Blakemore v. The Board of County Commissioners of The County of Johnson

• Decision Date: 06 April 1918
• Docket Number: 21,445
• Citation: 172 P. 518,102 Kan. 822
• Parties: RACHEL LILLARD and MOLLIE E. BLAKEMORE, as Executors, etc., of R. I. MCQUIDDY, deceased, Appellants, v. THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF JOHNSON, Appellees
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

172 P. 518

102 Kan. 822

RACHEL LILLARD and MOLLIE E. BLAKEMORE, as Executors, etc., of R. I. MCQUIDDY, deceased, Appellants, v. THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF JOHNSON, Appellees

No. 21,445

Supreme Court of Kansas

April 6, 1918

Decided January, 1918.

Appeal from Johnson district court; JABEZ O. RANKIN, judge.

Judgment affirmed and cause remanded.

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

1. ESTOPPEL--Consistency of Conduct Required. The doctrine of estoppel requires of a party consistency of conduct when inconsistency would work substantial injury to the other party.

2. CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS--County Warrant Issued--Ownership of Warrant--Arbitration--Estoppel. A landowner entitled to a warrant for certain condemnation money, instead of demanding its delivery, submitted to the county board the question whether he or his grantee was entitled to such warrant stating, among other things, that he felt "sure that when the facts are known by you, that no better tribunal can be found to decide our relative rights than your Honorable Body." Thereafter the vendee appeared before the board, and upon his showing the warrant was delivered to him. Later the vendor sued the board to recover the amount and value of the warrant. Held, that he is estopped.

I. O. Pickering, of Olathe, for the appellants.

C. L. Randall, county attorney, for the appellee.

OPINION

WEST, J.:

A road was ordered opened across the land of R. I. McQuiddy, who presented his claim for damages and was allowed $ 600. On October 30, 1915, the board of county commissioners ordered a warrant to be drawn and issued to him for this amount. The petition set out the warrant, and alleged that when it was drawn there was sufficient money in the treasury to pay, but that before the action was begun he demanded payment, which was refused. The board answered by general denial, admitted the execution of the warrant, and alleged that it was held by the clerk to be delivered to the party legally entitled thereto. Further, that about December 16, 1915, McQuiddy sold the property and executed a general warranty deed therefor, of which fact the board had no knowledge until sometime after the execution of the warrant and until the grantee appeared and demanded that it be delivered to him. The board further alleged its clerk communicated with McQuiddy, advising him of the claim of his grantee, whereupon McQuiddy authorized the board to ascertain and decide who was entitled to the warrant and dispose of it accordingly, setting out a copy of his letter in which he said:

"After due deliberation, I have concluded to submit the question of ownership to the $ 600.00, awarded me for damages. . . . after a fair and true statement of all the essential facts I desire the said honorable board to decide who should have the money and so dispose of it."

Then followed a statement as to the price and profit on the sale, and the expression,

"I feel sure that when the facts are known by you, that no better tribunal can be found to decide our relative rights than your Honorable Body."

It was alleged that after receiving this letter the grantee with his attorney appeared before the board, and that the latter in good faith, after hearing the matter, delivered the warrant to such grantee, and did so upon the direction contained in the letter referred to. To this answer a demurrer was filed and overruled. Thereupon a motion was made for judgment on the pleadings, which was also overruled. McQuiddy having died, the case was revived in the names of the plaintiffs as executors, who appeal.

The plaintiffs contend that the county board was the proper tribunal to establish the road and determine to whom the damages were due; that this determination was in favor of the decedent; and that,

"The board had no power to review and revise that decision and award or to sit in judgment in a controversy between rival claimants of a fund in its possession."

The board, Duvall not having been made a party as requested contends that...