Blakeney v. Associated Subdivisions, Inc.
| Decision Date | 27 November 1963 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 10442,10443,s. 10442 |
| Citation | 195 A.2d 234,3 A.L.R.3d 970,97 R.I. 34 |
| Parties | , 3 A.L.R.3d 970 Francis BLAKENEY v. ASSOCIATED SUBDIVISIONS, INC. Noreen BLAKENEY v. ASSOCIATED SUBDIVISIONS, INC. Ex. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Edward I. Friedman, Howard I. Lipsey, Providence, for plaintiffs.
James F. Murphy, Coventry, for defendant.
These are two actions of trespass on the case for negligence, one brought by a married woman to recover for injuries alleged to have been sustained while on the defendant's land and the other by her husband to recover consequential damages. These cases were tried together to a justice of the superior court sitting without a jury, who thereafter gave decision to the plaintiff wife in the amount of $3,000 and to the plaintiff husband in the amount of $862. From the decisions the defendant has prosecuted its bills of exceptions to this court.
It appears that defendant was the owner of a large tract of land located in the city of Cranston and during the summer of 1954 was engaged in developing it for sale as home sites. The defendant's sales manager, Lester S. Toll, Jr., testified that late in July of that year the tract was in the predevelopment stage, some rough roads having been opened and the land partially cleared. He stated that the tract 'was all virgin land, had never been developed, and the whole area had rabbit holes or woodchuck holes' and that such holes were 'very common in the area.'
The evidence discloses that on July 29, 1954 plaintiff Noreen Blakeney and her husband Francis Blakeney visited the tract for the purpose of inspecting certain lots that had been offered for sale by defendant. There they were met by Robert E. Anderson, its salesman, who drove them in his automobile to the location of a lot that he desired them to inspect. Upon arriving at the site of this lot, the Blakeneys alighted from Mr. Anderson's car, and at that time defendant's sales manager, Mr. Toll, arrived and assisted Mrs. Blakeney to climb up a small bank to the surface of the lot. The evidence is uncontradicted that while this lot had been partially cleared of trees and underbrush, portions of it were still covered by low brush about ten inches high.
It appears that the group had been at the edge of the lot for a brief time when Mr. Anderson, at the direction of Mr. Toll, began to walk toward the rear of the lot seeking to locate a boundary stake that was concealed in the underbrush. Mr. Toll testified that during that time he had advised Mrs. Blakeney 'to be careful because she had very high heels on,' and Mr. Anderson testified that he had suggested that Mrs. Blakeney 'not walk on the property, or through the property, because of the condition of the ground with her high heels.' This testimony was contradicted in part by that of Mr. Blakeney, who answered, 'No, sir,' to the question, 'Did the salesmen at any time advise you to be careful in any manner?' It is not disputed that as Mr. Anderson was making his way toward the rear of the lot Mrs. Blakeney began to walk into the lot, her testimony being that she 'was following slowly trying to watch my step because of so much unevenness.' It was at that time that she stepped into the hole and fell to the ground.
The defendant asserts that the trial justice erred in holding that the duty of defendant with respect to the safety of those entering its property at its invitation was that of an insurer. The defendant notes correctly that in Stapleton v. Hyman, 69 R.I. 466, 35 A.2d 6, this court held that a landowner is not an insurer of the safety of those who at his invitation enter upon his property and that he is under no duty to exercise more than reasonable care to discover and correct dangerous conditions existing on the land to which the invitation applies. This court has repeatedly affirmed the view that a landowner is under a duty to exercise only that degree of care for the protection of those who enter upon his land at his invitation as would be exercised in the same or similar circumstances by persons of reasonable prudence.
The defendant, as we understand it, does not claim that the trial justice in express terms stated its duty to these invitees to be that of an insurer but argues that such view is clearly implied in his statement that defendant's knowledge or lack of knowledge as to the existence of the hole was unimportant. The defendant argues that this language clearly discloses the view of the trial justice that it was liable for injuries to its invitees sustained by reason of a dangerous condition on the land concerning which it was without either actual or constructive notice and thus, in...
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...v. City of Alexandria, 395 So.2d 727 (La.1981); Williams v. Terminal RR, 399 S.W.2d 139 (Mo.Ct.App.1966); Blakeney v. Assoc. Subdivisions, 97 R.I. 34, 195 A.2d 234 (R.I.1963); see generally Restatement of Torts (Second) § IV The United States argues that negligence on the part of plaintiff ......
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