Blake v. Starr

• Decision Date: 04 March 2009
• Docket Number: No. 34771.,34771.
• Citation: 146 Idaho 847,203 P.3d 1246
• Parties: Jennifer L. BLAKE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Delbert L. STARR, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

203 P.3d 1246

146 Idaho 847

Jennifer L. BLAKE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Delbert L. STARR, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 34771.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, January 2009 Term.

March 4, 2009.

Goicoechea Law Offices, Chtd., Boise, and Lojek Law Offices, Boise, for appellant. Donald Lojek argued.

Cantrill, Skinner, Sullivan and King, LLP, Boise, for respondent. Daniel Skinner argued. David Cantrill appeared.

WALTERS, J. Pro Tem.

Jennifer L. Blake (Blake) appeals from an order awarding summary judgment to Delbert L. Starr (Starr) in Blake's action to recover damages in a personal injury action. Starr was alleged to have injured Blake when the front end loader Starr was operating struck and ran over Blake while she was working as a flagger on an Ada County Highway District project. We affirm the order granting summary judgment.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE

Blake was injured while working for Traffic Products & Services (TPS), a subcontractor providing flagging service to the primary contractor, Idaho Sand and Gravel (ISG), on a construction site. Starr, an employee of ISG, was operating a Caterpillar model front end loader on the construction site, when the loader struck and injured Blake. Blake was struck from behind when Starr raised the bucket of the loader, apparently obstructing his ability to see objects and persons in front of him, and drove forward into and over Blake. Starr backed up the machine and ran over Blake a second time, dragging her along the ground until someone caught his attention. Blake was seriously injured.

Blake filed suit against Starr to recover damages for her injuries. The district court granted summary judgment to Starr, ruling that Starr was exempt from liability under I.C. § 72-209(3). Blake timely appealed to this Court.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

We are asked to address two issues on this appeal. First, did the district court err in holding that Starr was exempt from liability under I.C. § 72-209(3)? Second, is Starr entitled to an award for attorney fees on appeal?

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Conway v. Sonntag, 141 Idaho 144, 146, 106 P.3d 470, 472 (2005). All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id. If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review. Id.

IV. ANALYSIS

1. Did district court err in holding Starr exempt from liability under I.C. § 72-209(3)?

A. Idaho's Worker's Compensation Law provides the exclusive remedy of employees against employers for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment.

The Idaho Worker's Compensation Act (Act) provides employees a definite remedy for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. I.C. § 72-201; Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 209, 76 P.3d 951, 953 (2003). In Kolar v. Cassia County Idaho, 142 Idaho 346, 127 P.3d 962 (2005), this Court repeated that, with few exceptions, the Idaho legislature has removed all workplace injuries from "private controversy," by crafting a system whereby "sure and certain relief" would be provided to injured workers regardless of fault. Id. at 351, 127 P.3d at 967; see also Venters v. Sorrento, 141 Idaho 245, 248-49, 108 P.3d 392, 395-96 (2005). This relief is provided "to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding, or compensation, except as is otherwise provided in the worker's compensation scheme." Kolar, 142 Idaho at 351-52, 127 P.3d at 967-68. See also I.C. § 72-209(1);¹ I.C. § 72-211.²

It is undisputed that Blake and Starr were working within the normal course and scope of their employment. This case concerns the proper interpretation of the limited exception of third party tort liability set forth in the Act.

B. Idaho Sand and Gravel is a category one statutory employer of Traffic Products & Services employees, and therefore protected from tort suit by the exclusive remedy rule.

The Act provides a limited exception to the exclusive remedy rule, allowing an injured worker who is eligible for worker's compensation benefits to bring a civil action for damages against certain third parties. Venters, 141 Idaho at 249, 108 P.3d at 396. Idaho Code § 72-223(1) provides:

"The right to compensation under this law shall not be affected by the fact that the injury, occupational disease or death is caused under circumstances creating in some person other than the employer a legal liability to pay damages therefor, such person so liable being referred to as the third party. Such third party shall not include those employers described in section 72-216, Idaho Code, having under them contractors or subcontractors who have in fact complied with the provisions of section 72-301, Idaho Code; nor include the owner or lessee of premises, or other person who is virtually the proprietor or operator of the business there carried on, but who, by reason of there being an independent contractor or for any other reason, is not the direct employer of the workmen there employed."

The Act "specifically excludes certain employers from third party liability." Fuhriman v. State, Dept. of Transp., 143 Idaho 800, 804, 153 P.3d 480, 484 (2007). The plain language of I.C. § 72-223 refers to the term "employer" which has a specific definition under the Act. The previously established statutory definition of "employer" is found in I.C. § 72-102(13)(a). As presented by this Court in Fuhriman, that definition has two categories. Id. Under the first category, a statutory employer "means any person who has expressly or impliedly hired or contracted the services of another. It includes contractors and subcontractors." Id.

This Court also explained in Gonzalez v. Lamb Weston, Inc., 142 Idaho 120, 122, 124 P.3d 996, 998 (2005), that the term "employer" is more broadly defined under the Idaho Worker's Compensation Laws than under the common law. "An employee may have more than one employer: the employer who directly hired the employee and a person or entity who, by statute, is also held to be the employer for the purposes of worker's compensation." Id. The Court clarified the legal position of statutory employers by stating that while they "can be held liable for worker's compensation benefits, they also enjoy immunity from liability for common law torts." Id.

In Robison, this Court held that a statutory employer was anyone who, by contracting or subcontracting out services, is liable to pay worker's compensation benefits if the direct employer does not pay those benefits. Robison, 139 Idaho at 210-11, 76 P.3d at 954-55. In Fuhriman, this Court reviewed the proper approach to evaluating whether a party qualifies as a statutory employer in relation to Idaho Code §§ 72-102(13)(a), 72-223(1) and 72-216. Fuhriman, 143 Idaho at 804-05, 153 P.3d at 484-85. "In order to qualify as a category one statutory employer, the employer by contracting or subcontracting out services, must be liable to pay worker's compensation benefits if the direct employer does not." Id. at 805, 153 P.3d at 485. (citing Venters, 141 Idaho at 249, 108 P.3d at 396). "The Court has summarized the I.C. § 72-223 category one protection for employers as including `employers who make use of a contractor's or subcontractor's employees.'" Id.

Blake concedes that because TPS complied with § 72-301 by procuring worker's compensation coverage, ISG "may be" a third party exempt from suit. Blake argues, however, that the definition of employers in I.C. §§ 72-216 and 72-223(1) are mutually exclusive. Blake contends that because TPS had complied with § 72-301, ISG is not one of the employers described in I.C. § 72-216. Blake questions whether ISG can qualify for third party exemption under I.C. § 72-223(1), concluding "this issue may be visited through a subsequent action directly against ISG."

This Court has not held I.C. §§ 72-216 and 72-223(1) to be mutually exclusive. To the contrary, this Court harmonized these provisions in Venters, stating that I.C. § 72-223(1) "clearly excludes certain parties, known as statutory employers from third party liability. Such third party liability shall not include those employers described in section 72-216, Idaho Code, having under them contractors or subcontractors who have in fact complied with the provisions of section 72-301, Idaho Code." Venters, 141 Idaho at 249, 108 P.3d at 396. There is nothing ambiguous or contradictory in these provisions of the Act. ISG was an employer described in I.C. § 72-216 because it had under it a contractor (TPS) and ISG would have been liable to the contractor's employee (Blake) for worker's compensation benefits if the contractor had not provided coverage. Gonzalez, 142 Idaho at 122, 124 P.3d at 998. Blake represents that TPS had complied with I.C. § 72-301 by providing worker's compensation benefits for its employees, and in her argument Blake states she was covered by TPS's insurance "to the extent the worker's compensation system allows." If, as Blake argues, TPS did in fact comply with the provisions of I.C § 72-301, then ISG is immune from liability for Blake's injuries. Id. Under this Court's recent holdings and the plain language of the Worker's Compensation Act, ISG is a category one statutory employer of TPS's employees, and therefore protected from tort suit by the exclusive remedy rule. The parties agree that ISG and TPS had a contractual relationship at the time of the...