Blanck v. Kimland Realty Co.

• Decision Date: 08 January 1937
• Citation: 122 Conn. 317,189 A. 176
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: BLANCK v. KIMLAND REALTY CO.

189 A. 176

122 Conn. 317

BLANCK v. KIMLAND REALTY CO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

January 8, 1937

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, New Haven County; Walter M Pickett, Judge.

Summary process action by Joseph Blanck against the Kimland Realty Company. From a judgment of a justice of the peace in favor of plaintiff, a writ of error was brought to the Court of Common Pleas and tried to the court, judgment was rendered for defendant in error, and plaintiff in error appeals.

Error and judgment directed for plaintiff in error.

William J. McKenna and Anthony A. E. De Lucia, both of New Haven, for appellant.

Benjamin F. Goldman, of New Haven, for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, BANKS, AVERY, and BROWN, JJ.

BROWN Judge.

By a writing of May 14, 1935, the defendant, hereafter referred to as the defendant in error, leased to the plaintiff in error, hereafter referred to as the plaintiff, " for the balance of this year 1935," property in West Haven designated as Newt's Bingo Stand, where an amusement park concession had been operated. The plaintiff took possession and paid the rent for 1935, $100 on the signing of the agreement, and the final installment of $150 on August 5, 1935. The agreement contained the following provision: " It is also understood that Mr. Joseph Blanck has the privilege of renewing this agreement for the years 1936 and 1937 for the same rental." It is undisputed that the plaintiff continued in possession without any further payment of rent or communication with the defendant concerning the renewal of the lease, and on March 6, 1936, a summary process action was instituted. From the judgment for the plaintiff there (present defendant) to recover possession of the premises, the case was brought by writ of error to the court of common pleas, which found no error.

The vital question determinative of this appeal is whether or not the plaintiff's tenancy had terminated when the summary process was instituted. Since the provisions of the lease agreement that the term was for the balance of the year 1935 are clear and free from ambiguity, the concrete question to be determined is reduced to this, whether, under the renewal provision above quoted, the mere continuing possession of the plaintiff subsequent to December 31, 1935, was effective to extend the lease. It becomes important in this connection to conclude whether this provision constitutes a covenant for renewal or one for the extension of the lease.

This depends upon the intention of the parties to the instrument. Carrano v. Shoor, 118 Conn. 86, 93, 171 A. 17; Freiheit v. Broch, 98 Conn. 166, 169, 118 A. 828. " The question as to which exists may be controlled by the intention of the parties as manifested by the entire lease, or by their practical construction of their contract, whereby the privilege may be construed as one for an extension of the term, although it is called one for a renewal." Johnson v. Mary Oliver Candy Shops, Inc., 116 Conn. 86, 89, 163 A. 606, 607; Ackerman v. Loforese, 111 Conn. 700, 104, 151 A. 159. The present record, however, is devoid of any facts revealing a practical construction of the contract by the parties, so that we must resort solely to the agreement itself to determine the question.

Although the lease agreement under which the plaintiff entered into possession of the property expressly provides for his privilege of renewing the agreement, as shown by the words above quoted, this is not necessarily the effect to be given them. While the use of the word " renewal" imports the giving of a new lease like the old one, it does not necessarily indicate that it is used in this strict and technical sense, for the entire lease may determine otherwise. Whether such a clause is a covenant of renewal or an agreement for an extension depends, as we have said, upon the intention of the parties to the lease. Freiheit v. Broch, supra; City Coal Co. v. Marcus, 95 Conn. 454, 460, 111 A. 857; Maltby, Inc., v. Associated Realty Co., ...