Blake v. Bradley
| Docket Number | 20 C 5856 |
| Decision Date | 23 March 2022 |
| Parties | Willie B. Blake, Plaintiff, v. Brian D. Bradley and United States of America Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Plaintiff Willie B. Blake sues Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent Brian D. Bradley under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). In his four-page complaint, Plaintiff alleges Fourth Amendment violations (Count I) and false arrest (Count II). The United States filed a Notice of Substitution of Defendant as to any common-law tort claims, certifying that, at all times relevant, Defendant Bradley acted within the scope of his federal employment. See [23]. Defendants Bradley and the United States move to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety. See [12], [22], [24] [31]. For the reasons stated below, this Court grants Defendants' motions, dismisses Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment Bivens claim with prejudice, and dismisses Plaintiff's tort claim without prejudice.
This case arises from a criminal investigation conducted by Defendant Bradley, a Special Agent with the FBI. [20] ¶ 5. On October 2, 2018, Defendant Bradley arrested Plaintiff pursuant to a warrant obtained based upon a sworn criminal complaint that included an affidavit attested to by Bradley. Id. The sworn criminal complaint alleged that Plaintiff: (1) distributed packages of heroin to various locations on the west side of Chicago; (2) turned over proceeds from the heroin distributed to “LAKE DTO;” (3) conspired with others to distribute heroin as part of a criminal enterprise; and (4) conspired with others to knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, namely heroin. Id. ¶ 6. After his October 2, 2018 arrest, Plaintiff remained incarcerated for ten days, until the government voluntarily dismissed the complaint against him. Id. ¶¶ 9, 11.
Plaintiff sued, alleging that the criminal complaint's allegations were false and that Defendant Bradley, knowing this, nevertheless provided an affidavit attesting to the truth of the allegations. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff claims that the criminal complaint and Defendant's affidavit caused the court to issue a warrant for Plaintiff's arrest without probable cause. Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff claims his arrest and incarceration violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff also alleges that, in swearing the complaint and affidavit, Defendant Bradley made allegations with malicious, wanton, oppressive, willful, conscious, and reckless disregard for the matters asserted against Plaintiff, and that Defendant arrested Plaintiff without probable cause. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages for the violation of his rights. Id. at 3-4.
Defendants move to dismiss both counts under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), [22], [24], and they also seek to dismiss any Federal Tort Claims Act claim under Rule 12(b)(1).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim” showing that the pleader merits relief, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), so the defendant has “fair notice” of the claim “and the grounds upon which it rests, ” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A complaint must also contain “sufficient factual matter” to state a facially plausible claim to relief-one that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility” that a defendant acted unlawfully: Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action” and mere conclusory statements will not suffice. Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In evaluating a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), this Court accepts as true all well-pleaded allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
When reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court construes the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, accepts as true all well-pleaded facts, and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. See Long v. Shorebank Dev't. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that his Complaint meets the Court's jurisdictional requirements. See Ctr. for Dermatology & Skin Cancer, Ltd. v. Burwell, 770 F.3d 586, 589 (7th Cir. 2014). Once jurisdictional allegations are challenged, Plaintiff must support those allegations by competent proof. Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446 (1942). For a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court “may properly look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether, in fact, subject matter jurisdiction exists.” Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted).
Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim, arguing that the claim may not proceed under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). [32] at 4. They also argue that Plaintiff's tort claim (Count II) is precluded based upon Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies available to him under the Federal Tort Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. §1346(b). Id. at 6. This Court addresses these arguments in turn.
Plaintiff first alleges that Defendant Bradley, acting as a federal agent, knowingly supplied false information to obtain a warrant for Plaintiff's arrest. [20] ¶ 7. As a result, Plaintiff was arrested without probable cause and wrongfully incarcerated for ten days, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. ¶ 9.
In his initial complaint, Plaintiff sought to remedy his alleged constitutional rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [1] at 3. Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that Defendant's status as a federal agent precluded Plaintiff's claim under § 1983. [12] at 3-6. Plaintiff apparently agreed (and rightfully so, as § 1983 by its terms applies only to state actors, not federal officers, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1854 (2017) ( that § 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional rights violations committed by state officials and that “Congress did not create an analogous statute for federal officials.”), and he amended his complaint to sue under Bivens.
Bivens, which the Supreme Court decided in 1971, analyzed whether a constitutional violation by a federal officer “gives rise to a cause of action for damages.” Id., 403 U.S. at 389. In Bivens, federal agents entered Bivens' home and arrested him without a warrant. Id. The agents conducted a search in front of Bivens' family and threatened to arrest his wife and children. Id. Bivens brought a claim directly under the Fourth Amendment for constitutional violations committed by these federal agents. Id. While a remedy under § 1983 was not available, the Supreme Court held that courts should “adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief” where “federally protected rights have been invaded.” Id. at 392. In Bivens, the Supreme Court created an implied cause of action under the Fourth Amendment for constitutional violations committed by federal officials. Id.
After Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized implied causes of action under the Constitution in two other cases: a gender discrimination claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248-49 (1979), and an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim in the prison context, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980). These “three cases-Bivens, Davis, and Carlson-represent the only instances in which the Court has approved of an implied damages remedy under the Constitution itself.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017). And any further expansion of the Bivens remedy to new contexts constitutes “disfavored judicial activity.” Id. at 1856-57. Indeed, the Supreme Court has “consistently refused to extend Bivens to any new context or new category of defendants.” Id. at 1857 (quoting Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001)).
The Supreme Court has instructed that the proper test for determining whether a case presents a “new context” under Bivens is as follows:
If the case is different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by this Court, then the context is new. Without endeavoring to create an exhaustive list of differences that are meaningful enough to make a given context a new one, some examples might prove instructive. A case might differ in a meaningful way because of the rank of the officers involved; the constitutional right at issue; the generality or specificity of the official action; the extent of judicial guidance as to how an officer should respond to the problem or emergency to be confronted; the statutory or other legal mandate under which the officer was operating; the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches; or the presence of potential special factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider.
Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. at 1859-60. If the facts do not create a “new context” for a Bivens action, then the action may proceed; if, on the other...
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