Blake v. Classic Alaska Trading/Big Ray's Alaska, Inc.
| Decision Date | 27 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:16-cv-00014-SLG (consolidated),Case No. 4:16-cv-00005-SLG |
| Parties | SUZANNE BLAKE and CATHERINE SCALF, Plaintiffs, v. CLASSIC ALASKA TRADING/BIG RAY'S ALASKA, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Alaska |
Before the Court are Defendant Classic Alaska Trading/Big Ray's Alaska, Inc.'s ("Classic") Motion for Summary Judgment at Docket 83, Plaintiff Catherine Scalf's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at Docket 97, and Plaintiff Suzanne Blake's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Liability at Docket 100. The motions are fully briefed.1 Oral argument on the summary judgment motions was held on March 14, 2018.2 Also before the Court is Classic's Motion to Certify at Docket 137.3
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court must consider each motion separately to determine whether that party has met its burden with the facts construed in the light most favorable to the other side.4 Because the Court will grant summary judgment to Classic as to Ms. Blake for the reasons set forth herein, the facts as to Ms. Blake are presented in the light most favorable to her. As to Catherine Scalf, the Court denies both motions, and thus the facts are presented from each side's perspective.
Plaintiff Suzanne Blake was hired by Classic on August 27, 2013 as an outside retail sales manager ("ORSM") at the Fairbanks Market downtown Big Ray's store.5 Ms. Blake agreed to a salary of $62,000 per year.6 Ms. Blake states that as ORSM, 7 Approximately three weeks after being hired, Ms. Blake was informed by Monty Rostad, her supervisor and a co-owner of the company, that she would also be taking on the duties of the FairbanksMarket Manager ("MM").8 As MM, she was assigned to report to Jesse Glamann, who was located in Kodiak, Alaska, with whom she communicated by phone and email; Mr. Rostad also oversaw her activities as MM.9 Ms. Blake states that as MM, her primary duties consisted of learning how to ring up cash register sales, assisting customers, cleaning the premises, making sales signs, straightening and folding clothes on display tables and racks, stocking apparel and clothes, mowing the lawn, shoveling snow, opening and closing computer files, opening and closing the store, alarming the security system, and other similar duties.10 Ms. Blake maintains that overall her primary duties were those of an ORSM and the daily non-exempt tasks she performed in that role. She estimates those duties made up about 90 percent of her time at Big Ray's.11 Ms. Blake states that approximately "ten percent of [her] actual duties while working at Big Ray's consisted of performing as market manager."12
As part of her job duties, Ms. Blake supervised employees.13 On at least one occasion, Ms. Blake gave an employee a raise.14 On at least one occasion, Ms. Blake promoted an employee.15 Ms. Blake had the authority to grant employee time-offrequests.16 Ms. Blake also hired employees.17 And Ms. Blake had and exercised the authority to fire employees.18 However, Ms. Blake has stated that a "[v]ery little part of [her] job was hiring and firing employees."19 Ms. Blake stated that she answered only to the three owners of the company, as well as to Jesse Glamann and Cindy Benford.20
Ms. Blake turned in her resignation from Big Ray's on September 27, 2014 because she felt she was not being paid for the overtime she was working.21 On January20, 2016, Ms. Blake initiated this action against Classic, alleging that she was not paid for all of the time she worked, including the overtime hours for which she claims she was entitled to a rate equal to one-and-a-half times her usual rate.22 Ms. Blake alleges that Classic's actions violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. ("FLSA").23 Ms. Blake also alleges violations of Alaska Law, AS 23.5.140-260, and the Alaska Wage and Hour Act, AS 23.10.50-150 ("AWHA"), and a violation the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.24 Ms. Blake's Complaint also alleges that she "was not paid her final two days wages after separation nor was she paid her appropriate overtime in accordance with Alaska law."25 In July 2016, after the Complaint was filed, Classic paid Ms. Blake her wages for these two days.26 However, Ms. Blake seeks a statutory penalty for the delay.27
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The following facts are undisputed:
Plaintiff Catherine Scalf worked at Big Ray's from early 2006 until the summer of 2015.28 During her final three years working there, her title was Corporate Sales Manager ("CSM").29 Ms. Scalf's average annual compensation, including salary and benefits, from 2012 to 2015 was $52,910.30
On April 6, 2016, Ms. Scalf filed a Complaint in this Court, alleging that Classic's actions violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.31 Ms. Scalf also alleges violations of Alaska Law, AS 23.5.140-260, and the AWHA, AS 23.10.50-150, and a violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.32 On December 5, 2016, Ms. Scalf's case was consolidated into Ms. Blake's similar case against Classic.33
The parties dispute a number of facts relating to the character of Ms. Scalf's job duties. According to Classic, the facts are as follows:
Despite Ms. Scalf's claims to the contrary, Ms. Scalf did in fact have the authority to hire and fire employees.34 Ms. Scalf supervised employees in her department, as sheacknowledged in her deposition.35 Ms. Scalf also signed contracts on behalf of Classic and went on sales calls in an effort to establish new customer accounts.36 Ms. Scalf made bids on behalf of Classic.37 Ms. Scalf also had input into the budget.38
Ms. Scalf's view of these facts is as follows:
Ms. Scalf was "nominally in charge of the corporate sales department and embroidery department of the Fairbanks downtown store."39 Nevertheless, Ms. Scalf maintains that "approximately ninety percent of [her] time was spent taking, invoicing and filling purchase orders from corporate customers and their employees."40 Ms. Scalf described her duties as follows during her deposition:
Ms. Scalf stated that during her final two and a half years at Big Ray's, she supervised one full-time employee; for a few months during that time, she supervised a second fulltime employee and a part-time employee.42 Ms. Scalf stated that although she made bids and signed contracts and corporate agreements on behalf of Classic, she did not have the independent discretion to make these decisions.43
On December 1, 2017, the parties all filed dispositive motions. Classic's motion asserts that Ms. Blake and Ms. Scalf were each undisputedly exempt executive or administrative employees, or a combination of both, under both the FLSA and theAWHA.44 Classic asserts that the claim of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing also fails. Ms. Scalf's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment contends that because she engaged primarily in non-exempt work, as a matter of law she is entitled to overtime pay.45 Ms. Blake's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment likewise asserts that as a matter of law, she was a non-exempt employee who was unlawfully denied overtime pay.46
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this is a civil action with certain claims arising under federal law, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' related state law claims.47
The Court applies federal procedural law; Alaska substantive law applies to the state law claims.48
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) directs a court to grant summary judgment if the movant "show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [themovant] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." When considering a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his [or her] favor."49 When faced with cross-motions for summary judgment, the court "review[s] each separately, giving the non-movant for each motion the benefit of all reasonable inferences."50 To reach the level of a genuine dispute, the evidence must be such "that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party."51 If the evidence provided by the non-moving party is "merely colorable" or "not significantly probative," summary judgment is appropriate.52
The FLSA requires that employers pay overtime wages to employees who work more than 40 hours per week.53 However, "[e]mployees who are employed in executive, administrative, or professional capacities are exempt from that overtime requirement."54 Regulations define whether an employee is "employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity" so as to be exempt under 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).According to the regulation in effect during the relevant time,55 the executive exemption applies to an employee who is:
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