Blake v. Katter, 80-2429

• Decision Date: 22 November 1982
• Docket Number: No. 80-2429,80-2429
• Parties: Carolyn Sue BLAKE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Roderic H. KATTER and Steven R. King, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 677

693 F.2d 677

Carolyn Sue BLAKE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Roderic H. KATTER and Steven R. King, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 80-2429.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Sept. 21, 1982.

Decided Nov. 22, 1982.

Anthony O. Brown, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.

Frederick N. Kopec, Deputy Atty. Gen., Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, Ind., for defendants-appellees.

Before PELL, BAUER, Circuit Judges, and CAMPBELL, Senior District Judge. ^*

BAUER, Circuit Judge.

The issue in this appeal is what statute of limitations applies to a Sec. 1983 civil rights action brought against Indiana state police officers acting in their official capacities. Plaintiff-appellant Walter Allison Blake brought this action against Roderic H. Katter and Steven R. King, Indiana state police officers, alleging that the officers violated his constitutional rights during his arrest, detention, pre-trial proceedings and trial. Blake charged the officers with: (1) warrantless arrest; (2) illegal search and seizure; (3) unlawful detention; (4) failure to inform him of the charges against him or to allow him to confront witnesses; (5) cruel and unusual punishment; (6) subornation of perjured testimony; (7) proceeding to trial without a verified information; and (8) malicious prosecution. ¹ The district court held that each of these alleged claims was analogous to a personal injury claim and, thus, subject to the two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims. We reverse.

Blake filed his complaint while he was incarcerated in the Indiana State Prison. Katter and King responded with a motion to dismiss. Holding that the complaint failed to state a cause of action for which relief could be granted, the district court ruled on the motion before Blake's time to respond had expired. Blake appealed; this court reversed and remanded. Blake then filed an amended and supplemental complaint and Katter and King made a second motion to dismiss. The district court granted this second motion on the ground that the complaint was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. It also held that Blake's claims regarding unlawful detention, perjured testimony and cruel and unusual punishment were legally insufficient. Blake again appealed. ²

Blake contends that the district court erred in applying the two-year statute of limitations to his civil rights claims and in holding that several of the allegations did not allege claims for which relief can be granted.

I

The threshold question is whether Blake's claims are time barred. Blake insists they are not for several reasons. First, he asserts that under Ind.Code Sec. 34-1-2-2 the applicable statute of limitations is five years. Next, Blake argues that, assuming arguendo the two-year statute of limitations does apply, the statute was tolled because he was imprisoned. Finally, Blake asserts that at least some of his claims accrued within the two year period prior to the filing of his complaint.

The parties agree that because 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 does not specify a limitations period, the state statute of limitations controls. They also agree that Ind.Code Sec. 34-1-2-2 is the governing state statute. They disagree, however, as to which subsection, the First or the Second, applies to Blake's claims.

Ind.Code Sec. 34-1-2-2 in part provides:

Limitations of actions--... The following actions shall be commenced within the periods herein prescribed after the cause of action has accrued ....

First. For injuries to person or character, for injuries to personal property, and for a forfeiture of penalty given by statute, within two (2) years ....

Second. All actions against a sheriff, or other public officer and his sureties on a public bond, growing out of a liability incurred by doing an act in an official capacity, or by the omission of an official duty, within five (5) years ....

Ind.Code Sec. 34-1-2-2 (1976). Asserting that unconstitutional acts of state officials are not analogous to state torts, Blake urges that the plain meaning of the statute dictates that Sec. 34-1-2-2 Second applies. Relying on Movement for Opportunity and Equality v. General Motors Corp., 622 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir.1980), appellees argue that Sec. 34-1-2-2 First governs all Sec. 1983 actions.

Appellees' reliance on Movement for Opportunity is misplaced, for its factual situation is inapposite to the circumstances of this case. In Movement for Opportunity black and female employees filed a Sec. 1981 class action suit charging racial and sexual discrimination at a General Motors plant. Since Sec. 1981 contained no statute of limitations, the court followed the general rule, enunciated in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975), of choosing the most appropriate state limitation. 622 F.2d at 1241.

In selecting the most appropriate statute of limitations provided by Indiana law, the Movement for Opportunity court had three choices: (1) a two-year statute of limitations applicable to injuries to person or character; (2) a six-year statute of limitations governing contractual actions; and (3) a fifteen-year residuary statute of limitations. The court rejected both the six-year statute and the fifteen-year statute. It felt that applying the fifteen-year statute of limitations would be inappropriate because it would extend the rights of Indiana citizens far beyond the maximum periods previously allowed for the bringing of civil rights claims. It also noted that it would be unfair to require employers to defend claims after fifteen years because the evidence would likely be lost or destroyed or witnesses unavailable. The court also emphasized that Indiana's residual statute of limitations had been consistently limited to real property claims. Next, while rejecting the general rule of characterizing civil rights claims as common law torts, id. at 1242, the court nevertheless stated that "when the general statute of limitations fails and no easy comparison exists, [citation omitted] some analogies must be used." Id. at 1243. It concluded that the civil rights claim brought against General Motors was more closely related to a tort than a contract and, thus, the two-year statute for tort causes of action should be applied.

In choosing the two-year statute of limitations, the court stated that its choice was influenced by several factors. First, it noted that Indiana had a two-year statute of limitations for employers' liability for injuries to employees. Second, after the General Motors action had been filed, the Indiana legislature enacted a two-year limitation period for all employment related actions. Finally, the court noted that "the choice of a statute of limitations under section 1981 ... is essentially the choice to be made under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 ...", id. at 1243, and that the two-year statute of limitations had already been applied to an earlier Sec. 1983 action in Hill v. Trustees of Indiana University, 537 F.2d 248 (7th Cir.1976). For all these reasons, it deemed the two-year statute of limitations the most appropriate one provided by state law.

In contrast, in this case, we need not resort to analogies to determine which is the most appropriate statute of limitations. Section 34-1-2-2 Second applies to "[a]ll actions against a sheriff, or other public officer ... growing out of a liability incurred by doing an act in an official capacity, or by the omission of an official duty." Thus, this subsection applies to Blake's claims if appellees are public officers and the acts Blake complains of were performed in their official capacities.

While Sec. 34-1-2-2 Second does not expressly refer to state police officers, it seems obvious to us, even without judicial interpretation, that state police officers are public officers. However, we need not base our conclusion that a police officer is a public officer within the meaning of Sec. 34-1-2-2 Second on our own interpretation of the term, for it has already been judicially construed to include police officers. Bottos v. Avakian, 477 F.Supp. 610 (N.D.Ind.1979). The Bottos court defined a public officer by the nature of the duties attached to the position. It noted that a public officer was one who held an office having special duties prescribed by law to serve a public purpose, and that those duties were invested with "some of the functions pertinent to sovereignty." Id. at 614 (citations omitted). It concluded that since a police officer had the duties to preserve the peace, protect and arrest offenders, suppress riots, protect the rights of persons and property, inspect all places of business under license, and enforce and prevent the violation of all ordinances and laws in force, a police officer was a public officer. We find that analysis compelling and adopt it here.

We next consider whether the officers were acting in an official capacity. The acts alleged in the complaint were acts relating to a police investigation which culminated in Blake's arrest, imprisonment and prosecution. Certainly there can be no dispute that such acts were acts in a police officer's official duty. Accordingly, we hold that for the purposes of the claims here appellees are public officers within the meaning of Sec. 34-1-2-2 Second and were acting in their official capacities. Thus, a five-year, rather than a two-year statute of limitations, applies and Blake's claims are not time barred. ³

II

Appellant challenges the district court's rulings that the claims regarding unlawful detention, perjured testimony and cruel and unusual punishment failed to state claims for which relief can be granted. Each of these claims is discussed briefly below.

A

Blake claims that his fourth amendment right was violated because he was arrested on August 29, 1977 but was not formally charged until eight days later. He also claims that his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial was violated because he was...