Blake Const. Co., Inc. v. Laborers' Intern. Union of North America, AFL-CIO
| Decision Date | 11 April 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 73--1707,AFL-CIO,73--1707 |
| Citation | 511 F.2d 324,167 U.S.App.D.C. 86 |
| Parties | 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3443, 167 U.S.App.D.C. 86, 76 Lab.Cas. P 10,777 BLAKE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. v. LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA,, et al., Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Daniel B. Jordan, Washington, D.C., with whom Samuel Levin was on the brief, for appellants.
Edward R. Levin, Washington, D.C., with whom David W. Rutstein, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for appellee.
Before ROBINSON and MacKINNON, Circuit Judges, and DAVIES, * United States Senior District Judge for the District of North Dakota.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III.
Blake Construction Company (Blake), the appellee, is a general contractor in the building construction industry. Its operations extend to various parts of the United States. For that reason, in 1957 it negotiated the first of a series of collective bargaining agreements with the Laborers' International Union of North America (the International) broadly defining Blake's relationship with the union's members wherever Blake employed them. In 1971, the parties entered into a new contract, 1 the National Construction Agreement, which specified that wages and working conditions on Blake construction projects would be those established cooperatively by local contractors and labor organizations. That agreement also included no-strike and no-lockout provisions, 2 and erected a procedure for arbitrating grievances. 3
In our area, the Laborers' District Council of Washington, D.C. and Vicinity (the Council) and Local Union 74 (the Local), both chartered affiliates of the International, bargain with the local organization of contractors over wages and working conditions for their respective members. 4 Blake is not a party to their contracts, nor is the Council or the Local a signatory to Blake's agreement with the International.
On June 28, 1972, the National Construction Agreement remaining in effect, a dispute arose locally between the Council and certain contractors. Although Blake was not involved in the controversy, union members allegedly absented themselves from, or walked off their jobs at, six Blake construction sites in the area. A Blake official promptly contacted the Council, and Blake's attorneys communicated with the International. It appears that some employees returned to work shortly thereafter, and it is clear that all were back on the job the next working day.
Blake's eventual response to the incident was an action in the District Court 5 for damages for alleged breach of the no-strike provision of the national agreement. 6 Its complaint asserted that the agreement was binding upon the Council and the Local as constituents of the International, and that representatives of all three organizations had contributed to the work stoppage. The District Court denied the International's motion to stay the suit pending arbitration of its subject matter, and granted Blake a partial summary judgment in effect declaring that the Council and the Local were bound by Blake's agreement with the International. 7 On this appeal 8 by the union parties, 9 we reverse the ruling on the requested stay 10 and affirm the summary judgment. 11 Our reasons now follow.
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 12 the Supreme Court held that a union is entitled to specific performance of an employer's promise to arbitrate grievances. The Court emphasized the importance of maintaining industrial stability and recognized the significant contribution of arbitration to preservation of peaceful labor-management relations. 13 The Court again stressed these values in the Steelworkers Trilogy, 14 reiterating the wholesome federal policy promoting enforcement of dispute-settlement procedures fashioned by the parties.
To be sure, duty to arbitrate rests on contract, and submission to arbitration is compellable only to the extent that there is agreement to do so. 15 The role of the courts is 'confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by the contract,' 16 and the judicial task is limited to construing the agreement for that purpose. 17 But '(a)n order to arbitrate the particular grievance,' the Court instructs, 18
Subsequent to emergence of these doctrinal considerations, a number of federal courts considered the contention that cases, like that at bar, involving an alleged breach of a no-strike covenant are not subject to the same principles. 19 That question was, however, directly addressed by the Supreme Court in Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery & Confectionery Workers International, AFL--CIO, 20 which of course is controlling here. The Court held that even though a no-strike promise is the quid pro quo for a promise to arbitrate, 21 the relationship between the two is not so inflexible that one party's violation of the no-strike ban excuses the other party from its contract to arbitrate. 22 Indeed, the obligation to arbitrate survives a breach of the collective bargaining agreement other than an outright repudiation of the promise to arbitrate by the party seeking arbitration. 23
Blake contends, however, that by the terms of the National Construction Agreement violation of the no-strike clause was not an arbitrable issue. Blake invokes the rule, already mentioned, 24 that 'arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.' 25 Blake then endeavors to escape the import of Drake Bakeries by noting that the arbitration clause there involved was broader than the one presented on this appeal. 26
Much of the language in the Drake Bakeries provision, however, is similar to its counterpart in the instant agreement, and we believe the differences that exist are not pivotal. Since the union parties deny any violation of the no-strike clause, Blake's contrary claim clearly generates a dispute, in the words of the arbitration provision, 'involving or arising out of the interpretation or application of the provisions of this Agreement.' 27 If a controversy over infringement of the no-strike clause had been regarded as so fundamental as to demand special treatment in construing the contract, the parties expectably would have excluded its arbitrability explicitly. 28
We conclude, then, that the arbitration clause of the collective bargaining agreement in this case ranges far enough to encompass the parties' dispute. We perceive nothing in the agreement to indicate an intent that the dispute was not to become subject to the covenant to arbitrate. 29 That the arbitration clause intercepts this dispute seems totally consistent with the federal decisions since Drake Bakeries. 30 We hold that a stay of competing judicial proceedings pending arbitration should have been granted.
Our decision concerning the stay necessitates inquiry as to whether the Council and the Local are bound by the National Construction Agreement executed by representatives of the International. 31 If bound, the local parties must of course participate in the arbitration with the International and Blake. The District Court held, on Blake's motion for partial summary judgment, that the agreement is obligatory on both the Council and the Local. We affirm that determination.
We note initially that the question is not one of power. The International's constitution authorizes it to enter into contracts with employers and to enforce their observance by subordinate bodies and members. 32 We understand, too, that it is common practice in the labor relations field for a national labor organization to bargain with employers on behalf of its local constituents regarding inclusion of arbitration and no-strike provisions. 33 The International's contracting authority undoubtedly contemplates legally binding compacts, and on its face the National Construction Agreement is of that character. It would be anomalous to permit local units to enjoy the benefits of bargaining agreements and yet to rid themselves of the duties concomitantly imposed simply because the agreements are signed only by the parent unions. 34 More fundamentally, a party may be responsible on a contract negotiated and executed by other parties, 35 and here provisions of the International's constitution 36 combine with others in the national agreement 37 to empower the International to commit the Council and the Local to promises to arbitrate. 38
The question, then, is whether the collective bargaining agreement with Blake, as drawn, actually binds the local affiliates, and the answer depends upon a construction of the agreement. The Council and the Local contend that the District Court's holding in the affirmative is inconsistent with the textual import of the agreement. We think that, on the contrary, the plain language the parties used strongly supports the reading the District Court gave it. The preamble to the contract recites that it was entered into by 'the Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL--CIO, for and on behalf of its affiliated Local Unions and District Councils (hereinafter referred to as the 'Union').' 39 The District Court construed 'Union' to mean the International and its local affiliates as a single unit, and on that basis the court held that the local subordinates as well as the parent body were bound. This interpretation is buttressed by the explicit declaration in the agreement as to the organizational components for which it was made.
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