Blais v. Franklin

• Decision Date: 02 March 1910
• Citation: 75 A. 399,30 R.I. 413
• Parties: BLAIS et al. v. FRANKLIN et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

75 A. 399

30 R.I. 413

BLAIS et al.

v. FRANKLIN et al.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 2, 1910.

Case Certified, from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties.

Suit by Joseph D. Blais and another against Robert S. Franklin and others. Motion to return constitutional questions certified by the superior court denied.

John N. Butinan and Waterman, Curran & Hunt, for complainants. Edward D. Bassett, Irving Champlin, and James Harris, for respondent commissioners. Walter H. Barney and Barney & Lee, for respondent Shaw.

SWEETLAND, J. The complainants, Joseph D. Blais and William S. Grant, alleging that they are citizens and qualified electors of the city of Central Falls, and that said Blais is a taxpayer in the city of Pawtucket, and that said Grant is a taxpayer in said Central Falls, have brought their bill in equity in the superior court against Robert S. Franklin, Fred B. Lawton, and Albert H. Langworthy, who were appointed a commission to erect a bridge between the cities of Pawtucket and Central Falls, known as the "North Main Street Bridge," under the provisions of chapter 499 of the Public Laws passed at the January Session 1909, and against Frederick E. Shaw. In said bill the complainants seek to have a certain contract between said commissioners and said Shaw for the construction of said bridge declared null and void, and to have said Shaw enjoined from building said bridge.

In the twenty-third paragraph of said bill the complainants aver that in several particulars named the General Assembly has attempted to delegate to said commissioners discretion which can be exercised by the General Assembly alone, and hence said act should be declared unconstitutional and repugnant to, and in violation of, article 4, § 2, of the Constitution of Rhode Island. In the twenty-fourth paragraph of said bill the complainants aver that the said commissioners have executed a contract with said Shaw to construct a new bridge; that the entire cost of constructing said bridge, including the purchase of land, damages to various persons, and other expenses, will exceed $125,000; that the payment of said expenses and the costs and expenses of said commission is to be made by the cities of Central Falls and Pawtucket, and that the express consent of the people of Rhode Island has not, nor has the express consent of the people of Pawtucket and Central Falls, been obtained to the incurrence of such indebtedness; and that, so far as chapter 499 of the Public Laws authorizes said commissioners to proceed with and to make said contract for the construction of said new bridge, said chapter 409 is unconstitutional, and is repugnant to and in violation of article 4, § 13, of the Constitution of Rhode Island. In the twenty-fifth paragraph of said bill the complainants recite various provisions of said chapter 499, with reference to the payment in the first instance by the city of Pawtucket of the total cost of the construction of said bridge and the final apportionment of the cost of construction between the cities of Pawtucket and Central Falls, and aver that neither city is given any hearing as to the expense of the work, or its kind, size, or style, and hence that said chapter 499 is unconstitutional, and especially is repugnant to and in violation of section 1 of article 14 of the Constitution of the United States and section 10 of article 1 of the Constitution of Rhode Island.

In the superior court, six days after filing said bill, and before the respondent Shaw had filed either answer, plea, or demurrer to said bill, and before hearing and determination of a demurrer to said bill filed by the respondent commissioners, the complainants by motion called to the attention of the court the objections to the constitutionality of said chapter 409 contained in the twenty-third, twenty-fourth, and twenty-fifth paragraphs of the bill. In said motion the complainants set out in the form of interrogatories the constitutional questions which they claim are raised in said paragraphs, and moved that the superior court certify the same to the Supreme Court to be heard and determined. On this motion the superior court certified the following questions to this court:

First. Is chapter 499 of the Public Laws passed at the January Session of the General Assembly, A. D. 1909, unconstitutional and repugnant to and in violation of article 4, section 2, of the Constitution of Rhode Island?

Second. Is chapter 499 of the Public Laws passed at the January Session of the General Assembly, A. D. 1009, unconstitutional and repugnant to and in violation of article 4, section 2, of the Constitution of Rhode Island, in that it gives the commissioners a discretion which should have been exercised by the General Assembly, and is not properly an administrative discretion, but is a substantive matter of legislative discretion, that the General Assembly cannot delegate?

Third. Is chapter 499 of the Public Laws passed at the January Session of the General Assembly, A. D. 1909, unconstitutional and repugnant to and in violation of article 4, section 2, of the Constitution of Rhode Island, for the reasons stated in the twenty-third paragraph of the complainants' bill of complaint?

Fourth. Is chapter 499 of the Public Laws passed at the January Session of the General Assembly, A. D. 1900, unconstitutional and repugnant to and in violation of article 4, section 2, of the Constitution of Rhode island, for the reasons appearing in the complainants' bill of complaint?

Fifth. Is chapter 499 of the Public Laws passed at the January Session of the General Assembly, A. D. 1909, unconstitutional and repugnant to and in violation of article 4, section 13, of the Constitution of Rhode Island?

Sixth. Is chapter 499 of the Public Laws passed at the January Session of the General Assembly, A. D. 1909, unconstitutional and repugnant to and in violation of article 4, section 13, of the Constitution of Rhode Island, under the circumstances stated in the twenty-fourth paragraph of the complainants' bill of complaint?

Seventh. Is chapter 499 of the Public Laws passed at the January Session of the General Assembly, A. D. 1909, unconstitutional and repugnant to and in violation of article 4, section 13, of the Constitution of Rhode Island, for the reasons stated in the complainants' bill of complaint?

Eighth. Is chapter 499 of the Public Laws passed at the January Session of the General Assembly, A. D. 1909, unconstitutional and repugnant to and in violation of section 1 of article 14 of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and of section 10 of article 1 of the Constitution of Rhode Island?

Ninth. Is chapter 499 of the Public Laws passed at the January Session of the General Assembly, A. D. 1909, unconstitutional and repugnant to and in violation of section 1 of article 14 of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and of section 10 of article 1 of the Constitution of Rhode Island, for the reasons stated in the twenty-fifth paragraph of the complainants' bill of complaint?

Tenth. Is chapter 499 of the Public Laws passed at the January Session of the General Assembly, A. D. 1909, unconstitutional and repugnant to and in violation of section 1 of article 14 of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and of section 10 of article 1 of the Constitution of Rhode Island, for the reasons stated in the complainants' bill of complaint?

Eleventh. Is chapter 499 of the Public Laws passed at the January Session of the General Assembly, A. D. 1909, unconstitutional and repugnant to and in violation of section 1 of article 14 of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and of section 10 of article 1 of the Constitution of Rhode Island, because it deprives the complainants of their property without due process of law?

In this court the respondents move that the questions certified be returned to the superior court for the following reasons: (1) That said questions were prematurely and improperly certified to this honorable court. (2) That the constitutionality of said chapter 499 of the Public Laws passed at the January Session of the General Assembly, A. D 1909, has not been brought in question upon the record in the cause in which said questions were certified to this honorable court (3) That the unconstitutionality of said chapter 499 has been alleged in said cause only in certain allegations in the bill of complaint, and that such allegations are not now in issue in said cause. (4) That the constitutionality of said chapter 499 has been attacked in the cause in which said certification was made only by certain allegations in the bill of complaint; that the time fixed by statute for filing demurrer, plea, or answer to said bill, viz., the period of 30 days after the return day in said cause, has not elapsed, and one of the defendants has made no reply to said bill by demurrer, plea, answer, or otherwise, while the other defendants have filed demurrers, which might dispose of the cause without considering or determining the constitutionality of said act. (5) That said questions are not in proper form for certification to or decision by this honorable court. (6) That said questions as certified to this court are too indefinite for submission to or decision by this honorable court. (7) That said questions are not sufficiently specific for consideration or determination by this honorable court.

All of these reasons which are urged for the return of the questions to the superior court are objections to the action of the superior court in certifying said questions to this court. The first four reasons are based upon the alleged impropriety of the action of the court with reference to the time when it was taken; i. e., that its action was premature. The remaining reasons attack the manner of the certification, that the questions have not been properly formulated for certification. None of these objections are...