Blanchard v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.
Decision Date | 09 December 1975 |
Citation | 53 Cal.App.3d 590,126 Cal.Rptr. 187 |
Court | California Court of Appeals |
Parties | George M. BLANCHARD, Petitioner, v. The WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD of the State of California et al., Respondents. Civ. 15328. |
Petitioner (hereinafter 'Applicant') seeks review of an order of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (hereinafter 'Board') entitled 'Opinion and Order Granting Reconsideration and Decision after Reconsideration,' dated May 30, 1975, in case 69 POM 15410.
Applicant was employed as a corrections counselor by the Department of Corrections, State of California, from November 19, 1962, to May 26, 1969. During that period Applicant sustained compensable industrial injuries to his heart and circulatory system culminating in an acute myocardial infarction on May 26, 1969. On July 21, 1970, Applicant was awarded permanent disability benefits based on a disability rating of 30 1/2 percent. He was also awarded further medical treatment for the heart and circulatory injuries.
On May 13, 1974, approximately two weeks prior to the expiration of five years from the last date of his previous injury, Applicant filed a petition entitled 'PETITION TO REOPEN FOR INCREASED DISABILITY BENEFITS.' The petition reads in pertinent part as follows:
'. . . applicant herein, in accordance with the provisions of Labor Code Sections 5804 (sic, 5803) and 5804 and McCoy v. W.C.A.B., 37 C.C.C. 98, petitions for increased disability benefits, and in support thereof alleges:
No medical reports or other evidence of increased disability were appended to the petition or filed until several months after expiration of the five-year period (see Labor Code, §§ 5410, 1 5803, 2 5804 3).
On September 13, 1974, defendants filed a petition to dismiss Applicant's petition to reopen on grounds that Applicant had failed to submit any evidence in support of his petition to reopen within five years from the date of injury (May 26, 1969) and for lack of prosecution.
On October 3, 1974, Applicant filed his Declaration of Readiness to Proceed, and on January 24, 1975, hearing was held at which several medical reports were introduced into evidence including a report dated September 26, 1974, from Dr. John F. Miley and a report dated January 2, 1975, from Dr. James H. Rankin. No useful purpose would be served in setting forth these reports at length. Suffice it to say they constitute ample evidence that, subsequent to his heart attack, Applicant suffered a moderately depressive reaction with a large anxiety component and that this additional disability was directly related to his work as a correctional officer and his heart condition.
On March 13, 1975, the trial judge issued an order granting Applicant's petition to reopen and awarding Applicant further medical treatment to cure or relieve from the additional injury to his psyche, which disability was determined to be not yet permanent. Applicant was also awarded medical-legal costs of $824.55.
On April 2, 1975, defendants filed a timely petition for reconsideration. On May 30, 1975, the Board, by a two-to-one majority, issued its Opinion and Order Granting Reconsideration and Decision after Reconsideration finding that Applicant did not show good cause for reopening under either Labor Code, section 5803 or 5410, and that Applicant's petition to reopen was fatally defective because it failed to set forth in detail the facts relied upon to establish good cause for reopening under Labor Code, section 5803 (Rules of Practice and Procedure, 8 Cal.Admin.Code, § 10454 4) or to set forth the facts relied upon to establish new and further disability under Labor Code, section 5410 (Rules of Practice and Procedure, 8 Cal.Admin.Code, § 10458 5).
,2] Without question, Applicant's petition to reopen failed to specify the facts relied on and was therefore technically insufficient under sections 10454 and 10458 of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure. (See fns. 4 and 5, Ante.) The question remains whether a technically deficient petition to reopen filed within five years of the date of injury preserves the jurisdiction of the Board to receive evidence in support of the deficient petition and to reopen the case after the five-year period has elapsed. We hold it does.
3] In the first place, although the petition to reopen failed to specify the facts relied on, it could not have misled defendants. It was entitled 'PETITION TO REOPEN FOR INCREASED DISABILITY BENEFITS' and indicated it was based on Labor Code, sections 5803 and 5804 and McCoy v. W.C.A.B., 37 Cal.Comp.Cases 98, an increased disability case involving a subsequently developed psychiatric disability. Informality in pleading characterizes workers' compensation proceedings. (Bland v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 3 Cal.3d 324, 330, 90 Cal.Rptr. 431, 475 P.2d 663 and authorities there cited.) When a worker's application or petition is insufficient no demurrer thereto is permitted; if a party is surprised or otherwise disadvantaged by the insufficiency of a pleading, the remedy is to grant that party a reasonable continuance to permit him adequately to prepare to present his case or defense. (Rules of Practice and Procedure, 8 Cal.Admin.Code, § 10490.)
The Board is, of course, authorized to adopt reasonable and proper rules of practice and procedure. (Lab.Code, § 5307(a).) (Beaida . Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 263 Cal.App.2d 204, 210, 69 Cal.Rptr. 516, 520.)
"Limitations provisions in the workmen's compensation law must be liberally construed in favor of the employee unless otherwise compelled by the language of the statute, and such enactments should not be interpreted in a manner which will result in' a loss of compensation. (Citations omitted.)' (Bland v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 330--331, 90 Cal.Rptr. at p. 435, 475 P.2d at p. 667 (quoting from Fruehauf Corp. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 68 Cal.2d 569, 577, 68 Cal.Rptr. 164, 440 P.2d 236); accord: Beaida v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., supra, 263 Cal.App.2d at p. 209, 69 Cal.Rptr. 516.)
'4] The statute of limitations will not bar amendment of an application where the original application was timely and the amendment does not present a different legal theory or set of facts constituting a separate cause of action.' (1 Hanna, California Law of Employee Injuries and Workmen's Compensation (2d ed.) § 5.01(2)(e).) In...
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