Blake v. Wash. County

• Decision Date: 09 December 2010
• Docket Number: No. 10cv0793,10cv0793
• Citation: Blake v. Washington Cnty., No. 10cv0793 (W.D. Pa. Dec 09, 2010)
• Parties: ALOMA BLAKE, an individual, and on behalf of minor child R.R., RUSSELL ROBERTSON an individual, Plaintiffs, v. WASHINGTON COUNTY, and DR. BRUCE CHAMBERS individually and in his official capacity as court appointed psychological evaluator, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

ALOMA BLAKE, an individual, and on behalf of minor child R.R., RUSSELL ROBERTSON an individual, Plaintiffs,

v.WASHINGTON COUNTY, and DR. BRUCE CHAMBERS individually and in his official capacity as court appointed psychological evaluator, Defendants.

No. 10cv0793

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dated: December 9, 2010

ELECTRONICALLY FILED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Russell Robertson, filed this civil rights lawsuit essentially claiming his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when Defendant, County of Washington, prevented him from having contact with his son, R.R. for a prolonged duration. Plaintiff, Aloma Blake, R.R.'s paternal grandmother and legal guardian, has filed the same claims on R.R.'s behalf.¹ The Plaintiff's also brought pendant state tort law claims against Defendant, Dr. Bruce Chambers, a court-appointed psychologist, for allegedly failing to submit psychological evaluations of the parties involved in an underlying state court custody dispute over R.R.

Shortly after filing their Complaint, the Defendants² filed a Motion to Dismiss under F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6). Doc. no. 11. In response to the Motion, Plaintiff's filed an Amended Complaint which resolved some of the issues raised by Defendants in their Motion to Dismiss.³ Doc. No. 17. Subsequent to the filing of the Amended Complaint, this Court held a case management conference with counsel for the parties and during that conference openly, and in a detailed manner, discussed the outstanding issues which Plaintiff's Amended Complaint failed to address.

Plaintiff's indicated a willingness to file a Second Amended Complaint to clarify its claims and fully address the outstanding matters raised by Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. This Court then issued its Case Management Order (doc. no. 18) requiring Plaintiff's to submit a Second Amended Complaint, and Plaintiff's did so in a timely fashion. Doc. no. 21.

Defendants timely filed the instant Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint under F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Defendants predicate their Motion on three grounds: (1) Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint fails to allege the existence of an unconstitutional custom or policy on the part of Defendant, Washington County, thereby requiring the dismissal of Plaintiffs' §1983 claims; (2) the on-going state court custody proceedings present this Court with grounds to abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); and (3) Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint must be dismissed pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Plaintiff's are essentially attempting to re-litigate in federal court the factual and legal determinations made by the state court in the underlying child custody and welfare proceedings.

Because this Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss on the first ground, i.e. Plaintiffs' failure to allege the existence of an unconstitutional custom or policy on the part of Defendant, Washington County, this Court will not address the Younger abstention, nor the Rooker-Feldman arguments.

I. Standard of Review

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, federal courts require notice pleading, as opposed to the heightened standard of fact pleading. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only " 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and the grounds on which it rests.' " Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

To survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that, if accepted as true, state "a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 at 570). A claim has facial plausibility when a plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant may be liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 1949. However, the court is "'not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.' " Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In deciding a motion to dismiss, a court must determine whether the complaint "pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." PA Prison Soc. v. Cortes, 622 F.3d 215, 233 (3d Cir. 2010), citing Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id.; see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-211 (3d Cir. 2009).

As explained succinctly by the United States Courts of Appeals for the Third Circuit: Pursuant to Ashcroft v. Iqbal, [citation omitted], district courts must conduct a two-part analysis when presented with a motion to dismiss. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2009). "First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated." Id. "The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions." Id. at 210-11. "Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a 'plausible claim for relief.' " Id. at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950).

Edwards v. A.H. Cornell and Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 219 (3d Cir. 2010).

When determining whether a plaintiff has met the second part of the analysis and presented facts sufficient to show a "plausible claim for relief," the Court must consider the specific nature of the claim presented and the facts pled to substantiate that claim. For example, in Fowler, a case predicated upon a violation of the Rehabilitation Act, the Court of Appeals determined that "[t]he complaint pleads how, when, and where [the defendant] allegedly discriminated against Fowler." 578 F.3d at 212. The Court, while noting that the Complaint was "not as rich with detail as some might prefer," it the "how, when and where" provided by the plaintiff sufficient grounds to establish plausibility. Id. at 211-212.

The Court of Appeals in Guirguis v. Movers Specialty Services, Inc., 346 Fed.Appx. 774, 776 (3d Cir. 2009), a civil rights and Title VII case, affirmed a decision to dismiss a plaintiff's complaint because the plaintiff failed to plead facts explaining why he believed his national origin was the basis for the termination of his employment.

Therefore, when deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court should apply the following rules. The facts alleged in the complaint, but not the legal conclusions, must be taken as true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of plaintiff. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. We may not dismiss a complaint merely because it appears unlikely or improbable that plaintiff can prove the facts alleged or will ultimately prevail on the merits. Id. at 556, 563 n.8. Instead, we must ask whether the facts alleged raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary elements. Id. at 556. In short, the motion to dismiss should not be granted if plaintiff alleges facts which could, if established at trial, entitle him to relief. Id. at 563 n.8. Generally speaking, a complaint that provides adequate facts to establish "how, when, where, and why" will survive a motion to dismiss. See Fowler and Guirguis, supra.

It is on this standard that this Court has reviewed Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint.

II. Background

The parties are familiar with the facts of the underlying state court custody and welfare proceedings. Because of the parties' familiarity, and because Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint totals 156 paragraphs in length and 116 of those paragraphs detail the underlying state court custody and welfare proceedings (see, doc. no. 21), this Court will not recite in detail the underlying facts.⁴

In summary, Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint essentially alleges that Washington County, through its political subdivision, Washington County Child, Youth and Family Services ("CYS"), improperly prevented Plaintiff Roberston from having contact with his son, R.R., for nearly three years.⁵ See, doc. no. 21, ¶ ¶ 8, 11. However, the Second Amended Complaint avers that on January 31, 2007, Plaintiff Robertson signed an agreement presented to him by a CYS worker indicating he would "stay away" from his children while CYS conducted a 60-day investigation into allegations of abuse of R.R. Id. at ¶ ¶ 40-46. According to the Second Amended Complaint, CYS concluded its investigation deemed the allegations of abuse to be unfounded, and established a family service plan enabling Plaintiff Robertson to visit R.R. (Id. at ¶ ¶ 53-55). Plaintiff Robertson visited twice with R.R. in June of 2007. Id. at ¶ 65. All additional visits through mid-September of 2007 were cancelled by someone other than Plaintiff Roberston. Id. at ¶ ¶ 66, 69. On September 17, 2007, the Washington County Court of Common Pleas entered an Order allowing Plaintiff Robertson to have "fee-based" visitation with his three other children, (id. at ¶ ¶ 74, 77) but the Second Amended Complaint is silent as to whether, or if, Plaintiff Russell saw R.R.

In May of 2008, R.R. was placed in the custody of the Greensburg YMCA for 30 days pending an investigation into claims of abuse which R.R. asserted against his stepfather (who was living with R.R.'s mother) and/or his mother. Id. at ¶ ¶ 98-106. On August 5, 2008, an adjudication hearing for R.R. was held (because R.R. ran away from his mother's home shortly after his release from the Greensburg YMCA and remained at large for 5 weeks), resulting in R.R.'s placement at Auberle for eleven months. Id. at ¶ ¶ 107, 110, 114. R.R. remained in the custody of Washington County CYS until January 26, 2010...