Blalock v. United States

Decision Date07 August 1957
Docket NumberNo. 7435.,7435.
Citation247 F.2d 615
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
PartiesAlva Eugene BLALOCK, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

Hayden C. Covington, Brooklyn, N. Y. (Richard M. Welling, Charlotte, N. C., on brief), for appellant.

J. M. Baley, Jr., U. S. Atty., Marshall, N. C. (Hugh E. Monteith, Asst. U. S. Atty., Sylva, N. C., on brief), for appellee.

Before SOPER, SOBELOFF, and HAYNSWORTH, Circuit Judges.

SOBELOFF, Circuit Judge.

This appeal is from a conviction under an indictment charging a violation of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix,1 by refusing to submit to induction into the armed forces for non-combatant duty. At his trial, the defendant, Alva Eugene Blalock, challenged the appeal board's denial of his claim for a I-O conscientious objector classification, which would have immunized him from military service, both combatant and non-combatant. He also asserted that certain procedural rights were denied him in the course of the administrative process. These contentions are repeated here.

The appellant, a Jehovah's Witness, claims that, as a member of that sect and by personal conviction, he is conscientiously opposed to war and service in the armed forces. Since his original registration with Local Board No. 85 in Albemarle, North Carolina, in March, 1951, his relationship with the Selective Service System has been extensive. He has had a number of personal appearances before the local board, several appeals to the appeal board, and has undergone at least two F.B.I. investigations and hearings before Justice Department examiners.

In answering the questionnaire submitted by the local board, the appellant claimed exemption as an ordained minister of Jehovah's Witnesses and stated his objections to military service on grounds of conscience. He thereafter filed a special conscientious objector form and asserted, in addition, that he could not accept any appointment to do civilian work in the national interest, as is required by law of those exempted as conscientious objectors. He insisted that to obey this requirement would interfere with his service to God.

The board nevertheless classified him I-A. A subsequent personal appearance in February, 1952, however, resulted in a III-A classification, since his mother, sister, and two brothers were dependent upon him for support.

The following year, in May, 1953, Blalock was reclassified I-A by the local board.2 Upon appeal to the appeal board, it made a preliminary determination that he was not entitled to a I-O conscientious objector claim, and in accordance with the required procedure, his file was forwarded to the Department of Justice for investigation, hearing, and recommendation. Section 6(j), 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, § 456(j), 65 Stat. 83. As a result of these procedures, the Department recommended that the I-O classification be granted. The résumé of evidence, forwarded to the appeal board by the Department, pointed out favorable evidence gleaned from the investigation. The hearing examiner had been impressed with Blalock's demeanor, and concluded that he was devoutly religious and sincere in his opposition to war. With this recommendation before it, the appeal board granted the appellant a I-O classification, which exempted him from all military duty, both combatant and non-combatant. However, he did thereby become subject to assignment to civilian work in the national interest. Sec. 6(j).

When, later, Blalock refused to select between several alternatives of civilian work offered him, a meeting was called at which Colonel Mathis, a State Selective Service Officer, and the local board sought to reach an agreement with Blalock. At this interview, Mathis asked the registrant if he would work in a defense plant, and Blalock's reply was that he would, because the use made of the products "isn't my responsibility" and "is no concern of mine." In view of this admission, coupled with a declared intention not to perform any civilian work in the national interest if so ordered by the board, the State Director reopened the case. The local board reclassified him I-A, and again the case was appealed and referred by the appeal board to the Department of Justice for investigation, hearing, and recommendation.

At the departmental hearing which followed, the examiner asked a question similar to that propounded at the earlier draft board interview pertaining to Blalock's willingness to work in a defense plant. He again answered that his religious beliefs would not prevent him from engaging in such work if it were necessary. Although the hearing officer recommended that the I-O claim be sustained, the Special Assistant to the Attorney General, on review of the file, recommended denial of the claim in view of the registrant's statement that he would work in a defense plant. The recommendation, however, suggested that he be given a I-AO classification, which would leave him eligible for military service but only in a non-combatant capacity.

Afforded an opportunity to reply to the Department's recommendation, Blalock altered his position regarding defense work, stating that he would not engage in such work if the materials were to be used in war. Thereupon, the appeal board, as the Department had suggested, classified appellant I-AO, rendering him subject to non-combatant military service. On being ordered to report, he reported, but refused to submit to induction; and this criminal proceeding followed.

On at least several occasions during his draft board history, appellant made known his opposition to the political, material wars of men and nations, although he stated that he would kill in defense of himself and his brothers as authorized by God. In voicing this opposition, to the administrative officials before whom he appeared, he sought to persuade them that he could not, consistently with his religious views, maintain any position but a neutral one regarding earthly conflicts.

The success or failure of such attempted persuasions must, of course, in the last analysis, rest upon the board's judgment of the registrant's sincerity. Human experience has devised no precise gauge for appraising a subjective belief lodged in the mind and heart of the person himself and never truly known by others. Sincerity can be judged only from the individual's demeanor, the consistency of his statements, appraisals by persons to whom he is known, and other immeasurable factors which may be deemed significant by some men but not by others.

Not only could the appeal board consider the decision of the local board which had had an opportunity to view the registrant's demeanor, but it could determine and evaluate any incongruity in his condemnation of war on the one hand, and his willingness, on the other, to do defense work with avowed indifference to the destructive use of the products of his labor. Had Blalock actually worked in a defense plant, that circumstance would have been a pertinent one in evaluating the conscientiousness of his objection to non-combatant duty. Jones v. United States, 4 Cir., 241 F.2d 704. His willingness to do so, though he has not in fact done so, is also pertinent. See Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 75 S.Ct. 392, 99 L.Ed. 428; See, also, Meredith v. United States, 4 Cir., 247 F.2d 622. The Board could consider, in addition, that his attitude regarding defense work was later modified when the adverse effect of his admission became known to him.

The District Judge also pointed out certain variations in the several versions offered by the defendant of his medical history, which could have been interpreted by the fact finders as reflecting on his over all sincerity.

In a prosecution for refusing to submit to induction, the scope of judicial inquiry into the administrative proceedings leading to the defendant's classification is very limited. The range of review is the narrowest known to the law. Campbell v. United States, 4 Cir., 221 F.2d 454. The "clearly erroneous" rule applied in equity appeals has no place here, nor even the "substantial evidence" rule of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 1009. Congress gave the courts no general authority of revision over draft board proceedings, and we have authority to reverse only if there is a denial of basic procedural fairness or if the conclusion of the board is without any basis in fact. Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 75 S.Ct. 392, 99 L.Ed. 428; Goff v. U. S., 4 Cir., 135 F.2d 610.

We cannot say that upon the record before the board there was no factual basis for the classification.

II

A ground for reversal, procedural in character, is also pressed. It relates to the production of the F.B.I. report on its investigation of the defendant.

As a special protection for conscientious objectors, it is, as we have seen, required by the Universal Military Training and Service Act that whenever an appeal is taken from a local board's rejection of a claim for exemption based on conscientious objection, before acting upon the appeal the board must first refer the case to the Department of Justice for investigation, hearing, and recommendation. It becomes necessary now to consider this procedure more closely.

The agency that conducts the investigation for the Department is its Federal Bureau of Investigation. After a hearing, which is conducted, not by the F.B. I., but by a hearing officer, there follows a recommendation by still another department officer specially designated. The appeal board is required to consider, but it is not bound by, the recommendation. In accordance with the prevailing practice, the defendant was furnished a résumé of the investigation. It revealed nothing new that was damaging or in dispute. He was, however, denied the basic F.B.I. records. The appeal board also received a résumé, but not the F.B.I. records themselves, so that nothing was communicated...

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