Blameuser v. Andrews
Decision Date | 30 July 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 78-C-739.,78-C-739. |
Citation | 473 F. Supp. 767 |
Parties | William BLAMEUSER, Plaintiff, v. Col. Donald ANDREWS, U. S. Army, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin |
William Blameuser, pro se.
Joan F. Kessler, U. S. Atty. by Lawrence O. Anderson, Asst. U. S. Atty., Milwaukee, Wis., for defendant.
DECISION AND ORDER
The issue raised by the instant case is whether the government may constitutionally deny the plaintiff admission as a cadet in the Advanced Army Reserve Officer's Training Corps (ROTC) program at least in part because he is a self-proclaimed Nazi. For the reasons which follow, I believe it can. Therefore, the defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted.
The plaintiff, William Blameuser, entered St. Norbert College in De Pere, Wisconsin, on September 2, 1976. During his first two academic years at the college he was enrolled in the Army basic ROTC course. On July 21, 1978, Mr. Blameuser's application for enrollment in the advanced ROTC program was denied. It is this action which the plaintiff challenges in the instant suit. In a letter to the plaintiff dated October 24, 1978, the defendant, Colonel Donald Andrews, who was in charge of the ROTC program at St. Norbert, stated the reasons for the denial of the plaintiff's application. Among the reasons given was the fact that the plaintiff was a self-proclaimed Nazi:
Mr. Blameuser, proceeding pro se, filed the instant action on November 20, 1978, alleging that the defendant's action violated the plaintiff's First Amendment rights. The case is presently before me on the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of a justiciable controversy or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.
The government's motion to dismiss for lack of a justiciable controversy is grounded on its contention that a decision on whether to allow an individual to participate in a military officer training program is a discretionary one, beyond the purview of judicial review. While the case law supports the conclusion that decisions made by the military regarding the composition of its personnel are entitled to judicial deference, I believe that it does not follow that such decisions are completely beyond the scope of judicial review.
It is well established that a federal court lacks jurisdiction to review the discretionary judgments of military officers acting within the scope of their authority. See e. g., Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 73 S.Ct. 534, 97 L.Ed. 842 (1953), Anderson v. Laird, 437 F.2d 912 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 865, 92 S.Ct. 68, 30 L.Ed.2d 109 (1971). However, this rule of judicial non-interference in military affairs is not absolute. The courts can review military orders which allegedly violate the Constitution, O'Mara v. Zabrowski, 447 F.2d 1085 (3rd Cir. 1971); acts of Congress, Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 78 S.Ct. 433, 2 L.Ed.2d 503 (1958); or the military's own regulations, Bluth v. Laird, 435 F.2d 1065 (4th Cir. 1970).
In the case at bar, Mr. Blameuser alleges that the defendant's refusal to admit him into the advanced ROTC program violated his First Amendment rights. Moreover, the government has admitted that the defendant's decision was, at least in part, based on the defendant's personal beliefs. Since the plaintiff has alleged the violation of an important constitutional right, I believe the instant controversy is justiciable despite the deference normally granted to military decisions regarding personnel.
Having determined that the instant controversy is justiciable, I must now pass on the defendant's contention that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In weighing the plaintiff's First Amendment claim, I am guided by the Supreme Court's decision in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974). In that case, the Court upheld the constitutionality of several articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice which were being challenged on grounds of vagueness, stating:
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Blameuser v. Andrews
...considering the plaintiff's beliefs and that those beliefs warranted denying the plaintiff admission to the program. Blameuser v. Andrews, 473 F.Supp. 767 (E.D.Wis. 1979). The facts are to a large extent uncontested. The objective of the Army's senior ROTC program is to attract and prepare ......
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St. Clair v. Secretary of Navy, 96-4087.
...military orders which allegedly violate the Constitution, acts of Congress, or the military's own regulations." Blameuser v. Andrews, 473 F.Supp. 767, 768 (E.D.Wis.1979), aff'd, 630 F.2d 538 (7th Cir.1980) (internal citations omitted). St. Clair alleges violations of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 8......