Blakeslee's Storage Warehouses, Inc. v. City of Chicago

• Decision Date: 21 October 1938
• Docket Number: No. 24536.,24536.
• Citation: 17 N.E.2d 1,369 Ill. 480
• Parties: BLAKESLEE'S STORAGE WAREHOUSES, Inc., et al. v. CITY OF CHICAGO. Appeal of MENN.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

369 Ill. 480

17 N.E.2d 1

BLAKESLEE'S STORAGE WAREHOUSES, Inc., et al.

v.CITY OF CHICAGO. Appeal of MENN.

No. 24536.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 15, 1938.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Oct. 21, 1938.

Appeal from Appellate Court, First District on Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; James J. Kelly, Judge.

Suit by the Blakeslee's Storage Warehouses, Incorporated, and others against the City of Chicago to recover interest on a compensation award. From the judgment of the Appellate Court, 292 Ill.App. 288, 11 N.E.2d 42, reversing a judgment in favor of plaintiff Paul L. Mann, administrator, he appeals.

Affirmed.

FARTHING and ORR, JJ., dissenting.Aaron Soble and William Feldman, both of Chicago (Max Chill, George A. Mason, Howard F. Bishop, Angus Roy Shannon, Daniel S. Wentworth, and Weightstill Woods, all of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Barnet Hodes, Corp. Counsel, of Chicago (Joseph F. Grossman, Arthur A. Sullivan, and J. Herzl Segal, all of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

JONES, Justice.

Appellant's interstate was awarded $58,152 in a special assessment proceeding for land taken, and judgment was entered in her favor for that amount February 16, 1926. After deducting $3598 for benefits, the net judgment amounted to $54,554. This amount was paid October 28, 1926. More than five years afterwards, to-wit, December 5, 1934, this suit was brought in the circuit court of Cook county against appellee for interest on the full amount of the award from February 16, 1926, to the date when payment was made and for interest on such unpaid interest after October 28, 1926. The trial court entered a judgment for interest on $54,554 from February 16, 1926, to October 28, 1926, in the sum of $1909.24, but it refused to allow interest on that sum. The city of Chicago appealed to the Appellate Court. That court held that whatever claim for interest plaintiff had was barred by the Statute of Limitations. The judgment was reversed and the cause is here on leave to appeal.

Appellant's contentions are that interest on a judgment is a part of it; that a judgment cannot be satisfied unless the face of the judgment, interests and costs are paid; that this proceeding is a cause of action based upon a judgment, and that such an action is barred only by the twenty-years' Statute of Limitations, Ill.Rev.Stat.1937, c. 83, § 26. On the other hand, appellee contends that appellant's claim is solely for interest; that it is purely of statutory origin, and is not a part of the judgment, and comes within the purivew of ‘all civil actions not otherwise provided for’ and is barred by the five-years' limitation in section 15 of the Statute of Limitations, Ill.Rev.Stat.1937, c. 83, § 16.

The record conclusively shows the claim is for interest, and being for interest, only, she could in no event recover interest on interest. The trial court and the Appellate Court correctly so held. If she is entitled to recover interest at all, it is only upon $54,554 from the date the judgment was entered to the date it was paid. Blaine v. City of Chicago, 366 Ill. 341, 8 N.E.2d 939.

In determining whether interest on a judgment is a part of it, the character of a judgment and the authority for imposing interest are important factors to be considered. A judgment is the sentence of the law pronounced by the court upon the matter contained in the record. 3 Blackstone's Com. 395. It is the law's last word in a judicial controversy and may be defined as the final consideration and determination of a court upon matters submitted to it in an action or proceeding. 15 R.C.L., Judgments, 569. A judgment is the judicial act of the court. Dorman v. Usbe Building & Loan Ass'n, 115 N.J.L. 337, 180 A. 413. On the other hand, the right to interest apart from contract, such as interest on a judgment, does not emanate from the controversy, or from the judgment, or from anything of a judicial nature. At common law, interest could be recovered in no case except where there was an express agreement therefor. Because of losses occasioned by delay in the payment of final judgments the legislature provided a remedy for such losses by way of interest thereon as fair compensation for such delays. The remedy is found in section 3 of the Interest act. The recovery of interest in this State, not contracted for, finds its only authority in the statute. It is purely statutory. Blaine v. City of Chicago, supra; Feldman v. City of Chicago, 36o Ill. 247, 2 N.E.2d 102;Turk v. City of Chicago, 352 Ill. 171, 185 N.E. 258.

Section 3 of the Interest act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1937, chap. 74, § 3), provides: ‘Judgments recovered before any court or magistrate shall draw interest at the rate of five (5) per centum per annum from the date of the same until satisfied. When judgments is entered upon any award, report or verdict, interest shall be computed at the rate aforesaid, from the time when made or rendered to the time of rendering judgment upon the same, and made a part of the judgment.’ It is to be observed that two classes of interest are contemplated by the statute,-i. e., that which accrues prior to judgment, and interest which accrues after the judgment is entered. Interest accruing before judgment is expressly made a part of the judgment, but no such provision is made as to interest accruing on a judgment after it is entered. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that the expression of one thing or one mode of action in a statute excludes other things or modes though not expressly prohibited. People v. Wiersema State Bank, 361 Ill. 75, 197 N.E. 537, 101 A.L.R. 501;Sammis v. Clark, 13 Ill. 544. That rule is applicable here, and excludes interest on a judgment as a part thereof. Furthermore, it is obvious that at the time the judgment was entered there was no interest due. Hence, the subsequently accruing interest, recoverable by virtue of the statute, could not be a part of the judgment when it was entered. How the interest could afterward modify the judgment by increasing it is amount is not suggested, and no logical interpretation of the law can reach any such result. A judgment stands in amount as it is entered, and the only way in which it may be modified is by a direct proceeding for that purpose. Interest on a judgment is to be distinguished from costs in a proceeding, for which judgment is entered as a part of the principal judgment in the cause. The conclusion is inescapable that interest on a judgment is not a part of it. It is further to be noticed that,...