Blair v. City of Hannibal

• Decision Date: 12 July 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:15CV00061 ERW
• Citation: Blair v. City of Hannibal, 194 F.Supp.3d 875 (E.D. Mo. 2016)
• Parties: Jacob BLAIR, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF HANNIBAL, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

194 F.Supp.3d 875

Jacob BLAIR, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.CITY OF HANNIBAL, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:15CV00061 ERW

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Northern Division, NORTHERN DIVISION.

Signed July 12, 2016

Nathan D. Sturycz, Edwardsville, IL, for Plaintiffs.

Joann Tracy Sandifer, Omri E. Praiss, Husch Blackwell, LLP, St. Louis, MO, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

E. RICHARD WEBBER, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant City of Hannibal's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF No. 41].

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Plaintiffs Jacob and Sarah Blair ("Plaintiffs") filed a Class Action Complaint in this Court on August 25, 2015, against Defendants City of Hannibal ("Hannibal"), Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc. ("Redflex") and Does 1 through 24 alleging Hannibal's red light camera program is unconstitutional. [ECF No. 1]. On November 16, 2015, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Class Action Complaint ("Amended Complaint") against Defendants asserting the following eight counts: (I) Declaratory Judgment and Request for Injunction pursuant to Missouri Revised Statute § 527.010 et seq . ; (II) Violation of Plaintiffs' Constitutional Rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I § 10 of the Missouri Constitution ; (III) Unjust Enrichment; (IV) Abuse of Process; (V) Civil Conspiracy; (VI) Aiding and Abetting against Redflex; (VII) Damages for Violation of Missouri Revised Statute § 484.010 et seq ., against Redflex; and (VIII) Money Had and Received. [ECF No. 16].

On May 5, 2016, Hannibal filed the pending Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings requesting this Court enter a judgment in favor of Hannibal, dismissing Counts I, II, III, IV, V, and VIII of the Amended Complaint. [ECF No. 42]. On May 27, 2016, in response to Hannibal's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the pending motion, requesting the Court deny Hannibal's motion. [ECF No. 49]. Plaintiffs contend their Amended Complaint states, with sufficient factual detail, multiple viable claims against Hannibal for their illegal scheme. [ECF No. 49, p. 1]. Plaintiffs further contend they have contemporaneously filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Class Action Complaint, which is pending before this Court and, therefore, makes Hannibal's motion moot. [ECF No. 49, pp. 1–2]. To date, irrespective of the Court's inquiry to Plaintiffs as to why the requested filing of a second amended complaint had not been filed, the Court has yet to receive Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Class Action Complaint and therefore, will base its decision on their response filed on May 27, 2016. [ECF No. 49].

B. Factual Background

This Court adopts the following statement of facts as well-pleaded allegations in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. Ginsburg v. Inbev NV/SA , 623 F.3d 1229, 1233 n.3 (8th Cir. 2010) ; Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). On July 9, 2010, Plaintiff Jacob Blair received a Notice of Violation and Citation based on an alleged violation of Ordinance 17–88C ("2010 Ticket"). [ECF No. 16, ¶ 6]; [ECF No. 17–2, p. 4]. The 2010 Ticket was comprised of eight pages of information, including an instructions page. [ECF No. 17–2, p. 5]. The instructions page informed the recipient of the alleged violation and the three different options on how to proceed. [ECF No. 17–2]. Recipient's first option was to pay the fine, thereby pleading guilty to the alleged violation. [ECF No. 17–2, p. 5]. Recipient's second option was to complete and return an affidavit which indicated the recipient was not the driver of the vehicle. [ECF No. 17–2, p. 5]. Recipient's final option was to schedule a hearing, enter a plea of not guilty, and wait for the court to notify him or her, in writing, of the date and time in which he or she was to appear. [ECF No. 17–2, p. 5]. After receipt of the 2010 Ticket, Plaintiff paid the subsequent fine. [ECF No. 16, ¶ 6].

On November 22, 2013, Plaintiff Sarah Blair received a Notice of Violation and Citation based on an alleged violation of ordinance 17–88C ("2013 Ticket").¹ [ECF No. 16, ¶ 7] [ECF No. 17–3, p. 4]. Plaintiff Sarah Blair's Notice of Violation Citation contained detailed instructions on how to proceed. [ECF No. 17–3]. Contained in the citation was the date of a corresponding hearing, if Plaintiff wished to plead not guilty and contest the violation. [ECF No. 17–3, p. 4]. Along with the hearing date, the notice contained two options for Plaintiff Sarah Blair: (1) plead guilty to the violation and pay the corresponding fine; or (2) fully complete the attached affidavit identifying the actual driver. [ECF No. 17–3, p. 4]. After receipt of the 2013 Ticket, Plaintiff paid the subsequent fine. [ECF No. 16, ¶ 7].

On June 19, 2007, the Hannibal City Council passed Ordinance 4412 which allowed for detection of violations of traffic control ordinances through an automated red light enforcement system.² On March 6, 2012, the Hannibal City Council revoked Ordinance 4412 and replaced it with Ordinance 4599 which governed the use of the automated red light enforcement system. On November 12, 2013, Hannibal City Council revoked Ordinance 4599 and replaced it with Ordinance 4652 to govern the use of the automated red light enforcement system.³

Hannibal filed the pending Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings asserting the following arguments: (1) Count I for declaratory and injunctive relief fails because Plaintiffs have an adequate legal remedy; (2) Count II fails because Plaintiffs have waived any constitutional claims they may have had; (3) if Plaintiffs have not waived their constitutional claims, Count II still fails because Plaintiffs have not pled a constitutional claim which entitles them to relief; (4) Counts III and VIII of Amended Complaint fail, as a matter of law, because they are barred by the voluntary payment doctrine; and (5) Counts III, IV, V, and VIII fail, as a matter of law, because they are barred by the sovereign immunity doctrine. [ECF No. 42].

II. STANDARD

Generally, a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is reviewed under the same standard as a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Ginsburg , 623 F.3d at 1233 n.3 ; Clemons v. Crawford, 585 F.3d 1119, 1124 (8th Cir. 2009) ; Ashley County v. Pfizer, 552 F.3d 659, 665 (8th Cir. 2009). The Court must view the allegations in the Complaint liberally and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp. , 514 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Luney v. SGS Auto. Servs. , 432 F.3d 866, 867 (8th Cir. 2005) ). The Court "must accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Coons v. Mineta , 410 F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005). A complaint must have "enough facts to state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (abrogating the "no set of facts" standard for Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) found in Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 45–46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) ). To prove the grounds for entitlement of relief, a plaintiff must provide more than labels and conclusions, and "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; Huang v. Gateway Hotel Holdings , 520 F.Supp.2d 1137, 1140 (E.D. Mo. 2007).

"[T]he Court generally must ignore materials outside the pleadings, but it may consider ‘some materials that are part of the public record or do not contradict the complaint.’ " State ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe , 164 F.3d 1102, 1107 (8th Cir. 1999). Additionally, the Court may consider materials that are "necessarily embraced by the pleadings." Piper Jaffray Cos. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. , 967 F.Supp. 1148, 1152 (D.Minn. 1997) ; Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp. , 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Sovereign Immunity

Hannibal argues Counts III, IV, V, and VIII fail, as a matter of law, because they are barred by the sovereign immunity doctrine, and Plaintiffs have failed to specifically plead an exception which would waive Hannibal's immunity. [ECF No. 42, p. 7]. Plaintiffs have previously argued Hannibal is not protected under sovereign immunity because its actions were not governmental in nature.⁴ [ECF No. 34]. The Court now must determine whether Hannibal is entitled to sovereign immunity and if so, based on the facts pled, whether Hannibal waived its sovereign immunity.⁵

A state may not be sued without its consent. Kleban v. Morris , 363 Mo. 7, 247 S.W.2d 832, 836 (Mo. 1952). Missouri Revised Statute § 537.600 creates two exceptions to this general rule: (1) injuries resulting from negligent acts by a public employee, out of the operation of motor vehicles, in the course of their employment; and (2) injuries caused by the condition of a public entity's property, if it is established the property was in dangerous condition. This statute solely governs the state's sovereign immunity from liability in tort; however, it does not govern immunity under non-tort theories of recovery. Kubley v. Brooks , 141 S.W.3d 21, 29 (Mo. 2004). A state entity may also waive immunity from suit by entering into an express contract. Id. at 28. When the State enters into a validly authorized contract, it lays aside whatever privilege of sovereign immunity it otherwise possesses and binds itself to the contractual performance, as if they were a private citizen. V.S. DiCarlo Const. Co., Inc. v. Missouri , 485 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Mo. 1972). This does not result in all claims involving contracts as being exempt from the application of sovereign immunity. State ex rel. Mo. State Highway Patrol v. Atwell , 119 S.W.3d 188, 190 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (abrogated on other grounds by Kubley v. Brooks , 141 S.W.3d 21 (Mo. 2004) ). A...