiracy theory; and (7) Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting claim fails because Plaintiffs' theories of liability do not constitute causes of action under Missouri law.

II. STANDARD

Generally, a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is reviewed under the same standard as a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Ginsburg, 623 F.3d at 1233, n. 3 ; Clemons v. Crawford, 585 F.3d 1119, 1124 (8th Cir.2009) ; Ashley County v. Pfizer, 552 F.3d 659, 665 (8th Cir.2009). The Court must view the allegations in the Complaint liberally and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp., 514 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir.2008) (citing Luney v. SGS Auto. Servs, 432 F.3d 866, 867 (8th Cir.2005) ). The Court “must accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Coons v. Mineta, 410 F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir.2005). A complaint must have “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (abrogating the “no set of facts” standard for Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) found in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) ). To prove the grounds for entitlement of relief, a plaintiff must provide more than labels and conclusions, and “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; Huang v. Gateway Hotel Holdings, 520 F.Supp.2d 1137, 1140 (E.D.Mo.2007).

“[T]he Court generally must ignore materials outside the pleadings, but it may consider ‘some materials that are part of the public record or do not contradict the complaint.’ ” State ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 164 F.3d 1102, 1107 (8th Cir.1999). Additionally, the Court may consider materials that are “necessarily embraced by the pleadings.” Piper Jaffray Cos. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 967 F.Supp. 1148, 1152 (D.Minn.1997) ; Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir.1999).

III. DISCUSSION

Redflex asserts seven arguments to support its assertion Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed. The Court will address each as follows.

A. Government Contractor Defense

First, Redflex asserts all of Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed pursuant to the government contractor defense. Redflex claims Hannibal is entitled to sovereign immunity, it performed its obligations in a non-negligent manner, and Plaintiffs did not allege a willful tort. Plaintiffs respond Redflex is not entitled to the government contractor defense because Hannibal is not entitled to sovereign immunity, Redflex did perform in a negligent manner, and Redflex engaged in a willful tort.

The government contractor defense provides a private party who enters into a contract for performance of public works with a public entity shares the immunity of the public entity if the private party is not guilty of negligence. Rector v. Tobin Constr. Co. , 377 S.W.2d 409, 413 (Mo. banc 1964). A private party is also not entitled to the defense when it engages in a willful tort. Id. To determine if Redflex is entitled to the government contractor defense, the Court must determine if Hannibal is entitled to sovereign immunity and if, based on the facts pleaded, Redflex performed its duties negligently or committed a willful tort.

1. Sovereign Immunity

A state may not be sued without its consent. Kleban v. Morris , 363 Mo. 7, 247 S.W.2d 832, 836 (1952). Missouri Revised Statute 537.600 creates two exceptions: (1) injuries resulting from negligent acts by a public employee out of the operation of motor vehicles in the course of their employment, and (2) injuries caused by the condition of a public entity's property if it is established the property was in a dangerous condition. This statute solely governs the State's sovereign immunity from liability in tort; it does not govern immunity under non-tort theories of recovery. Kubley v. Brooks , 141 S.W.3d 21, 29 (Mo.2004). A state entity may also waive immunity from suit by entering into an express contract. Id. at 28. “[W]hen the State enters into a validly authorized contract, it lays aside whatever privilege of sovereign immunity it otherwise possesses and binds itself to performance, just as any private citizen would do by contracting.” Id. at 30 (quoting V.S. DiCarlo Const. Co., Inc. v. Missouri , 485 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Mo.1972)). This does not mean all claims sounding in contract are exempt from the application of sovereign immunity. State ex rel. Mo. State Highway Patrol v. Atwell , 119 S.W.3d 188, 190 (Mo.Ct.App.2003) (abrogated on other grounds by Kubley v. Brooks , 141 S.W.3d 21 (Mo.2004) ). A state can also waive sovereign immunity through the purchase of liability insurance. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.610 ; see also Mo. Rev. Stat. § 71.185. Liability of a public entity is the exception to the general rule; thus, a plaintiff must plead specific facts showing his claims are within the exception. Meyers v. Red Roof Inns, Inc. , No. 4:15CV00393 ERW, 2015 WL 1650904 at *2 (E.D.Mo. Apr. 14, 2015) (citing Hummel v. St. Charles City R – 3 School Dist. , 114 S.W.3d 282, 284 (Mo.Ct.App.2003) ).³

Municipalities are considered entities of the state but are not entitled to sovereign immunity in all circumstances. Meyers , 2015 WL 1650904 at *2 (citing Gregg v. City of Kansas City , 272 S.W.3d 353, 359 (Mo.Ct.App.2008) ). They are only entitled to sovereign immunity when engaged in governmental functions. Sykes v. City of Pine Lawn , No. 4:15CV00462 AGF, 2015 WL 4162775 at *2 (E.D.Mo...