Blanchard v. Newton

Decision Date07 June 2012
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 11–723–FJP–SCR.
Citation865 F.Supp.2d 709
PartiesWayne K. BLANCHARD v. Cara NEWTON, in her official capacity as Executive Director of the Office of Community Development, An Agency of the Division of Administration, State of Louisiana, and Patrick Forbes, in his official capacity as Interim Director of the Disaster Recovery Unit of the Office of Community Development, an Agency of the Division of Administration, State of Louisiana.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Kevin O'Bryon, O'Bryon & Schnabel, PLC, New Orleans, LA, for Wayne K. Blanchard.

Toni J. Ellington, Suzanne Marie Risey, Frilot, LLC, Allen J. Krouse, III, Frilot, Partridge, Kohnke & Clements, LC, New Orleans, LA, for Cara Newton, in her official capacity as Executive Director of the Office of Community Development, An Agency of the Division of Administration, State of Louisiana, and Patrick Forbes, in his official capacity as Interim Director of the Disaster Recovery Unit of the Office of Community Development, an Agency of the Division of Administration, State of Louisiana.

RULING

FRANK J. POLOZOLA, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss 1 filed by the defendants Carol Newton (incorrectly named “Cara”), in her official capacity as the Executive Director of the Office of Community Development (“OCD”), and Patrick Forbes in his official capacity as Executive Director of the Disaster Recovery Unit of the OCD, an Agency of the Division of Administration, State of Louisiana. Plaintiff has filed an opposition to the motion.2 For the reasons which follow, defendants' motion is granted.

I. Factual Background

Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, federal funds were appropriated to the State of Louisiana by the federal government for the purpose of disaster recovery and compensation for those property owners affected by the storms. The Road Home Program was developed by the State of Louisiana and approved by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) as a plan for disbursement of Community Development Block Grant (“CDBG”) funds to property owners. The Road Home Program was developed by the Louisiana Recovery Authority and its successor, Office of Community Development (“OCD”), both offices in the Division of Administration for the State of Louisiana.

In accordance with federal statute, the state created the Louisiana Recovery Authority (“LRA”) to oversee the disbursement of federal funds.3 The state authorized the OCD within the Division to administer The Road Home Program.4 There is no dispute that the OCD is a state agency.

Plaintiff in this matter submitted a Road Home application for property located at 7900 Marquis Street in New Orleans, Louisiana. The OCD informed plaintiff by letter dated January 28, 2010, that he was ineligible because he failed to meet the occupancy requirements as set forth by the program since the OCD had discovered that plaintiff was an occupant of another residence located at 758 Delchaise Street at the time of the storm. Plaintiff attempted to appeal this decision; however, the OCD advised plaintiff through correspondence that the Road Home Program policies are not subject to appeals.

Plaintiff argues he did occupy the residence at 7900 Marquis Street as his primary residence during Hurricane Katrina, but claims he used the other address for mail delivery because of problems with mail delivery to the Marquis Street address. However, defendants contend the documents supplied to them did not establish occupancy under Road Home policies.

Plaintiff filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against the individual defendants, claiming he has been denied property without due process, denied equal protection under the 14th Amendment, and also brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants have filed this motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the State's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, discretionary immunity under Louisiana law, and alternatively, failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

The Court now turns to a discussion of the law applicable to the facts of this case.

II. Law and AnalysisA. Motion to Dismiss

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court “has the power to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any one of three separate bases: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.” 5 The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction.6

Plaintiff has asserted federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Defendants contend the funding of the Road Home Program does not supply the Court with federal question jurisdiction, and they are entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.

1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment prohibits an individual from suing a state in federal court, “unless the state consents to suit or Congress has clearly and validly abrogated the state's sovereign immunity.” 7 In addition to protecting states from suits brought by citizens of other states, it is well-established that the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from “entertain[ing] a suit brought by a citizen against his own state.” 8 Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to state law claims brought under pendent jurisdiction.9 Finally, “a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to any state agency or entity deemed an alter ego or arm of the state.” 10

Plaintiff contends he has not sued the State of Louisiana or a state agency but rather the individual officers of the state. He further argues he does not seek recovery from the state or state funds, but rather prospective injunctive or declaratory relief “designed to remedy an ongoing violation of federal law.” 11

The Court finds guidance in the court's decision in Stroebel v. Rainwater.12 In Stroebel, the purchaser of a home that had sustained damage from the hurricane brought suit against the executive director of the Louisiana Recovery Authority, challenging the amount of the grant issued by the Authority, and alleging violation of the Fair Housing Act, the Housing Community Development Act, and civil rights violations. Specifically, Stroebel sued Patrick Rainwater, in his official capacity as the Executive Director of the LRA. The defendant moved to dismiss under the Eleventh Amendment.

Rainwater argued that the Eleventh Amendment barred Stroebel's claims against him, since he was seeking retroactive monetary relief of what he claims he was owed by the Road Home Program. Rainwater further argued that since the development and implementation of the Road Home compensation grant formula and the administration of the Road Home grant funds are the responsibility of the LRA, the State (through the LRA) was the real party in interest in the suit. Rainwater contended that the effect of a judgment in Stroebel's favor would be to compel the state government to act and would significantly interfere with Louisiana's administration of its funds.13

Stroebel claimed Rainwater was not entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment because he was sued in his official capacity, and because he alleged that Rainwater acted outside the scope of his authority, or in such an arbitrary manner as to abuse the powers of his office in violation of Stroebel's civil rights. Stroebel also argued that the court did have authority to review the Road Home Program's award, stating that Louisiana state court decisions to the contrary were “simply wrong.” 14

The court noted that, [p]ursuant to the seminal case of Ex Parte Young and its progeny, an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity exists when suit is brought against a state officer, in his official capacity, seeking prospective relief to enjoin an ongoing violation of federal law.” 15 The court continued: “It is well-settled that ‘the doctrine of Ex Parte Young is of no aid to a plaintiff seeking damages from the public treasury.’ 16 Furthermore, [r]elief that in essence serves to compensate a party injured in the past by an action of a state official in his official capacity that was illegal under federal law is barred even when the state official is named as the defendant.’ 17 This is true even if the relief sought is equivalent to an award of damages for a past violation of federal law although set forth as something else; thus, courts will consider the substance rather than the form of the relief sought in determining whether the Ex Parte Young exception applies.” 18

The Stroebel court further noted:

It is additionally well-settled that [t]he Eleventh Amendment bars a suit against state officials when the state is the real, substantial party in interest.’ 19 This determination is not to be made ‘by the mere names of the titular parties but by the essential nature and effect of the proceeding.’ 20 “The general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.” 21 This occurs, for example, “if ‘the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration,’ or if the effect of the judgment would be ‘to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.’ 22

The court found that, “although Stroebel's complaint styles the relief sought as prospective declaratory and injunctive relief, in actuality, Stroebel is merely seeking compensation for Road Home funds that he alleges were wrongfully withheld from him in the past.” 23 For this reason, the court held that “the effect of a judgment in favor of Stroebel would operate against the State of Louisiana through the Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA), i.e., the state agency responsible...

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